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COMMENTARY
Shifting sands, not
shifting realignment
By Ehsan Ahrari
The appetite of the US mass media for creating
cliches never ceases to amaze, even those of us who are
in the midst of it. The latest example of this
phenomenon is the attempt to label the Bush
administration's long-expected decision to withdraw its
troops from Saudi Arabia as a "shifting alignment" of a
major proportion. The implication was that now that it
is pulling out of that country, the United States is
also about to give less significance to Saudi Arabia in
its strategic calculation of the Persian Gulf region.
Where have these cliche-makers been all these
months? Saudi Arabia lost its significance to the US not
too long after the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001. It has been concluded in Washington that the
domestic environment of that country is so acutely
anti-American that it cannot play the role of a credible
ally anymore. One also has to glance at the coverage of
Saudi Arabia in the US media since September 2001 to get
unequivocal evidence of that reality.
US-Saudi
relations had undergone several changes even before the
events of September 11. After defeating Saddam Hussein
in 1991, the United States did not show much interest in
getting out of the kingdom. The stated rationale was to
keep Saddam "in the box". Consequently, there would
never be any chance of the Iraqi dictator repeating any
sneak invasion into Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. But the
Saudis also had to pay the price of allowing a more or
less permanent stationing of US forces on their
territory, thereby adding to the litany of complaints
and resultant anger of all anti-regime forces. The
Saudi-born terrorist Osama bin Laden regularly mentioned
the presence of US forces on the birthplace of Islam as
"sacrilegious", a characterization that found
considerable sympathy in the world of Islam.
At
the same time, Saudi Arabia also neutralized whatever
threats it faced from the Islamic Republic of Iran in
the 1980s by signing a strategic agreement in April
2001. About the only question it might have nurtured
prior to the September 11 events was how long-lasting
that agreement was going to be.
The
post-September 11 security environment in South Asia and
the Persian Gulf regions fundamentally altered the very
nature of the strategic environment of Saudi Arabia for
the better. President George W Bush's declaration of war
against global terrorism, and then his inclusion of Iran
in a so-called "axis of evil", definitely put the
Islamic republic on notice. Since then, the ayatollahs
knew how important it had become for their country to
behave as an integral part of the community of nations
of the Gulf region and of the international community at
large. Even though hardliners inside Iran were slow to
comprehend how serious the United States had become
about its near-zero tolerance for any aspect of Iran's
behavior in the neighborhood that could have been
construed as sponsoring terrorism, they were not
interested in pushing the envelop.
The US
dismantled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and kept
its troops in that country, thereby making Iran nervous
about its long-term intentions. In this context, the
already-fledgling Saudi-Iranian strategic partnership
came in handy in mollifying the leadership of both
countries about not worrying about each other's
strategic intentions.
When the United States'
rhetoric about attacking Iraq was heating up, Saudi
Arabia made its opposition to such an action quite
clear. Whatever secret understandings were made between
Riyadh and Washington about the use of Saudi military
bases, the fact of the matter is that publicly the Saudi
monarchy remained aloof from its long-term ally. That
development turned out to be the proverbial straw that
broke the camel's back. Since then, both sides have been
looking for an opportune moment for the withdrawal of US
forces from Saudi Arabia.
The United States'
toppling of the Saddam regime has inserted radical
changes into the security environment of the Gulf
region. Now a major source of instability and a threat
of future war is no more. Saudi Arabia does not have to
look nervously across its northern borders anymore.
If the US were to gain military bases in Iraq in
the coming months - speculations about which surfaced in
the last week of April - then any potential resurgence
of Iran's desire to export its Islamic revolution would
also be eliminated. It should be noted that even though
Iran has stopped acting along those lines for about 15
years, Washington has never stopped getting anxious over
its prospects.
The post-Saddam Persian Gulf
region is also different for the US in the sense that it
has gained permanent bases in Kuwait and Qatar. As
unimportant as those emirates are as small states, they
are much more vulnerable to US attempts to bully them
for future basing needs than Saudi Arabia. Washington
will have no problem living with that hard reality. It
will have a hard time getting over the fact that Riyadh
withstood its pressure for allowing the use of its bases
to carry out air attacks on Iraq.
Under these
circumstances, the decision of the Bush administration
to station forces permanently in Qatar is merely an
inconsequential shift - which may be compared to a minor
sandstorm that slightly alters the shape of
insignificant sand dunes - not a realignment of a major
strategic import.
Now the US must assess what it
wants to achieve in the Persian Gulf region. An
important item on the agenda is to contain Iran and keep
it from influencing the nature of government that the
United States is attempting to build in Iraq. Both Iran
and Saudi Arabia have their respective agendas of seeing
a Shi'ite- and Sunni-dominated Islamic government in
Iraq. However, they are not likely to quarrel over it,
given how crucial it is for the US to have its own way
in Iraq - a secular democratic government. Riyadh and
Tehran are not likely to be too unhappy to see a
moderate Islamic democracy as a neighboring state. That
would be a better choice for both of them than having a
secular government headed by a pro-American expatriate.
By the same token, Saudi Arabia will also assess
its ties with the United States, especially when King
Fahd is no longer around. Until then, the withdrawal of
US troops is a welcome relief for the Saudi monarchy.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd.
All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
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