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IRAN AND REGIME
CHANGE
Leave it to the
Iranians
By Hooman Peimani
Over a one-week period, two groups of
influential Iranians have criticized the unelected but
powerful institutions undermining efforts towards their
country's liberalization. They have both expressed
concerns about the status quo, and demanded a change. As
the American administration is clearly shifting towards
destabilizing the Iranian government, these realities of
Iranian society suggest that an inevitable fundamental
change in its political system will not be an American
determined outcome, but one arising from a deep-rooted
indigenous movement for democracy.
Unlike what
some hawkish policy makers in Washington might think,
Iran is a totally different society from those of
Afghanistan and Iraq in terms of history, social fabric
and development, political aspirations and economic,
industrial, scientific and military capabilities. As a
result, the American experience in those countries on
"regime change" is simply inapplicable to Iran. Despite
the depth of social dissatisfaction with the status quo
and a clear desire for a secular political system, as
citizens of an ancient country now a regional power with
claims to a higher international status, Iranians will
not act according to any Washington-envisaged plan.
In particular, unlike in Iraq and Afghanistan,
Iran has a genuine popular pro-democracy movement with a
clear, but yet to be achieved, demand for a democratic
political system, whose roots can be traced back to the
second half of the 19th century. Internal and external
factors have since muted that movement during certain
periods. However, social and economic necessities have
made it reemerge in intervals.
Iran's first
major popular movement for democracy resulted in the
1906 Constitutional Revolution, which changed the Qajar
Dynasty's despotic monarchy into a constitutional one.
The subsequent suppression of that revolution and the
restoration of despotism, although not in name, muted
the movement until 1941, when Allied forces occupied
Iran. Unintentionally, that development weakened the
despotic Pahalvi Dynasty, the successor of the
aforementioned. Such new political environment helped
surface the movement one more time, which lasted until
1953 when an Anglo-American coup restored the Shah to
power.
The pro-democracy movement reappeared in
the early 1960s, only to be suppressed again in 1963 as
the Shah consolidated his power. Social necessities
helped its reemergence in 1976 in the form of an
expanding popular movement with clear democratic
demands. Thanks to three decades of suppression, the
weakness of the political parties with democratic
platforms enabled a faction of the dissatisfied clergy
to gain the movement's leadership. Thus, the Shah's
overthrow in 1979 did not bring about a democratic
political system. Yet such demands remained a popular
aspiration until 1981, when the ruling clergy resorted
to a massive suppression of all opposition forces in its
bid for consolidation. The profound social and economic
developments of the 1980s and the 1990s created grounds
for the reemergence of the democratic movement in the
second half of the 1990s.
Hence, the landslide
election as president of Mohammad Khatami did not begin
the Iranian democratic movement. On the contrary, it was
a reaction of the ruling elite to its surfacing. Thus,
whereas the popular movement demanded a radical change,
ie, the replacement of the religious regime with a
secular democratic one, Khatami and his faction in
totality advocated limited reforms of the existing
theocracy to ensure its survival. As the ruling regime
did not allow the establishment of political parties
promoting secular democracy, the majority of the
Iranians accepted Khatami's leadership, whose broad
statements in favor of the rule of law and democracy
coincided with their basic demands. However, the clear
decline in Khatami's enthusiasm for meaningful reforms
in 1998 initiated a process of split between the
Khatami's reformist faction and the popular
pro-democracy movement. The latter has gradually become
disillusioned about his ability and willingness and
those of his faction in leading a transition to a
desired secular democracy.
The existing popular
dissatisfaction should be viewed within this historical
context. Its existence is therefore not due to any
intentional effort on the part of any single political
group, but the natural outcome of a long process of
social development. Such a situation now demands a
fundamental change in Iran's political system to make it
compatible with the social and economic realities of its
society. Consequently, this is not a process over which
the American hawks, or anybody else for that matter, can
exercise control. Nor can they shape it to suit their
interests.
Although the majority of Iranians
support normal relations with the United States, they do
not desire to help build an American puppet regime. For
those who are not convinced, the Iranians overthrew such
a system in 1979. As a result, the desired ties as
stated by the Iranians are those based on equality of
the two sides and their recognition of each other's
interests, like the ones they have with two other
nuclear powers, Russia and France. The American
hoped-for puppet regime, like that of the Shah, cannot
be established in Iran - with or without B-52s.
Against this background, the expression of
concern by the two-mentioned groups can be analyzed.
What they have in common is their conclusion that the
total dissatisfaction of Iranians with their rulers has
numbered the life of the Islamic regime as it stands.
They also refer to the mounting threat of the American
military presence around Iran as a factor demanding a
quick addressing of the internal problems. However, they
differ in their offering solutions and their choice of
audience.
The May 24 open letter of 127
pro-reform MPs addressed to Ayatollah Ali Hoseini
Khamenei (the "Leader of the Islamic Revolution" who
presides over the powerful Council of Guardians)
demanded the Iranian leader to intervene on behalf of
frustrated Khatami to help him continue its reforms
within the framework of the existing regime. For that
matter, the signatories confined their criticism to the
destructive activities of the conservative-dominated
Council of Guardians. This entity has a constitutional
right to reject the Iranian parliament's passed laws and
decisions, a power used on an almost routine basis to
undermine Khatami's efforts to implement his reforms.
However, the May 19 letter of 196 well-known
political activists, university professors, journalists,
present and previous members of parliament and
politicians and dissident clerics, which was addressed
to the Iranian people, demanded "a free and independent
Iran". Thus, it attacked unelected institutions,
including the Council of Guardians, the Expediency
Council - which resolves legislative issues on which the
majlis (parliament) and the Council of Guardians fail to
reach an agreement - the judiciary as well as the
government-run radio and television organization in
control of all national and provincial radio and
television programs.
To be precise, the second
group does not specifically reject Khatami's efforts, a
logical point of compromise among a wide range of
signatories with differing final objectives.
Nevertheless, it clearly reflects the disillusionment of
the majority of Iranians who demand a political system
totally different from the existing one.
Between
the Iranian government's rival "conservative" and
"reformist" factions, the mounting dissatisfaction of
the Iranians with their political system is weighing in
favor of the latter's demands, whether it be for reform
of the present system, or a completely new one. If the
current trend continues, this will pave the way for a
gradual replacement of the religious system with a
secular one. Any American intervention in this process
will simply hamper such process by making all Iranians
unite in face of a superpower seeking to restore its
lost influence in their country, an unwanted scenario
for the nationals of a regional power.
Dr
Hooman Peimani works as an independent consultant
with international organizations in Geneva and does
research in international relations.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All
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