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D
Day and after
By B Raman
The
United States-United Kingdom occupation of Iraq, which
could come about more rapidly than imagined, possibly
even within a week, could lead to three possible
consequences. In the immediate and short terms, there is
a strong possibility of anti-US demonstrations and
terrorist attacks. The short- and medium-term
consequence could be the weakening of the pro-US
governments in the West Asian region. This analysis will
confine itself to highlighting the likelihood of
demonstrations and terrorist reprisals.
The
demonstrations, with or without violence, in the Islamic
world, particularly in those countries which are
perceived by their population as allied with the US,
overtly or covertly - such as Pakistan, Egypt and some
of the Gulf countries - are unlikely to get out of
control. However, Pakistan and Egypt will need careful
watch. In Pakistan, which is the home of many anti-US
fundamentalist and jihadi forces, the demonstrations
could be of high intensity, but President General Pervez
Musharraf should be able to control them without major
difficulty if the corps commanders of the army remain
united behind him.
Since General Mohammad Yousef
Khan, the Vice Chief of the Army Staff, who is reputed
to be even closer to the US than Musharraf, returned
from his visit to the US last month, there have been
uncorroborated reports of strained personal relations
between the two for unknown reasons. Moreover, there
have recently been two intriguing developments in
Pakistan, the significance and implications of which are
not clear. The first is the tenacity with which the
fundamentalist forces are sticking to their demand that
Musharraf should renounce his second hat as the Chief of
the Army Staff (COAS) in addition to being the president
and that he should seek re-election as president
according to the procedure laid down in the
constitution. He got himself elected through a
referendum in April last for which there is no provision
in the constitution.
The second development
relates to two unusual press briefings held by the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) on the hunt for Osama
bin Laden and the allegations of links between al-Qaeda
and the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI), a fundamentalist party.
At the first briefing, which was for foreign journalists
posted in Pakistan, the briefers gave the impression
that the ISI believed that bin Laden was alive and
possibly in Pakistan and that he was a few hours away
from capture. They were also inclined to agree with the
widely-voiced suspicion of links between al-Qaeda and
the JEI.
At the second briefing, which was only
for Pakistani journalists and followed a few days later,
the briefers denied that bin Laden was in Pakistani
territory and took the position usually taken by
Musharraf that if alive, he was not in Pakistan. They
also said that while there were instances of individual
members of the JEI sheltering al-Qaeda elements, there
was no evidence that the JEI as an organization was
colluding with al-Qaeda.
Why these contradictory
briefings? Which briefing was held at whose instance? Is
there discordance at the top level of the military
leadership? Is someone in the army hierarchy instigating
the JEI to keep up its campaign for Musharraf's
resignation as the COAS and defending the JEI against
allegations of complicity with al-Qaeda? Is someone else
hitting back at the pro-JEI elements in the military
leadership by spreading stories of links between the JEI
and al-Qaeda? These questions have been the subject of
considerable speculation in Pakistan, but there are no
convincing answers.
The indications until now
are that, despite all this, practically all the Corps
Commanders remain united behind Musharraf and are
unlikely to do anything that might displease the US. So
long as he enjoys their support, Musharraf should be
able to deal with any large-scale public demonstrations.
The position in Egypt is not clear. President
Hosni Mubarak gives the impression of assured stability.
Recent years have seen the seeming decimation of the Al
Gama Al Islamiya, the jihadi organization that was
active in the 1990s with many attacks on Christians and
foreign tourists. There are no indications of any unrest
in the army over Mubarak's policies, which are widely
perceived by the people as pro-US and anti-Islam. But
no-one is certain of the extent of fundamentalist
penetration in the army and at what level. Large
civilian casualties in Iraq and reports/pictures of
damages to mosques and historic places associated with
Islam could inflame public opinion and make it difficult
for Mubarak to control the resulting public anger.
The recent arrest of Khalid Shaikh Mohammad,
reportedly No 3 in al-Qaeda, in Rawalpindi in Pakistan
has shaken the confidence of al-Qaeda not because this
was a great loss to them, but because it showed their
increasing vulnerability to action by the US.
Consequently, al-Qaeda and the International Islamic
Front (IIF) show signs of being more cautious and less
confident of the success of their operations. However,
their anti-US motivation and determination to make
Israel, the US and the rest of the West bleed remain as
strong as ever.
As President George W Bush said
in his telecast address of March 18, reprisal attacks by
terrorists are not inevitable, but possible.To thwart
such attacks, the US has already upgraded the level of
security inside the country to the second highest under
an operation reportedly code-named "OP Liberty Shield".
Reprisal attacks by terrorists against Israeli,
the US and other Western targets would most probably
come in the countries/areas where their capability for
attacks remains intact and where in their perception
physical security measures are not strong enough to
prevent attacks. Such countries/areas are graded as
follows in the descending order of probability, with the
reasons for grading indicated. These gradings are based
on circumstantial evidence and, hence, not error-proof:
Afghanistan and Pakistan: Despite the
recent arrests, the al-Qaeda and the IIF set-ups there
remain strong and well-motivated. There is considerable
collusion of the religious parties and serving and
retired elements from the military-intelligence
establishment with the terrorists.
India:
While al-Qaeda itself has until now had no presence in
India, four of the five Pakistani members of the IIF -
namely the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen, the
Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami (HUJI), the Lashkar-e-Toiba
and the Jaish-e-Mohammad - have an active presence,
mainly in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), but also in other
parts of India to a smaller extent. The recent increase
in terrorist incidents involving them in J&K and
other parts of India show that their capability for
action remains largely unimpaired despite the
counter-terrorism measures taken by Indian agencies.
West Asia: A number of al-Qaeda elements
have escaped from Balochistan in Pakistan to Yemen and
from there spread to other parts of West Asia. They have
considerable local support.
Africa: The
terrorist attacks in Tunisia and Kenya (Mombasa) last
year attested to the unimpaired capability of al-Qaeda
and pro-al-Qaeda elements in the region and the local
public support enjoyed by them.
Southeast
Asia: Despite the arrests made by the Indonesian
authorities after the Bali explosion of October last,
the capability of the Jemmah Islamiyah and other
organizations aligned with al-Qaeda and the IIF remains
strong. While there has been increased intelligence and
security cooperation among the countries of the region,
the terrorists still retain their capability for
surprise action.
Bangladesh: The HUJI, a
member of the IIF, has an active presence here. Some of
the al-Qaeda and IIF elements, who escaped from
Afghanistan, have taken shelter in Bangladesh territory
with the connivance of the local JEI and the HUJI.
Europe and the US: The strengthening of
security measures in this region post-September 11 has
disoriented and disorganized the sleeper cells there.
However, the failure of the local intelligence agencies
to identify and neutralize all the sleeper cells should
be a matter of continuing concern.
B
Raman is Additional Secretary (ret), Cabinet
Secretariat, Government of India, and presently
director, Institute For Topical Studies, Chennai; former
member of the National Security Advisory Board of the
Government of India. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com. He was also
head of the counter-terrorism division of the Research
& Analysis Wing, India's external intelligence
agency, from 1988 to August, 1994.
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