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New and still newer wars
By
Stephen Blank
American officials are evidently
attempting to broker a deal between Iraqi Kurds and
Turkey. This deal would allow for the Turkish military
to occupy what is called a small part of Iraqi Kurdistan
when war begins.
Naturally enough, Iraq’s Kurds,
who have lived under the umbrella of US military power
for over a decade and who have thus gained a substantial
amount of autonomy, have misgivings about this idea,
even if their ties with Turkey have lately improved.
Nevertheless the real question is, what do Washington
and Ankara hope to gain from such a deal?
For
Washington, securing Turkey’s participation would
facilitate its plans for mounting an invasion of Iraq
from Turkey into Northern Iraq, thus accelerating its
military pressure on Saddam Hussein. Turkish support
would also ease, if not reduce, the already high degree
of suspicion of American motives prevalent throughout
the Islamic world. Allowing Turkey's army to occupy a
strip of as yet undefined land in Iraqi Kurdistan may
also be seen as an effort to prepare those Turkish
forces for post-conflict duty in an international peace
support operation (to use US military language) in Iraq
and ease any future burden on US forces there. This deal
would also energize the overall US-Turkish alliance and
reconfirm Turkey's position as one of America’s closest
allies in critical areas of the world, like the Middle
East. America’s bases in Turkey would also again be
fully usable as points of departure for American power
projection abroad.
These American interests are
relatively easy to determine, Turkey's gains are a more
complex affair. The new Turkish government has cleverly
walked several tightropes since coming into power late
last year. For example, it must keep the powerful
military happy, yet show Europe that it wants to join
the EU and make the necessary reforms. This already
implies a contradiction between a military which sees
any concessions to the idea of an independent Kurdish
state as anathema and a betrayal of Ataturk's legacy,
while Europe demands reforms that enhance Kurdish rights
within Turkey. Whereas the military resists anything
that might challenge Ataturk’s vision of a unitary
state; Turkey’s economy has long since broken the bonds
of his statist vision and must reform along Western
lines for Turkey to be a competitive player in the years
to come.
But all these maneuvers must also be
undertaken at a time of Turkey's greatest economic
crisis in years. This crisis, though, is not merely
economic, but is also a direct outgrowth of the
decomposition of its political system which remains
mired in multi-party corruption, insufficient democratic
control over the armed forces and an obsession with
Ataturkism that is readily apparent to any observant
visitor to Turkey. Indeed, Turkey arguably needs a new
Ataturk to shatter his now ossified system in order to
rescue the spirit of Ataturk and of Kemalism from his
successors' constricted viewpoints.
Some figures
also evidently hope that by occupying Iraqi Kurdistan
they will not only be able to deflect or suppress
Kurdish nationalism, including dreams of an independent
Kurdish state, but also that they will once again be
able to lay claim to the rich oil prizes of Mosul and
Kirkuk. Turkey tried this repeatedly in the 1920s, only
to be decisively rebuffed, but evidently the dream of
acquiring rich oil fields under Ankara's control still
haunts some offices within Ankara. Supposedly this, plus
a large aid and defense package from Washington, will
offer sufficient compensation for Turkey's risks during
and after the upcoming war with Iraq.
Thus the
new government has on the one hand publicly sought to
convince Saddam Hussein to leave Iraq, announced
publicly its reluctance to participate in a war, thereby
propitiating both indigenous Muslim and West European
sentiment, and privately admitted to Washington that it
could tolerate a reduced American footprint in Turkey in
return for "compensations". These compensations include
this occupation, the large aid package that includes
defense assistance, and perhaps a favorable response to
Ankara's claim to Mosul and Kirkuk. While Turkey
certainly could benefit from the economic package,
particularly if it comes with strings attached obliging
Ankara to return to International Monetary Fund
prescriptions that had started to work earlier; a new
Kurdish occupation and claims to Iraqi oil fields can
only bring a new conflict after the forthcoming Iraqi
war. Those claims are an invitation to war and political
crisis.
Can one imagine that the Kurds will sit
still for a Turkish occupation or that Iraq will? Is it
reasonable to assume that Iraq will accept Ankara's
claims on Mosul and Kirkuk? Likewise, it is not hard to
imagine the hue and cry from the EU about the violations
of human rights and the naked old-fashioned spheres of
influence deal that would have then been made over
Iraq's corpse. Whatever gains accrue to Ankara from
supporting Washington would probably be lost vis-a-vis a
post-Saddam Iraq, the Kurds, and the EU.
This
appears to be a rather short-sighted bargain by the
government, perhaps because it is still overly concerned
about the military's response to a war and the outcomes
of any liberation of Iraqi Kurdistan from Saddam
Hussein. But when one looks at the outlines of this
deal, especially as they relate to the Kurds and to oil,
its long term strategic potential for embroiling Turkey
yet again in a frustrating and debilitating war that
robs it of the ability to play a major role abroad
clearly outweighs those short term gains. Moreover, it
certainly is possible that another and less welcome
short term outcome would be the strengthening of the
military's position in Turkish politics and society that
would enhance its ability to block domestic and security
policy reforms that are absolutely essential if Turkey
is to enter Europe fully or become a truly important
international actor.
Turkey's actions throughout
this crisis, pleading reluctance and simultaneously
demanding payoffs are entirely understandable in view of
its delicate internal and international situations.
Neither is it surprising that it would try to exploit
prospective Iraqi weakness. That kind of action is
hardly news in world politics. So the problem with this
policy is not that it is cynical, but rather that it is
too greedy and hence too dangerous. On the eve of a new
war it promises to create the conditions that will spawn
new crises and conflicts, if not newer wars. Or to quote
Talleyrand, a statesman of a very old school, "It is
worse than a crime, it is a blunder."
Stephen Blank is an analyst of
international security affairs residing in Harrisburg,
PA.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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