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COMMENTARY
The EU as a quasi-military
power
By Ehsan Ahrari
As the
United States military was busy smashing the remnants of
Saddam Hussein’s regime, two important developments were
taking place in Europe. The first concerned the future
dynamics of European power - ie, whether the European
Union will opt to become an autonomous military force.
The second surrounds evolving EU-Iran ties. Both issues
are likely to influence the balance of power in Europe,
as well as in the Middle East.
For the countries
of the European continent, the proposition of developing
their collective military power under the aegis of the
EU has more than its fair share of ambivalence. The
Gaullist perspective envisions military power as a great
source of prestige. But for Germany, for historical
reasons, it is not a source of much enthusiasm. For
Great Britain, the proposition of European military
power has its own share of ambivalence. Even after
accepting a diminished status in the global balance of
power since the end of World War II, Britain remains
part of the "major league" by constantly siding with the
United States. That was the Churchillian perspective,
and no British prime minister has shown any interest in
abandoning it. The alternative for Britain is to have a
foreign policy independent of the US and become just
another European country, or become a part of European
military power and get embroiled in the intermittent
trans-Atlantic squabble on a number of global issues.
Remaining on the US side assigns Britain
visibility. The significant aspect of that visibility is
that it is definitely larger than the UK's current
military power. Being a close ally of the lone
superpower has its perks. As displayed by a highly
unpopular topic like the invasion of Iraq, Britain’s
decision to remain on the US side added considerable
political prestige to its status. In return, the US
could say that the "coalition forces" were launching a
military campaign against Saddam Hussein, as opposed to
just the US. Britain also remains a major player in
determining the shape of the post-Saddam government in
Iraq.
If the EU were to emerge as a credible
military power, its member states have to raise their
defense expenditures to a considerably higher level than
the current levels of 2 percent of their respective
budgets. Even then, language differences, differences in
levels of technological development, and varying levels
of military capabilities of various EU nations will
serve as formidable barriers in the EU's attempt to
develop a powerful military.
In addition, the EU
nations, after deciding to develop a powerful military,
must also work hard to minimize, if not completely
alleviate, problems related to "interoperability". The
DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms defines
it as "The ability of [military] systems, units or
forces to provide services to and accept services from
other systems, units, or forces and to use the services
so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively
together." Even an old and well-established an entity
like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has not been
able to overcome its own interoperability problems.
Thus, it chugs along as an alliance in which the awesome
military capabilities of the US remain as the
determining aspect of NATO's potency as a military
alliance.
Another problem that is related to
interoperability is that it remains in a constant state
of flux, largely because technology that drives it is
constantly changing. Consequently, large capital
investments must be made on a regular basis to remain at
the cutting edge of technological change and still must
remain fully focused on solving problems related to
interoperability. Given the magnitude of these problems,
the prospects of the EU's emergence as a formidable
military power are minimal, at best.
Thus, one
suggestion is that, instead of attempting to emulate
America's military power, the EU should concentrate on
becoming a "civilian quasi-military power". Andrew
Moravcsik, a Harvard Europeanist, made this suggestion
in an essay entitled, "How Europe Can Win Without an
Army", in the Financial Times of April 3. If the EU were
to accept that role, its military will be used largely
on the basis of a global division of labor whereby the
US armed forces will focus on regime change wherever and
whenever its leadership deems appropriate, and the EU
military forces will do the task of cleaning up the mess
created as a result of those actions. This is the
essence of what Moravcsik is suggesting.
Strange
though his proposition is, it also reflects the thinking
of American neoconservatives, whose imagination is
running wild these days, about "shaping" the world to
suit America's global aspirations. But the suggestion
that the EU should become a quasi-military power also
assumes that it has decided, once and for all, that such
a role will be its niche in global affairs.
The
general pattern that various nation-states adopt to find
their strategic niches goes through an evolutionary
process, but is also interrupted as a result of
accidents of history that may bring about revolutionary
changes. Such accidents may significantly diminish one
nation's status while catapulting another's to a new
height. The emergence of the US as one of the
superpowers might have been an evolutionary one, but its
survival as the sole superpower - and a resultant
quantum leap in its prestige and influence - was
definitely an accident of history. That accident
happened when the Soviet Union imploded, thereby
creating a unipolar system, at least in the military
realm.
Looking at the evolution of the EU as an
economic superpower, one can safely extrapolate that its
emergence as a military one is well within the realm of
rational predictability. Thus, to think that as an
evolving military power the EU should be content with
permanently assigning its military the role of a
"cleanup crew" for the US forces implies that the EU
will also remain a subservient, if not less relevant,
force. Few self-respecting Europeans will consider that
a rational or even a reasonable proposition.
The
consistently evolving EU-Iran ties serves as important
evidence of the fact that the former is in no mood to be
content with remaining either subservient to the US or
in becoming of secondary significance. The EU was
working assiduously "to deepen political dialogue" with
Iran at a time when the US Secretary of Defense, Donald
Rumsfeld, has warned that country of reprisals if it
joined the war in Iraq. Even though Iran stayed on the
sidelines during the US invasion of Iraq, its hands-off
approach to future developments in the neighboring state
may not be taken for granted.
There is
speculation in Washington that Iran might become a
target of the US doctrine of regime change. Additional
issues of contention between Washington and Tehran are
the latter's nuclear program, and its support of
terrorist groups in Lebanon and in the occupied
territories in Israel. The EU's perspective is that by
engaging Iran, it is lowering the chances of conflict
escalation with Washington, especially since the issues
of negotiations are weapons proliferation, the fight
against terrorism and Middle East peace. In the process,
it is also seeking better conditions for European
companies doing business in Iran, and improved
protection for foreign investment. In return, the EU is
expected to offer Iran the same legal status as it gives
its trading partners in the World Trade Organization.
Considering the fact that the Middle East looms
large in the calculations of the Bush administration for
the foreseeable future, the EU is definitely emerging as
a rival for political and economic power and influence.
Its mere involvement with Iran strengthens the arguments
of those in the international community who strongly
oppose the US' exuberant application of regime change,
inconsiderately advocated by the Washington
neoconservatives. In addition, a proactive and visible
engagement of the EU in the Middle East is also likely
to keep US policies under strong scrutiny - as the Bush
administration remains entangled in dealing with the
consequences of regime change in Iraq.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com
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policies.)
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