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US tries again to bridge Muslim cultural
divide
By R S Zaharna
(Posted
with permission from Foreign Policy in Focus)
The recent Pew Research Center for the People
and the Press poll found that America's image has become
"dangerously" negative throughout the Arab and Muslim
world. Ironically, this follows an intensive public
diplomacy initiative aimed specifically at the region.
How did America's battle for the hearts and minds of the
Arabs and Muslims wind up alienating the very people
Washington was trying to reach?
Many in
Washington are struggling to find an answer. On June 6,
the State Department appointed Edward Djerejian, former
ambassador to Syria, to lead a team of experts to
improve America's communication with Arabs and Muslims.
But before we begin the second round of public
diplomacy, it may be helpful to review what went wrong
in the first.
Lessons from round
one
The immediate explanation for the declining
support is America's war on terrorism that culminated
with the American-led military action in Iraq. However,
the purpose of public diplomacy is to garner support for
policies, even unpopular policies - and even from
skeptical foreign publics. To be effective, public
diplomacy must work not only in times of peace, but also
in times of conflict. During times of conflict, support
is even more imperative.
Another explanation is
American credibility. Many throughout the region
perceive a mismatch between the words of American public
diplomacy and the actions of American foreign policy.
This discrepancy between America's words and actions
creates a serious credibility problem that can undermine
even the best campaign. While not all public diplomacy
problems are "communication problems", communication can
help resolve policy and credibility issues. Public
diplomacy may not have been the answer to the
post-September 11, 2001 crisis, but it was an important
tool. The problem is, it didn't work.
The idea
that American public communication backfired with
foreign audiences suggests a primary culprit: culture.
Rather than being culturally neutral, American public
diplomacy reflects a uniquely American cultural style of
communicating. While effective with the American public,
this style failed with Arab and Muslim publics. In some
cases, efforts by American officials to explain American
policy were as offensive as the policy itself.
First, the goal of American public diplomacy
focused on getting America's message out. This
information-centered goal parallels the "information
overload" syndrome found in America, where communication
problems are seen and solved by supply of information.
The Arab world has a more relationship-centered view of
communication. Rather than focusing on one-way message
strategies to inform people, Arab culture tends to use
two-way relationship-building strategies to connect
people. America's information-centered goal resulted in
a flood of information that was neatly packaged, but
that failed to connect with the people.
Second,
American public diplomacy relied heavily on the mass
media to get Washington's message out to the most people
in the least time. Americans' emphasis on communication
efficiency, as well as a relatively long and trusting
relationship with the mass media, make the mass media
the most efficient and effective medium for
communicating with the American public. In the Arab
world, meeting people face to face may not be the most
efficient means of communicating, but it is the most
effective. Interpersonal channels are not only
preferred, but the Arab mass media does not have a
stellar history of credibility and trust with its
public. Accordingly, relying on the mass media may be
ineffective, if not counterproductive.
American
officials were repeatedly shocked by the tenacity of
rumors when America went after the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Despite setting up a rapid response team of
American spokespersons to cover the news cycle from
Karachi to Washington, vicious rumors persisted. Rumors
speak to the power that social networks have over the
media to spread information. The misperceptions speak to
the credibility that interpersonal communication has
over the mass media.
The State Department's
multi-million dollar advertising campaign promoting
Muslim life in America failed for the same reason.
Television advertisements cannot compete with personal
phone calls from Muslims and Arabs in America about the
immigration and discrimination problems they have faced
here after September 11.
Similarly, the American
style uses facts and evidence as its primary tools of
persuasion. Each time Secretary Colin Powell appeared
before the United Nations, he forcefully detailed the
facts of America's case against Saddam Hussein. For most
Americans, "the facts speak for themselves". For most
people in the Muslim world, impersonal facts ring
hollow, while metaphors and analogies persuade. Not
coincidentally, the dominant persuasive devices found in
the Holy Koran are analogies, metaphors and rhetorical
questions. These are the tools Osama bin Laden wields so
effectively.
Directness is another stylistic
difference. President George W Bush's penchant for
"speaking straight" communicated a resolve that most
Americans cheered. In many Muslim countries, such
directness in public settings is perceived as
"confrontational", threatening one's public face as well
as the collective social fabric.
Finally, many
of the appeals found in American messages missed the
mark. One outstanding example was American attempts to
show how the "war on terror" was not a "war on Islam" by
emphasizing America's help to Muslims in Bosnia, Kosovo
and Afghanistan. Emphasizing "one's good" is a coveted
practice in American public relations. American
officials were naturally confused, and some offended by
the apparent ingratitude. However, for most Muslims,
calling attention to one's charity or good deeds is
frowned upon. The Koran admonishes, "Cancel not your
charity by reminders of your generosity or injury."
Missing culture
These are but a few of
the subtle, yet powerful cultural differences that
distinguish American public communication from that in
the Arab and Muslim world. Because the American style
elicits such a positive response with the American
public, American officials were at a loss to explain why
their best efforts were failing and America's image was
spiraling downward. Many were understandably frustrated.
However, seldom do different styles of communicating
resonate the same with different cultures.
American officials appear to have overlooked
culture as an inherent feature of public diplomacy, and
in the process, inadvertently magnified
misunderstandings and tensions between America and the
Arab and Muslim worlds. Because of the open nature of
public diplomacy, a nation can no longer separate its
domestic public from foreign publics. What one hears,
the other hears. When America amplified its message
through stronger language and more vigorous
dissemination, American domestic support grew and
foreign support weakened - same message, opposite
reactions. The more America intensified is public
diplomacy efforts - using an American style - the
greater the gap became between America's domestic and
foreign publics.
The problem may have been
exacerbated by America's crisis management strategy.
During times of conflict, rallying domestic support
often means identifying a foreign enemy. If a foreign
public identifies with the "foreign enemy", efforts to
demonize the enemy will only further alienate the
foreign public. The Pew study bears this out.
As
America embarks on a new round of public diplomacy, the
challenge is how to cross the cultural barriers so
America's public communication positively resonates with
its domestic and foreign publics. Meeting this challenge
requires that American public diplomacy coordinate
America's message among its many spokespersons and
harmonize America's communication with its many publics.
The two go hand in hand.
Achieving internal
coordination appears promising. America's initial public
diplomacy efforts highlighted the need for coordination.
Disputes within the administration were producing
conflicting messages. However, by the time America
entered Iraq, all officials were speaking with one
powerful voice. If there was a success in the first
round of American public diplomacy, achieving
coordination was it.
However, now that America
is in Iraq, the problem of coordination has re-emerged.
When the American military entered Iraq, it became the
new face of American public diplomacy in the region.
American troops are now are both the medium and the
message. America's credibility, matching words about
Iraq with deeds in Iraq, will be closely monitored. Such
scrutiny will require even greater coordination between
the Pentagon and State Department, but the two have had
much practice.
Harmonizing America's
communication with its internal and external publics
will be more challenging and require large doses of
cultural awareness. Just as culture appears to shape the
communication of a people, so culture shapes the public
diplomacy of a nation. Ironically, American officials
may have been so focused on studying their audience's
culture that they neglected the influence of their own.
Being more attuned to culture may mean less
Washington-driven initiatives that sound good here, and
more field-driven initiatives that work well there.
Few can envy the public diplomacy task
ambassador Djerejian faces. But then, as a veteran
diplomat, he may find the dual goals of coordinating
America's communication internally and harmonizing it
externally, very much in keeping with his expertise.
Public diplomacy, like traditional diplomacy, is more
about building relationships than sending out messages.
R S Zaharna
is a Middle East analyst for
Foreign Policy In Focus and an assistant professor of
public communication at American University.
(Posted with permission from Foreign
Policy in Focus)
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