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The American strategic
revolution
By Stephen Blank
In Afghanistan and now more visibly in Iraq, we
are witnessing the latest stages of a strategic
revolution. This revolution is not merely the strategic
effects gained by using precision-guided munitions.
Rather, in both cases, the unparalleled ability of the
United States to project and sustain joint military
power has been graphically displayed to a degree that is
unprecedented in military history.
Never before
has anyone successfully projected naval and air power
into Afghanistan or Central Asia. Indeed, many of the
foreign commentaries directly after September 11, 2001
could not even begin to conceive of such an operation
being successful or being mounted at all.
Therefore, we must acknowledge that the
revolution in military affairs, at least in its current
incarnation, is as much about maneuver as it is about
firepower and precision strike. This conclusion will
undoubtedly shape future decisions about weapons
acquisitions and force structures. This conclusion also
cannot be taken to mean that the Iraqi war or other wars
that may come will be cakewalks.
But it does
mean that the synergistic effects of combining precision
strikes with what the armed forces call dominant
maneuver have greatly transformed the nature of
contemporary warfare, and that this transformation is
apparently beyond both the cognitive and material
capabilities of most other major militaries or potential
threats to our security.
It must also be
remembered here that this achievement is possible only
through the synchronization first of all of joint
forces: naval, air, land, space, and computer, and
second through the level of interoperability that we
have been able to create with our allies. Although those
levels of interoperability vary with the war and the
ally, the Northern Alliance being obviously a very
different ally than the British military, in both cases
the coalitions' achievement in maneuver have been
revolutionary.
Our joint forces remain capable
of providing both logistical and aerial support to our
ground forces in Afghanistan. And in Iraq the ground
forces covered unprecedented amounts of ground since
operations began. Although in neither case have we
surmounted the "fog of war" nor should such an outcome
be reasonably expected, prophecies to the contrary
notwithstanding; unexpected events and "fog" are
inherent in all warfare because all war is about the
strategic interaction of two thinking and willing
enemies. Therefore all strategy is not only interactive,
it is inherently dynamic, fluid, and subject to
unforeseen or unexpected decisions by commanders and
leaders. Therefore, the unexpected must be expected and
we should not become excessively disoriented should that
occur.
Even if we take the unforeseen into
account, these two wars open a window on future wars and
demonstrate that joint operations, performed at an
unprecedented level of proficiency, are leading to ever
higher levels of achievement with respect to both
precision strikes and the ability of forces to maneuver.
These revolutionary achievements, in turn, will trigger,
or perhaps raise the existing debate within the US armed
forces to a higher level.
Undoubtedly, a major
postwar debate within the US armed forces will take
place over the capabilities, structure and missions of
all of the services. The army must prepare for this
debate and learn to make a better case for its strategic
utility. Arguments over force structure and end strength
cannot remain confined to the need for boots on the
ground to hold ground, but must now relate to the
unprecedented capability of maneuver forces supported by
precision-strikes from all the services.
Consequently the role of armor on the
battlefield must be reexamined. It is clear that the
need for heavy armor and for land-based artillery remain
essential, perhaps even more in austere and rough
terrain than was previously thought to be the case.
Likewise critical arguments about the role of
helicopters and the appropriate tactics for using them
should undergo searching examination. Evidently the only
"retreat" or abortive operation was one in which
sustained and coordinated ground fire drove away Apache
helicopters. In other wars, too, helicopters have failed
to realize their potential. Thus in Chechnya since 1999
Moscow has lost 50 helicopters, a fact that goes to the
heart of the debate over the need to devise appropriate
tactics for effective maximization of their
capabilities.
Equally, if not more importantly,
those arguments must also relate to the need for
sufficient forces to fight urban battles and to maintain
order in transitional situations as the US moves to
peace operations after the end of hostilities. Indeed,
there are already congressional calls that we are
under-manned in Iraq with regard to current stability
operations, and these calls are occurring even as the
Pentagon is sending forces home. Therefore the
post-conflict situation in Iraq, which alone provides
the strategic justification to the world for what we
have done, must also be carefully examined regarding
lessons for future force packages and service missions.
But the need to rethink the role of heavy armor
and organic artillery, helicopters and post-conflict
structures and missions must also take place within a
context that also assimilates the most basic strategic
lesson of Iraq, ie the importance of joint
synchronization of firepower and maneuver which alone
offers maximum operational gains.
In both
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Marines and the army
demonstrated a revolutionary capability for maneuver,
provided that they were closely integrated in joint
operations with the navy and air forces. This new
capability should become the basis for military planning
because both these operations have demonstrated that
precision strike capability, notwithstanding the
revolutionary and enormous progress they have made,
cannot by themselves deliver strategic outcomes.
As we wage these wars we must continue to
remember that it is the synergies of synchronized joint
operations combining firepower with maneuverability that
invariably produce the most beneficial outcomes. The
revolutionary achievements of our land forces confirm
this, and those facts must not be lost sight of as we
move forward.
Stephen Blank is an
analyst of international security affairs residing in
Harrisburg, PA.
(©2003 Asia Times Online Co,
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
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