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OPINION
The making of America's Iraqi
quagmire
By Ehsan Ahrari
The
contours of the American occupation of post-Saddam
Hussein Iraq are already formulating. The initial
indications are unsettling. A major question is, if the
American invasion was aimed at liberating the Iraqis and
letting them have a free choice about their next
government, then why is Washington imposing Donald
Rumsfeld's choice, Ahmad Chalabi, as their next ruler?
Another related question is, if the Iraqis should be
allowed select their own form of government, why is
secularism being thrust on them? These questions might
be a bit harsh for those in Washington who are being
swept away with a palpable hubris of victory over the
fifth-rate armed forces of Iraq. That hubris may also be
driving the United States in the direction of a
quagmire.
The notion of "quagmire" is generally
related to the US involvement in Vietnam. However, a
cursory look at the history of America's involvement in
foreign wars underscores that no two such events are
exactly alike. So, any comparison with the quagmire of
Vietnam should be offered with a qualification. The
greatest difference between the Vietnamese debacle and
the Iraqi adventure is that, in the case of the former,
quagmire became the major obstacle in the way of
military victory. In the case of the latter campaign,
quagmire is likely to develop after the military
victory. The end result of the next quagmire is likely
to be similar to the one related to Vietnam: the US will
not come out any time soon, or without further loss of
life of US troops and damage to its prestige. The signs
are in the making.
First, the Iraqis have
already become resentful of a clear-cut American
preference for safeguarding the oil fields while
allowing the systematic looting of Iraq, including its
hospitals and museum - though it was swept under the rug
by the daily Central Command information campaign. The
occupying force wanted to ensure that the Iraqi
oilfields were safeguarded, so its capability to pay for
the reconstruction had to remain intact. Now lucrative
contracts for the reconstruction of that country are
being awarded to American companies - such as
Halliburton and Bechtel - with unambiguous connections
to such Republican luminaries as Vice President Dick
Cheney and George Schulz. The former was the CEO of
Halliburton before joining the Bush-Cheney ticket in the
last presidential election, and the later - secretary of
state during the Ronald Reagan presidency - was the CEO
of Bechtel, and still sits on its board of directors.
Second, the Bush administration continues to
disallow a primary role for the United Nations either in
Iraq's reconstruction or in putting together a corps of
leadership for the interim government that is a
representative of the major ethnic and religious
factions of that country. Secretary of State Colin
Powell's favorite line is that countries that spilled
blood of their soldiers to win "freedom" for Iraq must
have a dominant voice in shaping its government and
deciding what companies should be playing a visible role
in its reconstruction.
Excuse us, Mr Powell, but
who has asked the United States and Britain to spill the
blood of their sons and daughters for the liberation of
Iraq? If these countries were to go into Iraq with
explicit UN approval, the invasion of Iraq would not
have been labeled as such by the international
community. Then, the representatives of the
international community - under the auspices of the
world body - would also be playing a visible role in
engaging a broad spectrum of the Iraqis to govern
themselves. The Bush administration is missing a very
important point that the only way the next government of
Iraq will not get embroiled in serious doubts about its
legitimacy is if the UN - not just the US-British nexus
- starts to have a major say in its formulation.
Third, the palpable US preference for secularism
will also emerge as a source of major conflict between
the occupiers and the Iraqis who are committed to the
proposition of a powerful presence of Islam in their
next system of governance. Right now, the tactic from
the US side is to have Ahmad Chalabi remain assertive
about promoting secularism as a bargain for gaining
power. But by becoming the head of such a government,
can Chalabi rid himself of being depicted as a puppet of
the Americans? Will not a secular form of government for
Iraq - where the Shi'ite majority was systematically
suppressed and eliminated from the power structure
during the Saddam regime of Sunni rule - be perceived by
that group as another "conspiracy" related to not
empowering them, even though Chalabi, a Shi'ite, is
spouting the mantra of secularism? Is anyone in
Washington paying any attention to how much resentment
such perceptions will create toward the US? From all the
evidence I have seen in and around Washington, it is
safe to say that, indeed, not much attention is being
paid to these issues.
The trouble with Chalabi's
emergence as a possible head of the interim Iraqi
government is that Rumsfeld's, not Powell's, preference
has gotten the nod of President George W Bush. One has
to wonder why a prestigious secretary of state is
systematically playing second banana to the secretary of
defense, whose frequent dabbling in foreign affairs hits
the international headlines when he insults America's
major allies who happen to disagree with its involvement
in Iraq. One also has to wonder why America's foreign
policy in the post-Saddam Hussein Iraq is not being
determined on the basis of hard-nosed analyses of what
is good for Iraq and the region, and more important,
what is in the best interest of the US? Instead,
ideologically-driven neo-conservatives have consistently
been visible in making heady foreign policy choices.
Fourth, the Bush administration seems to be
systematically excluding any consultation with a number
of major Arab states, largely because they did not
support its invasion of Iraq. That is also a troubling
development. Even a US preference for a politically
pluralistic Iraq has to have some notion of
acceptability from its neighbors.
As an
occupying force in Iraq, the US is on shaky grounds. The
imminent priority ought to be to remain focused on the
wishes of the Iraqi majority, not to impose handpicked
rulers over them who have spent almost all of their
formative years in the West, and not to impose
secularism.
Secularism has been a much-maligned
and least-comprehended phenomenon in the Muslim world.
To assume that it should be good for Iraq because it
works in the US might turn out to be a recipe for a
disaster. If secularism were to become a major player in
Iraq, it should come from within and through a process
of public debates, phenomena that may become familiar to
the Iraqis only with the passage of time.
The
chief trouble with a quagmire is that it is not
perceived as such while it is in the making. Besides,
the notion of occupation of a Muslim land is totally
alien to the US. It should be treated gingerly and
handled with a clear head, certainly not with the hubris
of conquest, which is invariably intoxicating. The US,
above all, needs a very clear analysis about what it is
getting into by remaining an occupying force in Iraq.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights
reserved. Please contactcontent@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
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