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COMMENTARY
Why Syria need not be the
next target ...
By Ehsan Ahrari
As the United States' focus shifts from regime
change in Iraq to Syria, there are ample reasons to
think that it may not be the next target of regime
change. However, the vagaries of the post-September 11
era are such that there is no certainty that it will not
be targeted.
Despite the obvious similarities
that Iraq was and Syria is a Baathist and authoritarian
state, the latter is not like Iraq under Saddam Hussein.
Saddam was a dictator who caused an awful lot of
turbulence in his neighborhood throughout the 1980s and
considerable uncertainty in the 1990s. Even after the
Gulf War of 1991, he never really gave up on acquiring
at least chemical weapons. The indigenous pool of
knowledge related to the development of nuclear weapons
also remained intact in Iraq, for a possible pursuit of
that option.
Syria, on the contrary, was one of
the states that fought on the side of the international
coalition against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990.
Then, in the aftermath of September 11, it cooperated
with the US on tracking of al-Qaeda terrorists.
Syria has chemical weapons, but its neighbor
next door and its chief adversary, Israel, has not only
chemical weapons, but also nuclear weapons. So accusing
Syria for having chemical weapons is not the same as
accusing Iraq of having them. As a direct party to the
Arab-Israeli conflict, in the eyes of international
community, Syria is not committing any crimes by
possessing chemical weapons any less than Israel is by
possessing both chemical and nuclear weapons. Besides,
there have never been international sanctions on Syria a
la Iraq about possessing chemical weapons.
But
the United States may view these realities as
insufficient conditions for not making Syria a potential
target of regime change. Damascus was accused of
interfering in the US invasion of Iraq. Then it was
accused of helping the escape of Saddam's top officials.
Under stern warnings from Washington, Syria did force
the return of some officials to Iraq, where they were
captured and are currently held by the US forces.
But the real criticism and public show of anger
of the Bush administration toward Syria was not solely
related to chemical weapons, or even its alleged
interference in Iraq. The real cause appears to be the
American desire to cash in on its military victory in
Iraq by pressuring Syria regarding its hardened position
vis-a-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict, and about
extracting substantial concessions from the Baathist
rulers in Damascus involving Lebanon.
Syria
under Bashar al-Assad has never developed a new or a
different policy regarding the Syrian-Israeli conflict.
Rather, it has maintained the policy of the days of
Hafez al-Assad of wanting "total" Israeli withdrawal
from the Golan Heights for "total peace".
That
lack of flexibility would have been acceptable to the
Likud Party and its hardline Prime Minister, Ariel
Sharon, since a continued Israeli occupation of the
Golan Heights is something that has never bothered those
who still possess the aspirations for "Eretz Israel".
But there is a fly in the ointment: the
continued militancy of the Hezbollah of Lebanon toward
Israel. As an occupying power of Lebanon, Syria has not
only refused to restrain the Hezbollah, but, according
to Israeli intelligence, has used it to ensure that
Israel remains embroiled on its borders with Lebanon.
Jerusalem views this tactic as a way to persuade the
Jewish state to accede to the Syrian demand for
withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Israel is also
concerned about the long-standing Syrian-Iranian nexus
in Lebanon, which has served as another vehicle for
strengthening the militancy of the Hezbollah.
Now, with the feather of toppling Saddam in its
hat, the Bush administration views Syria from an
entirely different point of view. As long as there is a
large American military presence in Iraq, Syria may be
pressured into bringing about the following radical
changes in its foreign policy.
First,
there is that likelihood that Syria will be pressured
into withdrawing from Lebanon. Such a potential measure
will be aimed at isolating the Hezbollah. A potential
withdrawal of Syria will also weaken Iran's influence in
Lebanon, which, in turn, translates to further weakening
of the Hezbollah.
Second, the Bush
administration is also likely to compel Assad to
initiate a dialogue with Israel regarding the modalities
of its withdrawal from the Golan Heights. In view of the
new political realities in neighboring Iraq, Assad may
not be able to sustain a position of a continued impasse
vis-a-vis Israel. In fact, he is expected to adopt a
"reasonable" position from the Israeli perspective. That
means capitulation from Hafez al-Assad's original
insistence on total peace for total withdrawal from the
Golan Heights.
Third, the general
emphasis of the Bush administration seems to be a sort
of litmus test that Damascus must pass before it is
completely out of the woods. The US Secretary of State,
Colin Powell, said at the end of his visit to Syria on
May 3, "What I said to him [Assad] is that we would be
watching, and we would measure performance over time to
see whether Syria is prepared now to move in a new
direction in light of these changed circumstances," the
secretary said on ABC's This Week.
Fourth, Syria will also be pressured into
expelling all radical Palestinian groups. Powell told
Assad that his support of terrorist groups, including
harboring Palestinian organizations engaged in terror
attacks against Israelis, "makes it hard to move forward
on the Middle East peace process. These things have to
come to an end."
This is an entirely new tactic
of de-radicalizing the Syrian Baathist regime, and
weakening it in the process. The obvious, though
unstated, purpose is to provide ample signals to
domestic protest groups to intensify their anti-regime
activities, while insisting that he brutal arm of the
regime should not be used against those groups. The
ultimate purpose is to force the regime to "liberalize",
thereby weakening it. It is assumed that a weakened
Syrian regime will also be receptive to accepting a
negotiated peace vis-a-vis Israel.
The Bush
administration never stated that one of the significant
side effects of invading Iraq would be to give Israel
even more of an over-arching advantage over its
opponents in the Arab-Israeli conflict than it has thus
far enjoyed. Instead, Washington has euphemistically
suggested that the toppling of the Iraqi dictator would
improve the chances of the resolution of that conflict.
As matters stand on the Arab side of this equation,
further improving the bargaining position of the Jewish
state was an unstated, but not an unwitting, outcome.
Thus, regime change in Syria is not necessarily
aimed at overthrowing Bashar al-Assad. Washington will
be satisfied if he drops his traditional hardline
attitude toward the Syrian-Israeli peace process,
abandons supporting Hezbollah, and demonstrates a
palpable willingness to accommodate the Israeli demands
of giving up rights to a certain part of the Golan
Heights to satisfy the Jewish hardliners' demands of
security guarantees.
A weakened Syria knows it.
Now it has to figure out how best to negotiate from such
a position.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an
Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic
analyst.
(2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd.
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