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Hard choices for Iran's ayatollahs
By Ehsan Ahrari
A journalist
friend called from somewhere in the Middle East. His
question: what is the meaning of the increasing calls
from some clerics in Iran that Islam really belongs in
mosques, and that it has no business getting embroiled
in politics. But wait. That is the political version of
blasphemy in Iran, which calls itself an Islamic
republic.
In calling for the separation of
politics and religion, some Shi'ite clerics are once
again blazing a trail. They are way ahead of Sunni
ulama (religious scholars). One presumes that the
latter are watching and listening, and will be forced to
do some soul-searching of their own in this direction.
When the Islamic revolution in 1979 captured
power in Iran, the very edifice of Islamic thinking felt
a mixture of shock and jubilation. The late Ayatollah
Ruhollah Khomeini turned the doctrine of quietism on its
head. According to that doctrine, until the return of
the "Hidden Imam," the prevalence of a just order was
out of the question. In the ninth century, Imam Muhammad
al-Mahdi, who declared himself the 12th Shi'ite imam at
the age of seven, went into hiding. According to Shi'ite
theology, he is expected to reveal himself at a certain
time in the future and will guide humanity. It was the
duty of the Shi'ite ulama to indulge themselves
in silent protest against any unjust order.
Khomeini, through his incessant and virulent
criticism of Mohammad Reza Shah's tyrannical rule - for
which he was jailed and eventually forced into exile -
but especially through his spearheading of the Iranian
revolution, disagreed with the doctrine of quietism. It
can be argued that the creation of the Vilayat-e-Faqih -
ie, the rule of the clergy - under his leadership was an
attempt to create a just order in Iran. The religious
rationale for it is based on the tradition that gave the
ulama the authority to act as the deputies of the
Hidden Imam.
But for the past several years, the
Islamic Republic of Iran has degenerated into a
dictatorship of the hardline ayatollahs, who are as
recalcitrant about implementing political reforms as
Mohammad Reza Shah was during the last years of his
reign. The elected government of President Mohammad
Khatami has been fighting a losing battle to implement
reforms that were so overwhelmingly preferred by his
constituents during the general elections of 1997 and
2001.
Besides, in an increasingly globalizing
world, Iranians below the age of 30 - who formulate more
than two-thirds of that country's population - crave for
their homeland to enter into the 21st century with
gusto. Iran has large oil reserves to bankroll its
modernization, and a modest proportion of educated
population necessary to carry out the direly-needed
developmental programs. However, money from that
non-renewable precious resource is being misspent on
building that country's military muscle, an arsenal of
ballistic missiles, and even the acquisition of
capital-intensive nuclear know-how.
So the
hardest domestic choice for the ayatollahs is to bring
about necessary reforms that will persuade a majority of
the Iranians that the Islamic republic is capable of
adapting itself and surviving in an increasingly
globalizing world.
But there are other equally
formidable challenges that need urgent consideration by
the ayatollahs.
In the post-September 11 era,
active missile and nuclear programs anywhere in the
world will become a persistent source of conflict with
the United States, which has already developed a number
of aggressive strategic doctrines - such as the
preemption doctrine and even the notion of regime change
that is likely to be applied to Iraq - to ensure that if
the rationale underlying the extant nonproliferation
regimes fails to persuade the violating nations, then
the threats of aggressively carrying out counter
proliferation measures will stop nations in their
tracks.
The case of North Korea is being watched
by Iran with rapt attention. If, at some point in the
near future, the US, either through the use of coercive
diplomacy or counter proliferation strikes, brings about
the unraveling of North Korea's nuclear weapons program,
Iran will also be forced to reexamine the scope and pace
of its own nuclear and missile development programs. So,
the option for the ayatollahs will be to consider even
abandoning those programs. Even then, the aggressive
posture of the Bush administration toward Iran is not
likely to be altered.
The US has earnestly
decided to promote democracy in the Muslim Middle East
as a counterproposal to radical Islamism. Especially
once the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq emerges as a
supplicant state, the Bush administration is likely to
focus on unseating the ayatollahs of Iran. In fact,
George W Bush has already started his propaganda
campaign of directly addressing the Iranian youth with
the message that the US is really their friend and is
willing to work for the promotion of democracy in their
homeland.
The purpose of this propaganda
campaign is to strengthen the hands of those ayatollahs
who are arguing for the separation of politics and
religion. Washington is aware that the Iranian youth are
likely to garner their support around this seemingly
progressive group. However, given the gravity of this
issue, there is little hope that this group of
ayatollahs will be able to bring about a peaceful modus
vivendi capable of changing the very nature of the
Islamic republic. In the immediate future, the fly in
the ointment may turn out to be the US invasion and
occupation of Iraq. There is no way to predict how those
measures will be judged by Iranians, who know that the
Bush administration is not at all friendly toward their
country.
One possibility would be the sudden
change of heart on the part of the hardline ayatollahs
vis-a-vis political reform. If such a potential reality
gathers momentum, Iran is likely to emerge as more of an
open system than it presently is, but still not the kind
of democracy that the US envisions it to become. Even
then, the group of ayatollahs that are arguing for the
separation of politics and religion are not likely to
become an overwhelming force for change. Their
perspective is too radical to be given a large audience,
especially if the strategic environment of Iran remains
as tense as it has been for the past few months.
Another possibility would be increased tensions
between the hardliners and the youth, ending in a near
civil war situation. Under such happenstance, it will be
difficult for the US to intervene, except for offering
rhetorical support to the forces for change. The outcome
might be yet another cataclysmic political change, whose
modalities and direction will be hard to predict. One
thing is certain, however. The US will be able to
influence neither the nature of change nor its scope.
Change seems to be coming in Iran. The choices for the
ayatollahs are to remain in charge of it by managing and
spearheading it. If they continue to remain the chief
obstacle in the way of change, they are likely to be
swept aside, as was the regime of Mohammad Reza Shah.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
for information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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