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COMMENTARY
Saddam's Samson
option
By Ehsan Ahrari
Not
too many nations in the world understood from the outset
that the US objective regarding Iraq has always been to
bring about "regime change".
Everything else is
nothing but distraction, either purposeful or created
because of the unprecedented nature of such impending
action. Never before did the international community
feel so helpless about denying a dominant nation-state
the will to decide within its own domestic arena that
the government of another sovereign state should be
replaced because the ruling style of its head is so
odious.
Now the question is whether the world
should go along with such an action because the declared
purpose of Washington's impending invasion of Iraq is to
"democratize" it. Listening to neo-conservatives in and
around Washington, it is the indubitable right of the
United States to reorder the world in its own image,
just because it is an "exceptional power". Such a
curious rationale has few takers outside their ranks
even within the United States.
Yet this thinking
is being manifested in many government documents. Just
examine the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2001.
This is a congressionally mandated document, which
describes the US military strategy and relates it to
budgets and plans regarding force posture. This document
mentions talks about imposing "the will of the United
States and its coalition partners" by defeating any
adversaries. It goes on to note that "such a decisive
defeat could include changing the regime of an adversary
state or occupation of foreign territory until US
strategic objectives are met". Reading Bob Woodward's
book, Bush at War, it becomes clear that the US
president had regime change very much on his mind while
his military planners were busy working on a strategy to
dismantle the Taliban regime and kill and/or capture the
head of that government, Mullah Omar, and Osama bin
Laden.
However, Bush's intentions regarding
Saddam Hussein become public only slowly. Read carefully
his January 29, 2002, "axis of evil" speech, in which he
stated, "I will not stand by as peril grows closer and
closer". At that time, it was generally assumed that he
was referring to trans-national terrorism. However, his
"preemption" speech at West Point made it clear that he
was thinking about Iraq, even though he did not mention
that country by name. What made the linkage between the
preemption speech and Iraq obvious was the fact that
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, his deputy, Paul
Wolfowitz, and the president of the unofficial Defense
Policy Board, Richard Perle, were tirelessly making an
argument that Saddam Hussein, indeed, was part of
transnational terrorism - never mind the fact that even
the best US intelligence failed to establish such a
linkage - and should be toppled through military action.
The National Security Strategy document, issued
during September 2001, enshrined the preemption
doctrine. However, in an important speech at the UN on
September 12, 2002, Bush stressed that disarmament of
Iraq was his objective, not regime change. Two
contradictory conclusions may be drawn from that speech.
First, that he was, indeed, being ingenuous about his
administration's objective, and Secretary Colin Powell,
indeed, was succeeding in persuading him about adopting
a multilateral approach toward resolving the Iraq issue.
Second, Bush's emphasis on disarmament at the UN, as
opposed to regime change, was only a tactical maneuver
in order to gain support for the new UN Resolution 1441
from France and Russia - two visible opponents of regime
change based on unilateral US actions.
Now it
becomes clear that the US objective in Iraq was regime
change all along. As the juggernaut of US military
preparedness continues to move toward invading that
country, Saddam Hussein must be getting ready to face
what appears to him to be the ultimate and inevitable
outcome. He has exhausted all his options by cooperating
with the UN inspectors. There is not even an iota of
believability in Washington that he is not hiding
chemical and biological weapons, or has not made
significant strides in his aspirations to acquire
nuclear capability. His choices are: not cooperate with
the UN inspectors, and thereby ensure (if that is
possible, given the steady massing of the US military
manpower and materiel in his neighborhood) military
invasion; or continue to cooperate, but also get ready
to put up some sort of a last stand.
Bush must
be savoring the moment. He has the Iraqi dictator
exactly where he wants him. He is about to achieve what
his father did not. He is constantly insisting that the
burden of proof is squarely on Saddam's shoulders. The
UN chief weapons inspector, Hans Blix, has clearly
strengthened Bush's hand by stating on January 9, 2003,
that even though his inspectors have not found any
"smoking gun", Iraq's declaration about its weapons is
not "credible". From Bush's perspective, that is the
most credible way of making a case for the US invasion
of Iraq. However, in his February 14 report, the UN
chief inspector "tiptoed delicately along the tightrope,
condemning Iraq for breaching the rules on missiles, but
also criticizing evidence presented to the council last
week by Mr Powell".
The growing insignificance
of Arab states is underscored by the fact that two small
states, Qatar and Kuwait, are squarely on the US side,
helping the invasion of another Arab state. Crown Prince
Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia is speculating
about the unlikelihood of a war against Iraq. Egypt has
given up sending its interpretations to Washington about
what would happen to the Middle East in the aftermath of
the invasion. Also, there are reports that Arab leaders
are still seeking a peaceful solution, whereby Saddam
and his entourage of killers and thugs will go into
exile. That might not be a bad option for Bush, since he
can always insist soon thereafter that Saddam and his
"Killers Inc" should be tried in an international court
for crimes against humanity. Only Saddam knows whether
he would want to face that option, or face sure death by
making his "last stand" in Iraq within the next few
weeks or months.
Come to think of it, the
reported Arab quest for finding a suitable exile for
Saddam may be the best option from the US viewpoint.
That will be an ideal way of removing a dictator without
spilling any (or hardly any) blood. However, if one can
predict anything about Saddam, it is that he has
absolutely no interest in providing his chief enemy the
ideal way of removing him from power. The New York Times
of February 15, 2003, reported that Saddam has plans "to
blow up dams, destroy bridges and ignite its oil
fields".
A Pentagon spokesman in the same
dispatch reports that Saddam "may also deny food to
Iraqi civilians in the southern parts of the country to
try to create a crisis that would saddle advancing
allied forces with the responsibility of caring for
millions of desperate Iraqi civilians." However, that
might not be the end of his version of Armageddon.
Saddam's revenge very well could be his exercise of the
Samson option, whereby he would use whatever chemical
and/or biological weapons he has saved up for just such
a scenario.
One would only hope that such is not the
case. No one wants to hear Saddam's last words along the
following line: "You wanted to bring about regime change
by eliminating me. That you were able to accomplish, but
not without a price!"
Ehsan Ahrari,
PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent
strategic analyst.
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