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The Taliban of northern
Iraq
By Ian Urbina
For over a
year now the Bush administration has been committed to
demonstrating the existence of a bridge between al-Qaeda
and Saddam Hussein, and while it was this bridge that
would allow Washington to move from its war on terrorism
to a war on Iraq, finding support in hard evidence was
no easy endeavor.
As claims about the
much-vaunted meetings between Mohammed Atta and Iraqi
agents fell through under the weight of close scrutiny,
it seemed that Washington might finally abandon this
line of argument. Yet, with Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s recent presentation to the United Nations
Security Council, Washington went at it again. This
time, the bulk of the contention rested on Baghdad's
relations to a band of Taliban-style Kurdish Islamists
called Ansar al-Islam.
But once again, the new
and improved bridge of evidence is proving wobbly at
best, and its worth citing some of the reasons for
skepticism.
Though Islamism has long historical
roots in the area, Ansar al-Islam was officially created
on September 1, 2001. Taking control of a mountainous
enclave of villages near the town of Halabja, the group
resides not far from the Iranian border in the northeast
of the country. Estimated to have roughly 200 men, the
band of fighters have expressed their desire to impose
an Islamic state in the Kurdish territories of northern
Iraq. Their disdain for and armed conflict with secular
Kurdish parties in these parts is only slightly
surpassed by their fierce hatred for Saddam and his
years of anti-Kurdish (and secular) policies in the
area.
As a fundamentalist and Islamist group,
Ansar in all likelihood shares many of al-Qaeda’s
ideals. Some of Ansar’s followers probably fought in
Afghanistan with the Taliban. But establishing a
concrete and material connection, such as arms,
training, logistics or monies, between the group and
al-Qaeda has not occurred largely because there is no
independent access to Ansar-controlled areas. In fact,
there are also real concerns about the sources from
which Powell draws his information about the group.
The biggest problem is that much of the relevant
intelligence is drawn predominantly from individuals in
custody of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), one
of the main Iraqi Kurdish factions. But, since the
highly secular PUK is Ansar al-Islam’s sworn enemy,
having lost many of its men fighting the group, they
have their own agenda in the information they extract on
behalf of the US. But even if the PUK didn’t have a
gripe with Ansar al-Islam, the conditions in which any
of the region's detainees are providing intelligence is
highly questionable. As the Washington Post reported in
December, US officials have acknowledged that many of
the area detainees are being beaten and threatened with
torture by their local captors. In some cases these
individuals have been turned over to officials of
countries such as Syria, known to practice the most
severe torture.
An important part of Powell's
contention concerning an al-Qaeda/Saddam connection was
tied through the person of Abu Mousab al-Zarqawi, a
Jordanian and alleged al-Qaeda operative who last year
had a leg amputated in Baghdad after he was wounded in
the war in Afghanistan. During al-Zarqawi's two-month
stay in Baghdad, Powell claimed, two dozen "al-Qaeda
affiliates" established a cell in the city. Al-Zaqawi
subsequently disappeared. The Jordanian is also thought
to have provided weapons and money to the murderers of
US diplomat Laurence Foley in Jordan last October. But
aside from emphasizing al-Zarqawi’s al-Qaeda/Iraq
connections, Powell also showed the UN a satellite photo
of a camp al-Zarqawi supposedly set up in northeastern
Iraq to produce poison.
That al-Zarqawi is a
dubious character seems beyond doubt. That he was in
Baghdad is also firmly established. But that any of this
means that the Jordanian radical has created a chemical
weapons base in Iraq and/or established al-Qaeda ties to
Saddam is far from proven.
First, there is the
issue of the poison production facilities in Powell's
photos. After Powell's speech, a number of journalists
went immediately to investigate the destination in the
photo and they all reported finding no indication that
any such chemical production facility was or had ever
been there. Reporters were allowed to wander freely and
found only living quarters and a radio station.
The possibility of course remains that all signs
of prior chemical activities were removed. But even if
the site was a weapons site, that does not tell us about
Baghdad’s involvement. It's worth remembering that the
site referenced in Powell's photo is in the Kurdish zone
of northern Iraq, within the no-fly zone, and outside of
Saddam's control.
The dots are there, but the
evidence to connect them in any credible way is still
lacking. Many within the intelligence community have
raised this exact concern. For example, an unnamed
German intelligence sources cited by the Wall Street
Journal recently stated that there is no evidence that
either Ansar al-Islam or al-Zarqawi are linked to
Saddam. But if German sources are questionable because
of that country's leanings on the war, then look to US
sources. The Washington Post quotes unnamed US officials
arguing the same thing. Indeed, one told the Post that
Zarqawi may have no connection whatsoever to al-Qaeda.
Though Powell spoke of Saddam having "an agent at the
most senior levels of the radical organization" US
intelligence sources have since subsequently filled in
this picture too, explaining that Saddam’s alleged agent
might logically be spying on the group, not running it.
Interestingly enough, if there is a clear bridge
to be highlighted, it is between Ansar al-Islam and
Iran, not Iraq. To compensate for its weak foothold
locally, the group has shrewdly built its ties across
the border to Tehran, which has provided not only free
passage, but also significant amounts of light
artillery. The PUK also contends that Iran has provided
Ansar with aerial spotting of PUK positions and
artillery.
Though Iran is Shi'ite and Ansar is
predominantly Sunni, Iran has always seen Islamist
proxies in Kurdistan as a counterweight to the more
formidable PUK and KDP factions, both of which, if left
to their own devices, could stir up Iran's highly
repressed Kurdish population. And since some in
Washington would like to make Iran the next US target
after Iraq, Tehran is apt to see the US forces get
bogged down in messy cross-fighting.
If anything
is to be learned from Ansar al-Islam, it is as an
indicator of the dangerous and fractious scene in
northern Iraq. The tension which comes to play with this
group previews a real possibility for bloody infighting
- not to mention the chance of volatile involvement
(through well-armed proxies) from neighboring powers.
The US hopes to use the Iraqi Kurds to overthrow Saddam,
yet both the PUK and Ansar consist of Iraqi Kurds. Both
groups are well armed and each group despises the other.
Once and if their common enemy (Saddam) is removed, it
would not be surprising if they finally took the chance
to settle old scores, all the while with Iran discretely
in the mix on one side and the US on the other.
Ultimately in this scenario it would hardly
matter who is tied to al-Qaeda or not. The US will be
faced with the two unattractive options: pulling out
entirely, thereby tacitly opening the field to a
bloodbath, or getting mired in what could easily spiral
into a small civil war.
At that stage, the only
bridges Powell would be looking for would be the ones to
get the US out of Iraq, not in.
Ian
Urbina is an editor at the Middle East Report and
is based at the Middle East Research and Information
Project (MERIP), a foreign policy think tank.
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