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COMMENTARY
Damage control and blame
games
By Ehsan Ahrari
It's
either because of the reports of potentially enduring
economic downturn in the United States economy or the
strong sense that the next presidential election of late
2004 is fast approaching, but the Bush administration
has initiated two actions. The first one is the
beginning of damage control in Iraq, and the second is
blaming the neo-conservatives for creating false public
expectations that the conquest of Iraq would be a
cakewalk. Such a Pollyannaish description, it is
suggested in some quarters, might have been one reason
why the US did not adequately prepare itself for ruling
Iraq. The military campaign, at least the intense phases
of it, may be depicted as a cakewalk, but the occupation
of Iraq is becoming progressively more bloody and
frustrating as American troops are dying almost daily as
a result of mounting opposition to the occupation of
Iraq.
Watching the growing anti-Americanism in
Iraq, it was disconcerting to see, starting with the
collapse of the Iraqi government, how some top American
officials, behaving as if they were living in fantasy
land, refused to recognize the serious problems their
country would encounter in the days ahead. I vividly
recall how derisive and dismissive Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld was in his response to reports of
looting of the Iraqi national museum. He labeled it
minor "untidiness", then observed, "How many vases can
one nation possess?" Representatives of the American
media, who were covering that press conference, joined
in with an approving laughter. Obviously, there was no
recognition in the Pentagon how the deterioration of
land and order would come back to haunt them. Moreover,
Rumsfeld's and General Tommy Franks' frequent labeling
of attacks on American soldiers as "actions of the
deadenders" may have been aimed at soothing the
ever-growing sense of frustration, but it did not signal
that they comprehended the pervasive nature of
bludgeoning animosity in Iraq toward the US.
Even by moving away from the polemical end of
the spectrum of problems of ruling an occupied nation,
and looking at it from the angle of public
administration, one still has no reason to be reassured
that things will get better in Iraq in the near future.
To start with, the Iraqis are already comparing the pace
and scope of the current reconstruction of their country
with the one that was carried out by Saddam Hussein in
the aftermath of the Gulf War of 1991. But back then,
the work situation was quite different. Everyone worked
24 hours a day, non-stop. "The main reason," one Iraqi
pointed out, "is that back then we had a state. We got
high wages from the government; they were throwing money
at us." None of those conditions is present now. The
chief problem is the absence of a national entity that
speaks for the Iraqis. An international bureaucrat, who
is stationed in Iraq, chimed in by noting that his major
problems in working in that country stem from a lack of
a national decision maker with whom he can discuss
technical issues.
The Coalition Provision
Authority, headed by L Paul Bremer, is ruling Iraq;
however, the senior policy advisers (ie, Americans) of
that entity are reluctant to issue bold orders to the
Iraqi ministries (comprising senior Iraqi technocrats)
"for fear of appearing as arrogant colonial overlords".
Consequently, perhaps unwittingly, they are creating
what's called in the technical jargon "organizational
dysfunction", which, in layman's terms, is nondecisions
and impasse. Those conditions, in turn, explain the
pervasive snail-paced progress in reconstructing Iraq.
That low level of progress is feeding into resentment by
most Iraqis. Their hopes were that after getting
"liberated" from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein, they
would immediately become the masters of their nation's
destiny, and would not have to rely on the seeming
bungling American governors for the fulfillment of their
daily needs. Iraq badly needs a legitimate functioning
government; however, as a matter of technical priority,
Bremer has decided to postpone making such a government.
Even that measure is frustrating, especially for the
Shi'ites, who were hoping to play a visible role in
formulating a national government. Speaking of a
functioning government, there is also a dire need for a
large corps of experienced technocrats. But that need is
further exacerbated by Bremer's decision to dissolve the
Ba'ath Party by firing 300,000 of its top officials. It
is hard to question the essence of that decision;
however, its timing is terribly wrong and - at some
point in the near future - it may require
reconsideration.
Even when Bremer has taken bold
measures, the results are not less frustrating. For
instance, his decision to steer Iraq away from a
socialist command economy is a radical one, indeed.
Under normal circumstances - ie, during a time when
there is a functioning indigenous government - a
decision of that import produces powerful shockwaves
through the economy and the entire social structure that
so direly depends for its survival on the smooth
functioning of the economy. However, when a cadre of
American advisers is ruling Iraq, a decision of that
magnitude is bound to cause massive turbulence and
related social anguish. Bremer also disbanded the Iraqi
army, thereby adding a substantial size of antagonists
to an already large number of those who have reasons to
abhor the American presence in Iraq.
As
important as these problems are, nothing required more
urgent action than bringing an end to the killing of the
American soldiers on almost a daily basis. Thus far, the
American public has not manifested a lack of patience
over it, but the Bush administration knows that it is on
a short leash. Consequently, a quiet but highly
significant decision was taken to send a team of
"outside policy experts" for an "independent review of
post-war operations in Iraq". This group - which
comprises John Hamre, Bathsheba Crocker and Frederick
Barton of the Washington-based Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Bob Orr of the Washington branch
of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Johanna
Mendelson-Forman of the UN Foundation - will advise
Bremer while he conducts a "strategy review". The fact
that this group has been assembled is a testimony to
another fact: the innermost sanctum of the Bush
administration has begrudgingly accepted that it failed
to prepare adequately for the occupation of Iraq.
Some inter-agency experts in Washington - whose
job it is to advise the Democratic and Republic
administrations on the ever-changing and a highly
protean inter-agency process - have been using various
forums to make that point all along.
The issue
of blame game is not that serious yet. The Bush
administration also wants the neo-conservatives to
"cool" the rhetoric of Pax Americana, and let the
officials focus on designing a strategy that will help
the US calm things down in Iraq. There is a fear that if
the bloodletting continues, critics of the Iraqi
invasion will jump in with high decibel criticism of
President George Bush, who has already decided that the
"liberation" theme will play well during the next
election campaign. In fact, he is quite persistent in
pointing out to crowds in his fund-raising galas that
two "outlaw regimes" (in Afghanistan and Iraq) are no
more. That theme will be further sharpened in campaign
commercials, much like Ronald Reagan used his
anti-Soviet rhetoric in his reelection campaign in 1984.
At least for now, there are demands inside
Congress that Bush become more specific on the extent of
the troop commitment and the costs necessary to
stabilize Iraq. Senator Richard Lugar (Republican) -
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and
a highly respected voice on foreign affairs - has
publicly voiced his concern along those lines. If the
Iraqi occupation continues to bleed the US, then the
whole issue of the reapplication of the Bush doctrine a
la regime change will have to be shelved. That is
something the Washington neo-conservatives cannot
stomach at this time. But they are realistic enough to
know that the US has to get it right in Iraq. Then Bush
has to be reelected. Only then, they figure, they can
once again turn on their rhetoric of pax-Americana.
From the standpoint of the Bush administration,
damage control is a prudent tactic, especially before
the situation in Iraq deteriorates seriously. Once the
presidential elections-related campaign in the US
intensifies, Bush doesn't want to be in a defensive
mode, responding to daily headlines from Iraq. He has to
remain on the offensive, keeping the Democratic
presidential candidates off-balance on US national
security issues. But he can only do that if the internal
situation in Iraq stabilizes, and stabilizes very soon.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria,
Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd.
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