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US will ignore Turkey's gray wolves at
its peril
By K Gajendra Singh
Whatever the tactical differences between
Turkey's armed forces and its politicians, there is no
dispute over their ultimate strategic objectives.
Perhaps the time has come to redeem the unfulfilled
dream of Turkey's founder, Kemal Ataturk, who salvaged
the republic from the ashes of the Ottoman empire in
1923.
In 1919, when Ataturk and his comrades had
begun organizing a war of resistance for Turkey's
independence, then under the heels of World War I
victors led by Great Britain, their map of a sacred new
nation included, apart from the present-day boundaries
of Turkey, the Kurdish province of Mosul (with Kirkuk),
now in Iraq. Much of this area had been occupied by the
British forces after the ceasefire in 1918 and was later
joined with the former Ottoman Arab vilayets
(provinces) of Baghdad and Basra to create Iraq. But
this divided the Kurdish homelands. From Iraq too, the
sub-province of Kuwait under the Kayakayam of Basra was
detached to create a new emirate. Oil was then, as it is
now, the main driving force; not the freedom or welfare
of the people. The British colonial policy of
encouraging and then creating dissension and divisions
can be seen elsewhere, too, in the world - the Indian
sub-continent, Palestine, Cyprus and Ireland.
In
a fast-evolving strategic situation in the region, there
might be an opportunity to take back oil-rich Mosul and
Kirkuk, many Turks feel. Almost all political leaders,
including those from the ruling Justice and Development
Party (AKP), media writers and others have reiterated
the country's claims on Kirkuk. One of the reasons for
going into north Iraq is to protect their kinsmen the
Turkomans and their rights over the reserves of oil
around Kirkuk. This area is now under the control of
Saddam Hussein's Sunni Arabs, but it has been
traditionally claimed by the Kurds, who are in the
majority in the region. The other major reason cited, of
course, is Turkish fears of Kurds declaring an
independent state after the collapse of the Saddam
regime.
Turkey has paid dearly during the past
two decades because of almost autonomous Kurdish
enclaves in north Iraq, which have inspired and assisted
a fierce rebellion for independence among its own Kurds,
who form 25 percent of its population. During the
Iraq-Iran war in the 1980s and after the 1991 Gulf War,
the rebellion reached its heights. Since the beginning
of the Marxist PKK (Kurdish Workers Party)-inspired
rebellion in 1984, over 35,000 Turkish citizens have
been killed, including 5,000 soldiers. The struggle has
also shattered the social and economic fabric in the
south and east of Turkey. The problem is now under
control after a 1999 ceasefire was declared and the
capture of PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan. His death
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment last year and
the ban on the use of the Kurdish language for education
etc was eased.
Therefore, ignoring protests from
foes and friends alike, the Turkish armed forces have
regularly moved in and out of north Iraq to punish
Turkey's residual Kurdish rebels who shelter there. It
has regularly maintained some presence in Kurdish north
Iraq, which was stepped up even before Turkey's
parliament on March 21 authorized its troops to enter
Iraq, along with granting permission to the US to use
its air space to transport troops and hardware for a
possible second front in Kurdish north Iraq. Turkish
troops are now reported to be in north Iraq, estimated
to be between 2,000 to 5,000 strong. Ever since the US
administration took a decision to attack Iraq to bring
about a regime change in Baghdad, even without UN
sanction, serious differences and strains have emerged,
not only with the US's NATO allies in Europe, but also
with Turkey.
In order to conduct a successful
and short war to minimize world opprobrium, as well as
casualties and costs, the US asked for permission for
the use of Turkish bases in southeast Turkey to station
62,000 US troops in order to open a second front against
Iraq. The request was made in the US's usual insensitive
fashion of public "bribing" and arm-twisting. It was
irritating to hear daily broadcasts or claims that in
spite of a package of nearly US$30 billion in grants and
loans, Turkey was not taking the bait. Turkey has lost
tens of billions of dollars following the sanctions
imposed on Iraq since 1990. It is one of the major
reasons for the current economic malaise in Turkey.
The new and inexperienced government of the AKP,
especially its leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was
agreeable to provide bases to the US, but a massive
majority of Turks (now 94 percent) have remained opposed
to a war on Muslim Iraq. Iraq has been the friendliest
of Turkey's mostly inimical neighbors until very
recently. Many AKP deputies belong to southeast Turkey
with Kurdish and Arab blood relations across the borders
with Iraq and Syria.
Turkish president Ahmet
Sezer, a former head of the Constitutional Court, has
always insisted on international legitimacy before
waging a war on Iraq. Before the March 1 vote that
rejected the US request, he had impressed his view on
the speaker of parliament. It was a somewhat confused
situation. With tens of thousands of Turkish citizens
protesting passionately in front of parliament and
elsewhere, it further pressurized the newly- elected and
divided deputies. The AKP government had come into
almost absolute power unexpectedly after last November's
elections, but its leader Erdogan had still to be
elected in a by-election to become prime minister. This
led to more confusion, with diffused decision-making
centers. A day before the parliamentary vote, Turkey's
military-dominated, highest policymaking body, the
National Security Council, had dared not take a decision
to recommend a vote for the motion in the face of
overwhelming public opposition. After five hours of
discussion, it left the decision to the government and
parliament.
While Erdogan was enthusiastic, many
in the party were opposed to giving approval. The
government-supported motion, with the ruling party
boasting two-thirds of the deputies in a 550-member
parliament, was lost on March 1 when nearly 100 ruling
party members voted against it, along with the
opposition. The vote was lost by only 4 votes. This
stunned the US, stumping its war plans. It certainly
slowed down the preparations for the northern front. But
the US still hoped that once Erdogan was elected to
parliament and became prime minister, a second vote
would be held.
In an unusual move, the Turkish
armed forces' Chief of General Staff, General Hilmi
Ozkok, issued a statement on March 5 extending its
support to the government in "its option to open a
second front against Iraq in the event of war [which]
would shorten the conflict and minimize casualties". He
said, "Turkey's support of the US would also reduce the
harm to its economy." At the same time, Ozkok clarified
that it was the right of parliament to reject the
proposal to station US forces in Turkey, but "the
Turkish armed forces' view is the same as the
government's". He explained that the military had not
made public its views earlier to avoid the impression of
trying to influence the vote. "If we had expressed our
views, it would have amounted to pressurizing the
parliament for the approval of the resolution," he said.
"It wouldn't have been democratic."
Ozkok
pointed out that the Iraqi problem was a vital and
multilateral issue having political, social and legal
dimensions. Agreeing that 94 percent of the people said
"no" to war, he added. "We, as soldiers, know the
violence and dimensions of war and oppose the war most.
It is obvious that we will suffer major damage whatever
Turkey's move if a war starts. Turkey can face
political, economic, social damage and also damage to
its security." Ozkok went on to say, "It is a reality in
the current stage that Turkey does not have the
possibility and capability to prevent a war on its own.
I wish the war could be prevented. Unfortunately, our
choice is between the bad and worse, not between the
good and bad." He noted that Turkey would suffer losses
in any case, but if it joined the US, it would be
compensated. He believed that it would also eliminate
unexpected political developments in the north of Iraq.
Being a member of NATO since the early 1950s,
Turkey's armed forces have a very close relationship
with the US military brass. Turkey is heavily reliant on
the International Monetary Fund, controlled by the US,
to bail it out of its current acute economic problems
and ease the weight of massive external debt payments.
This was a failsafe position for Turkey. If the US
carried out a short and quick war successfully, Turkey
would play a major role in the reshaping of Iraq. If in
the unlikely event of a peaceful solution of the
problem, Turkey would have won enough brownie points
with the US.
But after taking over as prime
minister, Erdogan had a better appreciation of all the
pros and cons, including in his party. It might even
split. Sensing the mood of the country and in his party,
he continued to stall the second vote while the US
continued with its arm-twisting tactics, which further
annoyed the Turkish leadership, media and the public.
The US then said that it would change its war plans and
fly its troops and arms from Romanian and Bulgarian
bases and elsewhere to north Iraq. It said that it would
do without Turkish bases and withdrew its financial
package.
On the whole it was an unappetizing
show, as it has been between the US and the UK on the
one side and France and Germany on the other. Some US
ships were diverted to the Red Sea, but many still wait
at Turkish ports to unload military hardware for
transfer to the war front in southeast Turkey.
Statements and counter statements, bullying
tactics, threats and defiance between the US and Turkey
have left no less deep a chasm than between the Atlantic
alliance's Western members. There is a lot of confusion,
acrimony and misunderstanding aired publicly, even after
an agreement was passed in parliament for the US to use
its air space. Reportedly, the Turkish government had
even refused the US its permission for 24 hours unless
Washington agreed to let Ankara send its troops to
northern Iraq.
Secretary of State Colin Powell
had three phone conversations in 48 hours with Erdogan
to bring him round. The confusion continued when US
officials said that the US had not agreed to Turkish
demands, but senior Turkish officials said that they had
reached an agreement with Powell that allowed them to
add to the troops they already had in north Iraq. The
confusion, which even included reports of Turkish troop
movements into north Iraq, came amid high tension
between the two NATO allies and clenched teeth comments
by US officials (Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld did
show commendable restraint, though). Later on, it turned
out that fresh Turkish troops had not entered north Iraq
after all. But the ill will, rancor and suspicions
remain.
For the moment it appears that the US
will not be utilizing much of the airspace facility as
its plans have already been completely upset in north
Iraq. Incidentally, a few days before the terms were
agreed to, a US Special Forces team in north Iraq ran
into trouble with Iraqi forces and requested air
support. Turkey rejected the request. While the US
forces escaped unharmed, Turkey's refusal stunned
Pentagon and State Department officials. Verily,
US-Turkish relations have hit a nadir after years of
close cooperation.
Compare this to the 1950s,
when the Soviet Union, one of the victors of World War
II, had staked claims over two northeastern provinces of
Turkey and some control over the Bosphorus Straits. A
nervous Turkey, which had rightly kept out of the war,
as it did not want to be first devastated by the Nazis
and then liberated by the Soviets, went begging to the
US for protection. It sent a brigade to the Korean War
to fight until the last man. Since then, through thick
and thin, the allies have stayed together. Now, only a
bitter taste in the mouth.
There is a lesson for
all. A bully who can browbeat or thrash smaller kids,
sooner or later arouses hostility and resistance in the
whole community. Something like that coalesced between
the last week of February and the first week of March.
Turkey's democratic institutions, the region's largest
democratic republic, rejected a US troop presence on
Turkish soil as American ships waited off the Turkish
coast.
After five days, it appears that the war
is not turning out to be the cake walk that it was made
out to be to the US public. Iraqis are not welcoming and
hugging the US as "liberators". US soldiers have been
taken prisoner, and there have been battle fatalities,
apart from casualties of "friendly fire".
What
will happen in north Iraq? Without wider agreement and
more support from Turkey, with the second largest armed
forces in NATO, the war which the US and the UK have
embarked on could end up disastrously in north Iraq.
Even if all goes well, the US will still need Turkey as
a strategic partner in the now inflamed region. But the
US will have to pay a price. Otherwise, the "gray wolf"
will await and seize its opportunity.
Note.The ancestors of the Turks are
said to have been brought up among wolves. Hence, the
young, the brave and the bold call themselves gray
wolves - also a term favored by extreme
nationalists.
K Gajendra Singh,
Indian ambassador (retired), served as ambassador to
Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996. Prior to that, he
served terms as ambassador to Jordan, Romania and
Senegal. He is currently chairman of the Foundation for
Indo-Turkic Studies.
(©2003 Asia Times
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