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COMMENTARY
Regime change, al-Qaeda
style
By Ehsan Ahrari
The
suicide attacks inside the expatriate compound in Riyadh
on May 12 were the first salvo fired by al-Qaeda to
bring about regime change in Saudi Arabia. This might
become the beginning of the end for either the Wahhabi
regime as we have known it, or for al-Qaeda, which is
very much part and parcel of the Wahhabi sect, but which
has finally turned against the very guardian of that
sect, the Saudi monarchy.
This battle between
the Saudi regime and al-Qaeda is also being conducted
for the mantle of Sunni orthodoxy that the Saudi dynasty
pledged in 1745 to protect and promote. It did well in
fulfilling both promises until the early 1990s, when
Riyadh allowed United States troops - which were invited
in for the specific purpose of defending the kingdom
against a potential invasion of Saddam Hussein's Iraq,
and were expected to depart soon after defeating his
forces - to stay on its soil. That was when the battle
lines were drawn between al-Qaeda and the Saudi
government. But the chief enemy in the eyes of al-Qaeda
was the United States, the "super-Infidel" and the
promoter of hedonism and lecherous consumerism through
its "soft power". The Saudi monarchy was perceived as
its "errand boy", which was to be taken care of at a
later date.
Al-Qaeda might have targeted the
Saudi monarchy in the mid-to-late 1990s if not for the
Taliban regime, which gave it a home to open its "jihad
university" to train men who were to conduct jihad in
the areas contiguous to Afghanistan. The world then
looked quite promising from al-Qaeda's vantage point.
Afghanistan was the prototype of a failed and outlaw
state over which to take control, and then expand the
scope of its jihadi operations to neighboring Central
Asia. The five Central Asian states - Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan -
are also near-failed states, except Islam was, and
continues to be, on the defensive in all of them. That
reality made them ideal candidates for creating
conditions leading to civil war. That, in turn, was to
be a prelude to capturing power by the Islamist forces
within their respective borders.
From 1996
through 2000, the al-Qaeda-Taliban nexus remained on the
offensive. Even China and Russia were gravely concerned
about the terrorist activities of its cohorts inside
their borders. In fact, they established an alliance,
the Shanghai Five, in 1996 for the specific purpose of
battling terrorist threats stemming from Afghanistan.
That alliance comprised China, Russia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In June 2001, Uzbekistan
became its sixth member, and the alliance was renamed
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.
But no
indomitable regional or global attempt was made to
combat al-Qaeda at that time, much less eradicate it.
However, the terrorist attacks on the US in September
2001 changed all that. The lone superpower, and the
victim of al-Qaeda's campaign of terror, declared war on
terrorism, and vowed to eradicate it, along with its
cohorts anywhere in the world.
The
post-September 11 era started a phase when Saudi Arabia
also came under intense scrutiny and criticism by the US
government and the American media. Wahhabism as an
ideology came into the limelight, and the Saudi
association with that ideology also became part of the
acute analysis.
The dismantlement of the Taliban
regime in November 2001 deprived al-Qaeda of a sovereign
territory from which it could launch its regional and
even global operations. I would even argue that the
post-September 11 era created an environment when the
notion of "sovereignty" no longer restricted the US from
going after a government accused of sponsoring
terrorism. That terrorist entity had to find temporary
havens in Pakistan, Yemen, and even in Saudi Arabia.
There is little doubt that its battle with the US had to
intensify, especially since al-Qaeda had an opportunity
to regroup and garner its strength, while the US was
busy invading Iraq.
The credit for al-Qaeda's
seeming decision to intensify its battle with Saudi
Arabia goes to the Bush administration, its decision to
topple Saddam, and its heightened rhetoric of regime
change in the Middle East. What is significantly
different now is that, in the aftermath of the US
invasion of Iraq, no potential target of regime change
will view the US's rhetoric as empty talk.
This
reality has to have its effect on Saudi Arabia. Not that
it would become a target of regime change, but it will
have no choice but to examine its ties with the Wahhabi
sect, and that sect's contentious notion of jihad.
Rulers in Riyadh will have to take substantive actions
with a view to bringing about radical change within
their borders. That process may not take place
imminently, but it cannot be postponed indefinitely
either.
So, there is little doubt that the
Wahhabi rulers of Saudi Arabia are facing a defining
moment that will initiate a process of momentous change
in the domestic arena. One outcome is likely to be the
rejection of the militant notion of jihad strictly under
the traditional definition of "enemies" of God. Another
outcome might lead to the opening of the Saudi political
system, whose closeness has had one overarching purpose
- perpetuation of the Saudi monarchy. These changes are
not acceptable to al-Qaeda, for they will be swiftly
judged as "anti-Islamic", largely because they are
viewed as externally induced.
Why did al-Qaeda
choose this time to strike in Riyadh may not now, or
ever, be known. One can only speculate that it might be
concerned that the Saudi regime would crack down hard on
its cells inside the kingdom, and preemptively struck
first. Some reports say that the terrorist attack was
against the Vinnell Corporation of the US, which has
been accused of being a Central Intelligence Agency
front and of recruiting "executive mercenaries". Vinnell
is involved in training the Saudi National Guard and it
also trained Saudi troops to guard oilfields. Its
employees (six died in the latest suicide attacks) also
fought alongside Saudi troops in the Gulf War of 1991.
More to the point, it might have been targeted by
al-Qaeda because it is a symbol of the US in the
homeland of Islam.
My own thinking is that
al-Qaeda may have concluded that it has reached a point
when it can draw the US government into a major fight by
forcing it to come to the defense of the Saudi regime at
a time when anti-Americanism in that country, and in the
region, is at an all-time high. In this light, the
suicide attacks of May 12 may be the beginning of a
larger terror campaign aimed at destabilizing the
regime. Al-Qaeda knows that it will not win against the
US unless it can create enormous chaos in the Middle
East by drawing the power into the heartland of Islam.
The Saudi monarchy's own grim conclusions regarding
these events are reflected in the comments of its
ambassador to the US, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, when he
depicted those attacks as his country's Pearl Harbor, if
not September 11.
Even if one were not to opt
for name-calling, there is little doubt that regime
change is coming in Saudi Arabia, and al-Qaeda is
responsible for it in a major way. As a consequence, I
don't expect that country to choose political pluralism
or democracy any time soon. At the same time, however,
it will not remain the kind of inward-looking,
conservative monarchy that the world has known it to be.
But once change starts to enter the vocabulary of a
regime that has been abhorrent to any major changes, it
might be swept aside by its uncontrollable and
irrepressible momentum.
(?003 Asia Times Online
Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
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