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Good winners, good losers: Postwar
Iraq
By Yoichi Funabashi
(Used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS)
As war
on the ground in Iraq begins in earnest, the world
awaits serious plans for the peace that will follow.
Much has been said in recent months about the relevance
of the post-World War II occupation of Japan that could
serve as a model in Iraq. It is a seductive historical
parallel, and the common policy objectives of
democratization and demilitarization in both countries
make it an especially appealing comparison. Japan's
postwar success is a direct result of the United States'
nation-building strategy. Thanks to an experiment
unparalleled in international politics, a nation that
had been brought to its knees in 1945 was, by
independence in 1952, able to cast off its pariah status
and re-enter the world stage. The rest, as they say, is
history.
While the Japanese model provides food
for thought in Iraq, it is worth dwelling on the
differences between the two cases. These range across
cultural, ethnic, religious, historical, and political
grounds. Their pervasiveness means that ignoring them
and simply emulating the Japanese paradigm is to court
danger.
Indeed, the very legitimacy of the
occupation of Iraq can be called into question by
comparing it with that of Japan. The occupation of
war-weary Japan was founded on unconditional surrender
under the Potsdam Declaration. The sense of utter defeat
after Hiroshima and Nagasaki is a stark contrast to, for
example, Weimar Germany, which believed that it had been
"stabbed in the back by the Jews and a Fifth Column".
History suggests that "embracing defeat" (the title of
John Dower's classic study of the Japanese occupation)
is the prerequisite for a new start in Iraq. Japan chose
to play the "good loser", in former prime minister
Yoshida Shigeru's famous phrase. So should Iraq.
Moreover, Japan's occupation was supported by
other Asian countries, which were given a place in the
United Nations' Far Eastern Commission that officially
oversaw the mission. The occupation of Iraq follows a
preemptive invasion and will be based on a much shakier
form of legitimacy. The vast oil reserves involved
further complicate the equation - a factor obviously
without comparison in Japan's postwar experience. Ninety
percent of the "Arab street" believes that the US
motivation is to get its hands on Iraq's oil.
These twin challenges of legitimacy and oil will
probably complicate and compromise the US occupation in
Iraq.
The part played by Emperor Hirohito in
Japan's rehabilitation must not be underestimated
either. Albeit still controversial, the "grand bargain"
struck between the United States and Japan laid the
symbolic foundations for stability in postwar Japan. The
US preserved the emperor's status and waived his war
responsibility; Japan, in return, lent the occupying
forces its cooperation. Domestically, Hirohito became a
symbol of integration and contributed to postwar
stability. Iraq has no comparable unifying figure.
A similar disparity is revealed if we examine
the political leadership in each case. Japan was
exceptionally fortunate in this department. Both
Shidehara Kijuro and Yoshida Shigeru (immediate postwar
prime ministers) were former diplomats with a good grasp
of international politics. Whom can we expect to rule
Iraq? Throughout his almost 24-year rule, Saddam Hussein
has terminated all promising members of the leadership.
In terms of national makeup, too, the Japanese
are far more homogenous and united than the Iraqis.
Minorities and religious differences no doubt existed in
Japan in 1945, but did not serve as serious fault lines.
Iraq's ruling Sunni Muslim minority, on the other hand,
comprises only 20 percent of the population, and the
repressed Shi'a majority makes up more than 60 percent.
The Kurds are another factor that must be addressed in
the democratization process. You cannot just call a free
election and abandon Iraq to the tyranny of the
majority.
First, a tolerant, multiethnic civil
society must be built. Iraq's new constitution must make
clear that its identity should be neither Sunni, Shi'a,
nor Kurd. In contrast to Japan, the identity of which
has developed for more than 2,000 years, Iraq is the
post-World War I creation of colonial powers. The burden
is on Iraq to meet the serious challenge posed by its
artificial identity.
Substantial differences
therefore exist between the successful Japanese
occupation and the outlook for Iraq. Cynics wonder if it
was precisely because of these obvious difficulties that
the neo-conservatives latched so firmly on to the
Japanese precedent. Having separated the apples from the
oranges, I would like to elaborate on some lessons from
the Japanese occupation that the United States might do
well to recall.
Above all, the key to the
success of the occupation of Japan was that the United
States was prepared to play the role of the "good
winner" opposite Japan's "good loser". Occupation
reforms imparted many Japanese with a sense of having
been set free. The advent of labor unions, women's right
to vote, land reform, and so on created new
constituencies for reform. This ensured rock-solid
support for the postwar regime. Soon, 90 percent of the
Japanese felt that they belonged to the middle class.
In planning the reforms, General Douglas
MacArthur and the postwar Japanese leaders were
fortunate in being able to draw from the well of
homegrown ideas proposed in the Taisho period of 1920s
democratization (derailed by the militarists in the
1930s). Postwar politicians were able to revisit and
repackage these proposals. The key point is that, rather
than appearing to be foreign reforms imposed from above
and inducing resentment from below, the pattern of
renewal cultivated the Japanese people's sense of
ownership in change.
Fostering Iraqis' own sense
of ownership is similarly vital, although the absence of
indigenous traditions will require creativity. MacArthur
himself harbored suspicions that the Japanese remained
too immature to sustain democracy: "Measured by the
standards of modern civilization," he said, "they would
be like a boy of 12 as compared with our development of
45 years." Understandably disheartened by the Iraqi
emigres' state of confusion, many Americans may also be
tempted to believe that the country is ungovernable. The
Iraqi people, however, are blessed with enormous
resources and talent groomed in a splendid civilization.
Once liberated, they can be left to themselves.
Remember, the supposedly pubescent Japanese public
managed its own miracle.
Another critical pillar
of Japan's comeback was the San Francisco Peace Treaty
of 1951, designed by the victors to bind them in a
relationship of "trust and reconciliation" with the
vanquished. This gave Japan the chance to start over.
The cycle of revenge was contained and anti-Americanism
averted, by virtue of US foresight and generosity.
The international community faces battles for
"trust and reconciliation" on two fronts when the actual
fighting stops in Iraq. First, it needs to find ways to
bring reconciliation to Iraq's international
relationships, particularly with the United States.
Second, there is the job of healing the ethnic, tribal,
and religious wounds that have been exacerbated by
Saddam's divide-and-rule policy. These are not
challenges for the faint-hearted. But international
society should not - and cannot afford to - shy away
from them.
The United States also facilitated
Japan's reconciliation with "free world" East Asian
countries, particularly South Korea. This kind of
international peace strategy should accompany
reconstruction in Iraq, particularly vis-a-vis the
elusive Palestinian-Israeli peace settlement. Democracy
cannot be generated in a vacuum; the regional peace
structure must be addressed, too.
Don't place
too much faith in the democratic domino theory, though.
It contains its own catch-22. In the first place, it
relies on democracy taking root in Iraq. If that fails
to materialize, the dominoes will never start to fall.
Second, even if democracy does flourish in Iraq it could
destabilize autocratic US allies in the area. In that
event, tensions may arise between the United States and
its friends, who might resort to crushing the democracy
movements. Net effect on dominoes: the same. In the case
of Japan, it took almost 40 years for neighboring
countries (the Philippines, Korea, then Taiwan) to
democratize. Were that mirrored in the Middle East (if
any dominoes ever begin to fall there), it would be a
super-slow-motion domino effect.
In the last
analysis, perhaps the most important question to emerge
from a comparison of the Iraqi and Japanese cases hangs
not over Iraqi characteristics, but over the way in
which America's identity may have changed since 1945.
Put simply, the key question is this: does the
United States in 2003 still have the will to commit
itself to this effort? Particularly after events in
Afghanistan, many conclude that the answer is that the
US is "no longer in the nation-building business". In
World War II, US planners began to prepare for the
occupation three years in advance of Japan's defeat.
Thousands of Americans underwent a program of historical
and linguistic training to form the main administrative
pillar of the occupation. In peacetime, a number of
these went on to contribute greatly as scholars to
laying down the intellectual foundations of mutual
understanding with Japan - Edwin O Reischauer, Donald
Keene, and Edward Seidensticker, to name a few.
To coincide with the year of Japan's
independence, the two allies also created a potent
symbol of friendship in the Fulbright Program. By virtue
of the enduring effects of this program, 7,000 Japanese
and 3,000 Americans have forged bonds of lasting
friendship and understanding to date. This type of
50-year vision is also called for in Iraq.
One
has to search hard for evidence of a similar level of
dedication today.
The US must prove that this
pessimism is unfounded. The potential gap between
America's level of commitment then and now points to the
most valid historical lesson that Japan's occupation can
teach. In order to succeed in Iraq, the United States
needs to commit as it did to Japan, reprising its role
as the good winner in a prolonged curtain call. What is
more, it has to do so multilaterally, in concert with US
friends and allies - and most important, in partnership
with the United Nations. Establishing jurisdiction for
the Japanese occupation, one should recall, was one of
the debut acts of the UN.
Yoichi
Funabashi is chief diplomatic correspondent and
columnist for the Asahi Shimbun. He can be reached
at ja6868@sepia.ocn.ne.jp.
This article is used by permission of Pacific Forum CSIS.
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