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COMMENTARY
The US and post-war
Iraq
By Stephen Zunes
(Posted
with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus) There
has been a disturbing degree of triumphalism following
the overthrow - perhaps "evaporation" is a better word -
of Saddam Hussein's regime in the face of invading
American forces. Even putting aside the
inappropriateness of this kind of gloating in the face
of such death and destruction - including thousands of
civilian casualties - it is striking that few people are
asking whether the US or the rest of the world is safer
now as a result of this overwhelming American military
victory.
Operation Iraqi Freedom has about as
much to do with freedom as Sports Illustrated's annual
swimsuit issue has to do with marketing swimwear: it is
little more than an afterthought, a rationalization, and
a cover for the hegemonic designs of the Bush
administration and its Republican and Democratic
supporters in Congress.
Yet the other
rationalizations simply did not have much credibility.
The supposed threat to American and regional security
from the much-talked-about Iraqi arsenal of weapons of
mass destruction (WMD) appears to have been a ruse. No
such weapons have been found thus far, likely validating
the assessment of many independent strategic analysts,
key Iraqi defectors, and former chief UNSCOM weapons
inspector Scott Ritter that Iraq's WMD program had been
effectively dismantled.
Likewise, no significant
Iraqi link to the al-Qaeda network has been established.
Even before the invasion, Bush administration claims of
Iraqi backing for terrorist groups contradicted prior
assessments by the State Department and various US
intelligence agencies. Now, despite the capture of many
thousands of Iraqi documents and the interrogation of
Iraqi intelligence officials, there appears to have been
no significant Iraqi support for terrorist groups for
more than a decade.
There was never any debate
about the repressive nature of Saddam Hussein's regime
and the genuine relief that many Iraqis feel regarding
the end of the pervasive climate of fear that had
gripped the country for a generation. At the same time,
it is significant that Iraqi celebrations over the
regime's collapse have been relatively muted. A few
hundred celebrants in a city of 5 million should not be
portrayed as representing the sentiments of the
population as a whole.
Indeed, outside of some
Kurdish areas of Iraq, there has not been much gratitude
expressed by the population in response to the US
invasion. Though some American analysts have drawn
analogies to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the
overthrow of the communist regimes of Eastern Europe,
those 1989 celebrations were much larger and more
enthusiastic. There is a big difference between tearing
down the statues of an ousted dictator yourself and
having it done by an invading army.
Distrust
of the US
Even putting aside the tens of
thousands of Iraqis who have engaged in anti-American
demonstrations in recent weeks - some of which have been
met by gunfire from US occupation forces - there is a
pervasive sense of ambiguity among ordinary Iraqis
regarding the US invasion and occupation. What few
Americans are willing to recognize at this stage is the
fact that most Iraqis - including strong opponents of
Saddam's regime - simply do not trust the US.
Such mistrust is not unfounded. Consider the
following:
Washington backed Saddam during the height
of his repression in the 1980s, concealing Iraqi
atrocities - such as the chemical weapons attack against
Halabja and other Kurdish towns - and supporting Iraq in
its invasion of Iran.
The US targeting during
the 1991 Gulf War bombing campaign went well beyond what
was necessary to force Iraqi occupation forces from
Kuwait. It included the destruction of key sectors of
Iraq's civilian infrastructure, such as irrigation
systems, bridges and water purification plants. There
were also thousands of accidental noncombatant deaths
from bombs and missiles that landed in civilian areas.
The US-led economic sanctions that followed the
war made it difficult for Iraqis to obtain spare parts
to repair the damage to their civilian infrastructure
and to provide medicines and other necessities for the
general population. Although Saddam certainly shares the
blame for the humanitarian disaster that resulted -
estimates of deaths from malnutrition and preventable
diseases run well into the hundreds of thousands - most
Iraqis believe that US policy actually strengthened
Saddam's grip on power and caused unnecessary suffering
among ordinary Iraqis.
The recent US invasion
resulted in additional thousands of civilian casualties,
both from the initial air assaults as well as from
actions by American occupation forces, who have shot
into vehicles of unarmed civilians approaching
roadblocks and have fired into crowds of demonstrators.
US occupation forces failed to live up to their
obligations under the Fourth Geneva Conventions to
maintain order, to provide adequate health care and
other basic services, and to protect antiquities in the
face of chaos and looting. Nothing could be more
emblematic of US priorities, in the eyes of many Iraqis,
than the way US forces immediately secured oil fields
and the Iraqi Oil Ministry, yet stood by while looters
snatched priceless artifacts from museums and cleaned
out hospitals of crucial medicines and equipment.
Washington has thus far refused to allow the
United Nations to play a significant role in the
political restructuring of Iraq, insisting that it be
primarily a US role to chart the country's future. This
raises concerns among many Iraqis, rightly or wrongly,
that the US will reorganize their country pursuant to
America's economic, strategic and ideological interests
without adequate input by the Iraqi people themselves.
The historical failure of the US to support
democracy in the Arab world raises serious questions as
to whether Washington is really interested in democracy
in Iraq. The US still maintains close military,
diplomatic and economic ties with repressive governments
in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Oman and other Arab countries,
and Washington is a major supporter of Israeli
occupation forces in the Arab-populated West Bank and
Gaza Strip.
The tendency for American
policymakers to view freedom as encompassing not just
political liberties but also commercial "economic
freedom" limits the ability of other nations to protect
their domestic industries and natural resources from
control by powerful foreign corporations. Already,
American companies are being brought in for what the
Bush administration refers to as "reconstruction", and
they appear to be settling in to play a major ongoing
role in the Iraqi economy for many years to come.
As a result of all these and other factors,
there is clearly a growing degree of resentment toward
the American military presence in Iraq. A significant
number of Iraqis are still sympathetic with the
principles of the long-ruling Ba'ath Party, which is
rooted in Arab nationalism, anti-imperialism and
socialism. Although Saddam was to Baathism what Josef
Stalin was to Marxism - both came to power through
advocacy of a populist and egalitarian ideology that was
subverted by a brutal totalitarian governing apparatus
and a cult of personality - the original ideals of the
movement still have widespread appeal.
Filling a power vacuum
Perhaps more
significantly, the power vacuum left by the collapse of
Saddam's dictatorship has cleared the way for social and
political organizations led by Shi'ite clerics, who -
unbound by the more egalitarian structure in Sunni Islam
- can take advantage of their hierarchical
organizational structure to mobilize quasigovernmental
institutions.
Centered in the mosques, which
even Saddam's dreaded secret police could not totally
disrupt, these Shi'ite clerics - unlike most secular
opposition leaders - were able to survive the
repression. In many respects, the situation in Iraq
today parallels that of Shi'ite-populated Iran following
the collapse of the autocratic regime of the Shah in
1978-79, when Shi'ite komitehs (revolutionary
committees) were able to effectively build the
infrastructure of a new government based along
theocratic lines, even though the revolution itself was
broadly based. Within slightly more than two years,
hardline Shi'ite leaders solidified their control over
Iranian government and society, resulting in an
extraordinary wave of repression that has been weakened
only gradually in recent years.
Although
leadership by Shi'ite clergy and their supporters does
not necessarily mean that Iraq will follow the radical
and repressive model of Iran, Shi'ite Muslims do
constitute the majority of the country's population and
firmly believe that their time has come to rule Iraq
after centuries of Sunni domination. Ironically, there
are indications that the US is rehabilitating much of
the Ba'ath Party, including Saddam's police, as a
counterweight to the growing Shi'ite clerical influence.
Even though top leaders of the old regime are still
wanted men, US forces are beginning to see the remaining
Ba'ath Party apparatus as the only entity in the country
with the organization and experience to pose a challenge
to the emerging Shi'ite leadership.
Much of the
Ba'ath Party consists of individuals who joined solely
for career advancement, to take advantage of various
perks, or to try to save themselves and their family
from persecution. But most members still believe in the
party's nationalistic and anti-imperialist principles
and will join with the Islamists in challenging American
rule. Indeed, as the British learned early last century
during their occupation of Iraq after displacing the
Ottoman Turks, Iraqis harbor a deep resentment of
occupying powers from the West.
A safer
world
There is a very real possibility, then,
that a low-level armed insurgency could develop in the
coming weeks and months, not from loyalists of Saddam's
regime, but from ordinary Iraqis demanding
self-determination and an end to the US occupation. For
this reason, there may be no one happier that US forces
have invaded and occupied Iraq than Osama bin Laden, who
now has Americans where he wants them: in the heart of
the Arab-Islamic world and resented by hundreds of
millions of people who see this invasion as an act of
imperialism. Indeed, if there was any logic behind the
madness of September 11, 2001, it may have been the hope
that the US would be provoked to launch such an invasion
and that it would spark a dramatic growth in
anti-American sentiment throughout the region.
If this was indeed the plan, it appears to be
working. The US has squandered the unprecedented
sympathy of the international community in the immediate
aftermath of September 11 and faces the prospect of
unprecedented hostility today. This shift alone should
challenge the assumption that the invasion of Iraq has
somehow made the US safer.
Meanwhile, North
Korea - once it found itself on the Bush
administration's "axis of evil" list along with Iraq,
which it saw was about to be overrun - has decided to
break its commitment to halt its nuclear program,
apparently in hopes of developing a credible nuclear
deterrent to stave off a possible American invasion.
Other countries may learn the same "lesson". As a
result, the US invasion of Iraq has probably increased
rather than decreased the threat of nuclear
proliferation.
The Bush administration claims
that the US invasion of Iraq would somehow advance the
possibility of Arab-Israeli peace appear to be without
any foundation. Iraq has in recent years had virtually
no role in relation to the decades-old conflict in the
lands hundreds of miles to the west. Yasser Arafat and
the Fatah leadership have long resented Saddam's support
during the 1980s and early 1990s of the Abu Nidal
faction, which was responsible for the murder of a
number of prominent Fatah leaders.
Like other
opportunistic Arab dictators, Saddam has long given lip
service to the Palestinian cause but has done little in
practice. For example, there is no evidence that he ever
followed through on his offer to send money to the
families of suicide bombers and other Palestinians
killed in the struggle against Israel. The US invasion
of Iraq has merely highlighted Washington's hypocrisy in
demanding that Iraq disarm its weapons of mass
destruction and abide by UN Security Council resolutions
while refusing to insist that Israel do the same.
Still, in proving that the US can decisively
defeat any Middle Eastern government that challenges
American prerogatives, policymakers hope that - as a
result of the Pentagon's overwhelming and devastating
display of force - those who oppose US hegemony will
somehow now meekly accept American dictates. However,
the more likely result will be an increased sense that
the nation-state is incapable of resisting American
hegemony, and it is therefore up to nonstate actors
utilizing various forms of asymmetrical warfare - such
as terrorism - to fight back. And, as has already become
apparent in the ongoing and protracted war against
al-Qaeda, defeating a decentralized network of
underground terrorist cells is a lot more difficult than
defeating the Republican Guard.
An
alternative security agenda
In summary, even
putting aside the serious moral and legal issues raised
by the US invasion of Iraq, America is probably less
secure as a result. What, then, can the Bush
administration do now to advance America's security
interests?
The US should turn interim governance
of the country over to a United Nations administration
that will pave the way for Iraqi self-rule. There is
precedence for just such a UN role in the two-year
transition of East Timor from its devastating 24-year
occupation by Indonesia to independence this past fall.
With the entire international community, including other
Arab states, represented in the world body, UN efforts
to build up a functioning civil society and
representative political system would be more likely to
succeed.
The eventual Iraqi government would
have far greater legitimacy in the eyes of both Iraqis
and the international community if it developed under UN
administration; otherwise, it would appear - rightly or
wrongly - to simply be a puppet regime of the United
States.
The US should support the establishment
of a weapons of mass destruction-free zone throughout
the Middle East. Such regionwide disarmament regimes
have already been established in Latin America and the
South Pacific. A WMD-free zone throughout the Middle
East has been endorsed both by US allies Egypt and
Jordan and by the potentially hostile regimes of Iran
and Syria.
US security operations in the Middle
East should be restricted to the real threat: the
al-Qaeda network. This would primarily require improving
intelligence and interdiction, with the use of force
restricted to small targeted paramilitary operations
where appropriate. Since such efforts would be greatly
enhanced through the cooperation of Middle Eastern
states, pursuing policies that are less inclined to
alienate the governments and peoples of the region would
seem logical.
The US needs to vigorously support
a sustainable peace between Israelis and Palestinians,
recognizing that security for Israel and rights for
Palestinians are not mutually exclusive but are in fact
mutually dependent. Although Washington should continue
to insist that Palestinian violence - particularly acts
directed toward Israeli civilians - cease
unconditionally, the Bush administration must also
insist that Israel live up to its international
obligations by withdrawing from its illegal settlements
in the occupied territories, giving up control of the
West Bank and Gaza Strip in order to establish a viable
Palestinian state, sharing Jerusalem as the co-capital
of both countries, and negotiating a fair resolution to
the plight of Palestinian refugees.
The US must
support the establishment of democratic governments
throughout the Middle East, which will require - among
other things - suspending military and economic aid to
all countries that engage in gross and systematic
violations of internationally recognized human rights.
Although Washington should not try to impose its form of
democracy on other countries, a natural evolution toward
greater political pluralism in the region will far more
likely emerge if the US ends its current support for
autocratic governments and occupation armies. As
President John F Kennedy warned, "Those who make
peaceful evolution impossible make violent revolution
inevitable."
To set right US policy toward Iraq
would not only put the United States more into line with
international law and international public opinion, it
would be in the national security interests of the
country. There is also a more fundamental question as to
who we are as a nation. Today's debate regarding the US
role in the world in many ways parallels one that took
place just over a century ago when the US invaded the
Philippines. Leading intellectuals of the day, such as
the writer Mark Twain, formed the Anti-Imperialist
League, whose central question was, "What kind of a
nation should we be: a republic or an empire?"
The bottom line is this: The US must pursue a
foreign policy based more on human rights, international
law and sustainable development and less on military
conquest and occupation, arms transfers, and the
profiteering of US-based corporations. Developing such a
new posture in the Middle East would not only be more
consistent with America's stated values, it would also
make us a lot safer.
Stephen Zunes
is Middle East editor of the
Foreign Policy in Focus project and is the author of
Tinderbox: US Middle East Policy and the Roots of
Terrorism (Common Courage Press, 2003). He is
an associate professor of politics and chair of the
Peace & Justice Studies program at the University of
San Francisco.
(Posted with permission from
Foreign Policy in
Focus)
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