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THE ROVING EYE
Shi'ites on the
march to Karbala
By Pepe Escobar
NAJAF and KARBALA - The Shi'ite armies are on
the move. They have no tanks, no stealth bombers, no
night vision devices. Their sole weapon of mass
persuasion is the power of the word - deep religious
fervor inscribed in green, black and red flags waved
under the sandy winds of Mesopotamia. But the political
weight that they are about to display this Tuesday in
Karbala is something unheard and unseen in centuries of
history of "the land between the rivers".
Every
year, a pilgrimage celebrates the 40th day of the death
by decapitation of Imam Hussein, the son of the first
Imam Ali (the Prophet Mohammed's brother-in-law), at the
battle of Karbala, in the year 680 AD, which is the
founding event of Shi'ism.
But the pilgrimage
this year is unlike any other. At the office of the late
Great Ayatollah Muhammad Baqr al-Sadr in central Najaf,
top cleric Abbas Elroubaei, who is also a painter,
confides with a smile, "It took only three words." These
- pronounced by the all-powerful al-Hawza council of 15
to 20 supreme Shi'ite religious authorities in Iraq -
were simple: "Go to Karbala."
As early as
Saturday morning, hundreds of thousands were already on
the road, literally walking to their destination in
central Iraq and converging on Imam Hussein's shrine,
with its cupola and minarets covered with gold.
Elroubaei expects no less than 7 million people in
Karbala: "And this with just one phrase. Can you imagine
the power of 7 million?"
Karbala (an Aramaic
name) is the second Shi'ite holy place after Najaf
(Najaf is Islam's fourth holiest city, after Mecca,
Medina and Jerusalem). Karbala is so holy that many
pilgrims carry soil from it to pray in their cities, be
they in Iran or Pakistan. Many others sleep with little
round tablets under their pillows (sold for less than 50
US cents) made from the earth of Karbala. A pilgrimage
to Karbala can be more important to many Shi'ites than
the hajj to Mecca and Medina. This is the ultimate Holy
Land, sanctified by the blood of martyrs. The color
combination of flags waved by the pilgrims also carries
deep religious meaning. The red flag symbolizes Abbas,
Hussein's half-brother (venerated because he fought
alongside Hussein in Karbala), and also the blood of
Hussein. The black flag symbolizes Hussein, and also
sadness. The green flag symbolizes Imam Ali, and is also
the color of Islam.
"Prince" (as he is
affectionately referred to) Hussein's mosque in Karbala
is encircled by a vast courtyard and an ornate wall with
exquisite blue mosaics with verses of the Holy Koran.
Hussein's tomb is inside a silver-embroidered rectangle.
Three hundred meters away from Hussein's shrine, on the
other side of a huge square, is the also golden-domed
shrine of Abbas. Since Saturday, the square has been
turned into an immense religious bazaar - a congregation
of silent widows, street orphans, raucous families,
opportunists selling battered cassettes of Koranic
texts, impromptu preachers, and the odd coffin paraded
over heads and shoulders. The pilgrims on the move - on
the Baghdad-Najaf expressway or on the dusty two-lane
road between Najaf and Karbala - are an extraordinary
sight, mingling with the rumbling serpent of American
convoys, past charred T-72 tanks and "desecrated" Saddam
Hussein murals that would have pleased Andy Warhol.
Elderly Shi'ite women all in black carry plastic vases
on their heads. Most men just carry a flag, chanting all
the time, a keffiah (scarf) around the waist.
Some, at the sight of a foreigner, immediately shout "No
Saddam, no Amrika". Huge photos of Hussein, looking like
a dashing medieval warrior-prince, decorate the
entrances of tents set up in the desert offering tea, a
few cushions and the latest tribal gossip.
Anybody thinking that a giant political rally -
in a Western sense - will take place in Karbala is bound
to be disappointed. The political statement is the
gathering itself of Shi'ites in such staggering numbers.
The pilgrims tell us how it is through their banners -
like "I'm the one that Allah loves" - or through their
words: "Everyone in Karbala would wish to be a martyr in
Paradise with Ali and Hussein." What will happen,
according to top clerics, is a giant concert of wailing,
some flagellation and even some voluntary amputations -
prohibited during the whole Saddam era: these are
instruments for the Shi'ites to repent for not helping
Hussein in his battle against the Ummayad Caliphate
almost 14 centuries ago. There's nothing specifically
programmed regarding the war, said a top cleric:
"People, rather, are interested in how to work with God:
have a good life, help people, have children, money and
follow the right way."
For Shi'ites, Islam
should have been led by the Holy Prophet Mohammed's
descendants through Ali's lineage, and not by the
Caliphs. The battle of Karbala was a larger-than-life
event that not only defined the Sunni-Shi'ite split
inside Islam, but also defined the Shi'ite view of the
world as a blend of protest and martyrdom: a radical
activism. That's why the battle of Karbala is as vivid
in the Shi'ite imagination today as if it had just taken
place.
It's startling to compare Sunni and
Shi'ite attitudes in the highly-charged atmosphere of
post-Saddam Iraq. Sunnis - apart from the giant street
protest after jumma (Friday) prayers at the Abu
Hanifah mosque in Baghdad on Friday - have faded into
the background, while Shi'ite clerics have demonstrated
an extraordinary capacity for unity. They seem to be
united on at least one rallying cry, heard at the Abu
Hanifah demonstration and also on the road to Karbala:
>I>La Suniya, La Shieya, Wahda Wahda Islamiya
(No Sunni or Shi'ite, only one Islam). But another
battle cry - also vocally imprinted by Sunni and Shi'ite
alike, is infinitely more problematic: La ilaha ila
Allah, America Aduallah (There is no God but Allah,
and America is His enemy).
Right now, Najaf is
all but deserted: everybody went or is on the road to
Karbala. An April 13 proclamation by the powerful
al-Hawza - which could be defined as the high office of
Shi'ite religious authorities - affixed on the
meticulously decorated tiles of the Imam Ali shrine -
gives detailed instructions to Najaf's citizens. Some
crucial points: there is no difference between Sunni and
Shi'ite; everyone should go to the mosque; al-Hawza will
take care of managing health problems. Al-Hawza has made
numerous recommendations: "Don't listen to anyone
outside Iraqi or from the occupying force." "Keep your
eyes open", "Save your possessions from looting", "Help
people with food and medicine", "Don't do anything
against anybody like during the Saddam Hussein
government", "Everyone must respect any religion" and
"Everybody should go back to work".
In the
streets, a huge crowd immediately congregates around any
foreign visitor: "Tell the world we have no water, no
electricity, no gas, very little food, no money, no
medicine." Very few shops are open in the souk
(market) corridor that leads to the Imam Ali shrine. And
there's the matter of the assassination of a very
prominent figure to be solved.
Last year, the
imam of Najaf, Dr Haider Alkelydar, granted a long
interview to this correspondent, talking about
Sunni-Shi'ite unity and revealing among other things
that the city was a training camp for the Palestine
Liberation Army. On April 12, with the Americans already
in town, Haider was killed. According to Zaki
Elnouthfar, a prominent Najafi, "The imam was killed by
the Mukhabarat" [the Iraq secret service], by people
"who were not from Najaf, who knifed his body 100
times". Elnouthfar, whose story is corroborated by many
Najafis, swears "everybody here loved Dr Haider".
According to the Najaf street version, the
killing fit the Mukhabarat style. Residents say that
Haider left the Imam Ali shrine and was walking in
Thausat al-Ashrin street with two bodyguards when he was
attacked. Residents say that Haider had enough time to
"try to call the Americans on his satphone", apparently
with no success.
This version of events is
totally contradicted by Abbas Elroubaei of the Ayatollah
al-Sadr's office: "There was a relationship between
Haider and Saddam Hussein and his sons." He thinks that
the assassins were from Najaf. If they are, this would
confirm Elroubaei's assertion that "there are a lot of
people in the streets who have no responsibilities".
Who is the top Shi'ite authority in Iraq at the
moment? In Najaf, the al-Hawza says that 68-year-old
Grand Ayatollah Sistani is a crucial reference in these
troubled times. Others point to Kazem al-Haari, who left
for Iran 25 years ago. As far as Elroubaei is concerned,
the Shi'ite political parties based in Iran "have no
popular base in Iraq. Most Iraqi people want to hear the
opinions of al-Hawza." He insists though that "al-Hawza
will not play a political role. But it will support any
government who will serve the Iraqi people". He also
says, significantly, "there's no political role for
Ayatollah Sistani." There are indeed subtle distinctions
between the top Shi'ite names. For the office of
Ayatollah al-Sadr, al-Haari is the most popular. For
Najafis, Sistani is the most popular.
There are
photos of the Great Ayatollah al-Sadr - who along with
his sister was slaughtered on Saddam's orders in April
1980 - on sale all over Najaf; but it takes a real
pilgrimage to find a photo of Sistani. This may have to
do with the fact that al-Sadr was killed by Saddam, and
Sistani is still alive: for Shi'ites, martyrs hold the
ultimate power.
In the 1991 Shi'ite uprising
following the Gulf War, the anti-Saddam rebels briefly
took control of Najaf and Karbala, before Saddam's
forces wiped them out with brute force. This political
disaster taught them many lessons. It's wrong to think
along Elroubaei's lines that the political parties based
in Iran have no base inside Iraq.
The Da'wa
Party claims to be very well connected inside Iraq.
Their spiritual leader is none other than Ayatollah
al-Sadr. His martyrdom is one of the foundation stones
of the party. According to a privileged Iranian source,
in the beginning of the war the Da'wa Party did not
exactly disagree with the Anglo-American invasion.
Anybody was welcomed to remove Saddam. But Da'wa is
vigorously against a military protectorate. It insists a
maximum of two months are enough to organize an
election. It's not thinking in terms of a general
election for a parliament in the initial stage, but
local elections for municipal officials. These officials
would organize a constitutional assembly and then
general elections. Da'wa is absolutely against the
two-year or more transition period preferred by the
Pentagon. If it happens, it will be colonization, and
Da'wa will engage in armed struggle against the foreign
invaders. Da'wa are more "moderate", in a sense, than
the Supreme Assemble for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SAIRI). They know that America will remain in Iraq -
for some period of time. But they are adamant: Iraq's
future should be determined by Iraqis themselves. Da'wa
officials spent a long time in exile, and some imbibed a
lot of Western culture; they are certainly not hardcore
Islamists. For instance, their take on the application
of one form or another of Sharia (Islamic law) is that
it should be a parliamentarian decision. And crucially,
they reject the concept of velayat-al-faqih - or
government by specialists of Islamic jurisprudence. The
SAIRI, and its leader Ayatollah Hakim, is totally
aligned on this matter with Iranian supremo Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei.
Ayatollah Sistani's position is
much more complex than the position of political parties
based in Iran - although not dissimilar. The ayatollah
never left Najaf. Saddam tried to assassinate him at
least four times. And he is not pro-Iranian. He was in
the eye of the storm only a while ago, concerning his
alleged fatwa in favor of neutrality during the
war - something that was welcomed at the American
Central Command in Qatar.
His official website
had to post a window in Arabic denying "anything said by
the Western press agencies" attributing a fatwa
to him. And in London, the al-Khoei Foundation of Abdul
Majid al-Khoei (who is the son of the late Abul Qasem
al-Khoei from the first Gulf War, who tried in vain to
meet General Norman Schwartzkopf in the desert to
prevent a repression of the Shi'ites by Saddam) denied
the existence of the fatwa.
Abdul Majid
al-Khoei went to Najaf courtesy of the American army. He
arranged for the safety of Sistani and three others who
were captives in Najaf of Saddam's Fedayeen when Ba'ath
militia were occupying Imam Ali's shrine. Sistani was
finally liberated. He is in good health, but he is not
talking to anyone for the moment.
According to
the al-Khoei foundation, neither the supposed Sistani
pronouncement on neutrality nor another so-called
fatwa from September 2002 nailed on the doors of
Baghdad's mosques could be qualified as fatwas. A
fatwa is a religious edict that results from a
learned analysis of a point of Islamic jurisprudence.
Sistani, some say, just made a statement. Ayatollahs in
his position are usually asked questions regarding all
sorts of current issues. The answers are usually
circumstantial, and don't carry the same doctrinal
weight as a fatwa. This means that in September
2002, and again in March 2003, Sistani reinforced the
notion that in all the history of Islam, the protection
of the umma (the community of the faithful) means
that no infidel troops should occupy Muslim territory.
So if Iraq is caught in the crossfire between a Western
army and Saddam's troops, what is the solution? Sistani
(who still is not talking to the media) might have
answered, or not answered: "do nothing." This certainly
wasn't a fatwa.
It's enlightening to note
that Sistani's position perfectly matches Ayatollah
Hakim's, the leader of SAIRI in Tehran. A few weeks ago,
Hakim said, "I urge all Iraqis not to get involved in
the fighting. They should not side, either with Saddam's
forces, or with the US-led forces."
Hakim
belongs to one of the most notable Shi'ite families in
Iraq. His father is Muhsin Hakim al-Tabatabai, a senior
ayatollah from Najaf who sharply criticized the Ba'ath
repression against the Shi'ites in the 1950s and 1960s.
Hakim wants the SAIRI to be fully representative of all
Iraqi Muslims - Sunni and Shi'ite alike.
The
SAIRI's power base is basically in Basra, Najaf and
Karbala. It has refused American funding, has tried to
distance itself from any connection with America and is
of course opposed to an American government in Iraq. The
SAIRI's paramilitary wing, the 40,000-strong Badr
Brigades - mostly based in Iraqi Kurdistan - were
prevented by Hakim from engaging in any military
operations inside Iraq: this could be interpreted as
support for the Anglo-American invasion. But Hakim said
many times that the brigades were positioned inside Iraq
and ready to speed up the fall of Saddam's regime. Hakim
said two weeks ago in Tehran that "if Americans are
planning to stay in Iraq as an occupation force after
Saddam, we have repeatedly stated that they will be
faced by fierce armed resistance." On his vision of a
future Iraqi government, he said, "We don't believe in a
system that is based on sectarian or racial division. I
think what the majority of Iraqi factions have come to
recognize as the best political course for Iraq is the
parliamentarian system on the basis of one-man one-vote,
without applying any sectarian agenda. I also strongly
believe that any future government should uphold the
religious values of the Iraqi people, which are rooted
in Islam. It has to be emphasized that Islam is the
official religion of the state and that Sharia is the
main source of legislation. That said, all the rights of
the religious minorities will be respected. The cultural
sensitivities and religious values of the Iraqi people
have to be taken into account in any future Iraqi
government,"
What is being said in Tehran is in
effect reinforcing what is taking place in Najaf and
Karbala. Elroubaei scoffs at the fact that there is "an
unknown Iraqi" leading the Najaf provincial government.
In his own personal opinion, "Iraqis reject any kind of
foreign occupation. They will resist. When we believe
they will not leave and are behaving as an occupation
force, we will move." He insists, "Our rallying cry is
that there are no differences between Kurds, Sunnis and
Shi'ites. The Americans said that after the collapse of
Saddam's government and the search for weapons of mass
destruction they will go. If they don't go, we will take
our measures."
Shi'ites seem to know exactly
what they want. And most of all what they don't want.
After so much oppression, the march to Karbala may be,
on the surface, apolitical. But it may turn out to be
the most profound political affirmation of direct
democracy in the history of Mesopotamia.
(©2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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