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Iran feels the
squeeze
By Hooman Peimani
In
her parliamentary address of last Tuesday, British
International Development Secretary Claire Short
suggested that, to help Iraq recover after the end of
the war, Iran and Kuwait should accept smaller
reparations than those approved by the United Nations
Security Council. Iran has not yet received any amount
of the Security Council's approved reparations for the
damage that it endured during its war with Iraq in the
1980s. Given this situation, her suggestion, if it
becomes Security Council policy, will likely further
motivate Iran, a dissatisfied regional power, to
intervene in Iraq to ensure its interests that now seem
to be threatened.
Short justified her suggestion
by pointing to a European experience that helped Germany
turn into a dissatisfied power and pursue an
expansionist policy. Accordingly, "Iraq has high levels
of debt and significant reparation bills related to Iran
and Kuwait. That will all have to be restructured or
Iraq would be in the same position as Germany [was] at
the end of the First World War."
Short's
reference to the restructuring of Iraqi reparations
seemed to be more than a simple suggestion. Referring to
her recent talks with United Nations Secretary General
Kofi Annan on the postwar reconstruction of Iraq, she
added that the restructuring of the Iraqi debts and
reparation was an "important issue and we will have to
prepare for it".
The Security Council in 1990
declared Iraq as the instigator of the Iran-Iraq War
(1980-88) and approved reparations for Iran of US$100
billion. This was a fraction of Iran's war damage of 10
times that amount, but the Iranian government accepted
it as the best available option. However, Iran has not
received even a dollar from Iraq thanks to the Security
Council's lack of political will to demand Baghdad's
compliance with its resolution. Unlike Iran, Kuwait has
received about $16 billion in reparations through a
Security Council arrangement as part of the reparations
of $70 billion the Council approved in 1991 for Kuwait's
losses during its 1990 annexation by Iraq. Since 1991,
Kuwait has annually received $1.5 billion of Iraq's
oil-generated revenues.
Iran's isolation and the
opposition of the United States have been the two major
factors for this blatant discriminatory treatment by the
Security Council of its own similar resolutions
involving Iraq. No wonder if Iran is unhappy about its
treatment. The Council has clearly opted not to pressure
Baghdad to pay at least part of the reparations, a
feasible undertaking despite Iraq's severe financial
problems. Since the end of the first Gulf War in 1991,
the Council has fully controlled Iraq's oil exports and
its proceeds to ensure Baghdad's compliance with the
Security Council resolutions banning Iraq from rearming
itself.
As a likely prelude to a Security
Council policy, Short's suggestion is certainly bad news
not just for Iran but also for Kuwait. However, Iran
would likely be more affected given Tehran's estranged
ties with Washington. As a permanent Security Council
member aligned with another permanent member, the United
Kingdom, the US could influence any Council decision in
this regard against Iran and in favor of Kuwait. Given
Kuwait's role as a reliable US ally in the Persian Gulf
from whose land the Americans and the British are now
launching their war against Iraq, the Kuwaitis could
count on US assistance. Hence, they could be excluded
from any new Security Council resolution on Iraqi
reparations, or at least be given the best possible
reparations deal.
On the other hand, Iran's
status as one of three members of the "axis of evil"
along with Iraq and North Korea should guarantee the
worst possible deal, if any reparations at all. The
latter is a very realistic scenario, as a major
objective of the US government since 1979 has been the
weakening of Iran through a variety of means, including
those aimed at reducing its revenues. The US opposition
to Iran's military programs, including missile
development, and its peaceful nuclear program for its
alleged military implications has been a major
justification for such US policy.
Apart from its
implications for strengthening a future pro-American
Iraqi regime, Short's suggestion probably reflected a US
plan to prevent Iran from addressing its financial and
economic problems by receiving hefty reparations. Quite
possibly, it also indicated a first move toward dealing
with another member of the "axis of evil". Of its three
members, the Americans are fighting a war with one
(Iraq) and seemingly leaning toward taking some sort of
action against North Korea. Iran is the only remaining
member with which the Americans will somehow have to
deal in the near future.
Of course, dealing with
the "axis of evil" members may not be as easy as the
Americans hope. They are far from winning their war
against Iraq, and the expanding global anti-war movement
will create barriers to their launching another war. A
war with militarily strong North Korea, if it ever
happens, will be extremely costly for the Americans in
human lives, military hardware and financial resources.
However, there is still a ground to suggest that the US
government has at least an intention to take action
against Iran, as reflected in a significant increase in
its rhetoric against Iran's non-military nuclear
program.
Iran's growing concern over the
long-term plans of the US government in its surrounding
regions will probably convince it of a hidden agenda
behind Short's suggestion. Major factors justifying that
concern include an emerging aggressive US policy toward
Iran and a phenomenal increase in the US military
presence in Iran's proximity. In addition to a concern
about the Americans' success in turning Iraq into a
pro-American and anti-Iranian state under US military
occupation, Short's suggestion reflecting both US and
British consensus will undoubtedly motivate Iran to take
measures.
Iran already has incentives to
intervene in Iraq to ensure its long-term interests,
including denying the Americans the opportunity to turn
Iraq into a US-backed anti-Iranian regional power. Its
fear of a total loss of its reparations should provide
an additional strong incentive to intervene. An
intervention with a bearing on the ongoing war and
long-term US plans for Iraq could give Tehran a
bargaining chip for its negotiations with two Security
Council permanent members (the US and the UK) capable of
blocking any reparations for Iran, given their
sensitivity about those issues. Without a bargaining
chip, Iran's receipt of any reparations seems highly
unlikely if the Americans succeed in placing a pro-US
regime in Baghdad.
Tehran's intervention, if it
happens, will not likely take a direct military form,
lest it provide a pretext for a US war on Iran. It would
more likely take the form of backing certain Iraqi
opposition groups, mainly the pro-Iranian Supreme
Assembly of the Islamic Revolution of Iraq, to secure a
big share of the post-Saddam Iraq and/or of helping the
Iraqi Kurds meet Turkey's challenge. Among many other
factors, such developments will ensure further
unforeseen difficulties for the Americans and the
British in pursuing their ultimate objectives in Iraq.
Dr Hooman Peimani works as an
independent consultant with international organizations
in Geneva and does research in international
relations.
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