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Iranian change of tack on ME in the
wind
By Hooman Peimani
Amid
news of the implementation of a road map in the Middle
East and the intensification of attacks on the American
military in Iraq, last week most Western media ignored a
potentially important letter of an Iranian clergy with
ties to Iran's higher echelons of power as the letter of
Sayed Safavi hinted at a possible change in Tehran's
foreign policy towards the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
In a June 30 letter to a British newspaper The
Daily Telegraph, Safavi denounced suicide bombings
against civilians regardless of their religion as a
"crime" in his reference to the mentioned conflict. He
denounced such acts even within the context of a holy
war, or jihad. Accordingly, "for Muslims to kill
civilians unconnected with any attack on them is a
crime. This is not in accordance with Islam." He added,
"The principal law of Islam is, 'Don't attack
civilians'. This includes Jewish, Muslim or Christian
civilians." The Israelis and their Western supporters
describe suicide bombings as terrorism. However, many
Arabs, including Palestinians, consider them as a form
of resistance to the Israeli occupation of the Gaza
Strip, the West Bank and East Jerusalem and as a
reaction to the Israeli military's killings of
Palestinian civilians during its operations.
In his
letter, Safavi also implicitly referred to negotiations
as the means to end the Arab-Israeli conflict, while
hinting at a possible recognition of Israel by the
Iranian government. He therefore called for a dialogue
among Muslim, Jewish and Christian religious leaders to
help the parties to that conflict resolve their
disputes. Such a call would imply the acceptance of
negotiations between predominately-Jewish Israel with
the main Arab nations in conflict with that country,
Palestine, Lebanon and Syria, whose populations comprise
Muslims and Christians. As a means to end their
prolonged conflict, any dialogue among their religious
or non-religious representatives or among those with
ties with the mentioned nations necessitates the
recognition of the legitimacy of their respective
states, including Israel. Iran's approval of any such
dialogue would implicitly imply its recognition of that
state as well.
Beside its content, Safavi's
letter was significant for the status of its writer.
With regard to that letter, Safavi's importance is only
partly explained in his position as a clergyman. Being
the brother of the commander of Iran's Revolutionary
Guards Corps (RGC), General Yahya Rahim Safavi, his
letter carried a certain political weight unmatched by
any liberal-minded cleric, many of whom exist inside and
outside of the Iranian clergy-dominated political
system. The latter's "conservative" faction controls the
RGC, whose commander is appointed by Iranian Supreme
Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Being the brother of a
powerful "conservative", Safavi's statements would most
likely have had the blessing of the "conservatives", or
at least some of their influential members, even though
he described them as "personal reflections".
The
letter is also important for its timing. It was
published when British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw was
conducting talks in Tehran as he paid his fourth
official visit to Iran in less than two years. While
sharing some of the American government's criticisms and
concerns, the British government has sought its
independent policy towards its Iranian counterpart,
which coincides with the non-confrontational policy of
the European Union (EU) towards Iran. Building on the
peaceful ties restored by his predecessor Robin Cook
after years of estrangement, Straw's policy of
engagement with Iran has matched the Iranian
government's engagement policy towards EU countries, its
largest trading partners. A cooperative mood on both
sides has resulted in the expansion of British-Iranian
ties.
Although high-ranking Iranian officials
have not explicitly indicated their willingness to
revise their policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict,
there have been gradual changes in that policy since the
late 1990s. This has been evident in a noticeable
decline in rhetoric on the part of the Iranian
government, as well as in its decreasing material
support for those fighting Israel. Despite claims to the
contrary, there is not any evidence on Iran's assisting
Palestinian groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad.
As for Lebanon's Hezbollah, Tehran's backing of its
military wing has been declining in favor of supporting
its non-military activities, such as financing the
group's social services, including its educational and
medical centers open to all Lebanese regardless of their
religions.
Certain factors make the Hezbollah
distinct from Hamas and the Islamic Jihad, although Tel
Aviv and Washington put it in the same category. These
are its status as a legal political party represented in
the Lebanese parliament and its recognition by the
Lebanese government and all the major Christian, Doroz
and Islamic (Shi'ite and Sunni) Lebanese political
parties as a patriotic movement to resist the occupation
of Southern Lebanon by Israel. Consequently, the
Lebanese government excluded the Hezbollah from the
program to disarm all armed Lebanese groups as decided
in the Ta'if agreement of 1990, which ended the
devastating Lebanese civil war. Additionally, the
Hezbollah has mainly limited its attacks on Israeli
military targets and aims at the removal of the Israeli
troops from the Shaba region, which Israel has kept
since its 2000 withdrawal from South Lebanon and to
which the Lebanese government has territorial claim.
Despite occasional rhetoric and slogans, the
Arab-Israeli conflict has lost its preeminent position
in Iran's foreign policy, which it enjoyed in the 1980s.
This is the result of Iran's changing needs, which
requires extensive and peaceful relations with
non-Middle Eastern countries, in particular those of
Europe. It is also the consequence of a very different
international system in the post-Cold war era demanding
a new pattern of alignment, as reflected in Tehran's
comprehensive relations with Russia, China and India.
Finally, it is the outcome of the existence of
opportunities for Iran's political and economic
expansion in certain regions, which share historical,
cultural and ethnic ties with Iran, such as its
neighboring Central Asia and the Caucasus. Thus, while
many factors, including geographical necessities and
security considerations, make Iran interested in the
Middle East, many other factors are decreasing the
significance of that region, excluding the Persian Gulf,
in Tehran's foreign policy, with an inevitable lowering
Iranian interest in the Arab-Israeli conflict.
The Iranian government has not announced any
major change in its foreign policy towards the
Arab-Israeli conflict. However, as it and/or any of its
factions have not yet reacted to Safavi's letter, the
letter could be a sign of Iran's intention to change
that policy through probing the international reaction
to such a change. If this is the plan, a change in the
hostile policy of Israel and the United States towards
Iran will be a necessity to encourage the Iranians to
take steps towards that end.
Dr Hooman
Peimani works as an independent consultant with
international organizations in Geneva and does research
in international relations.
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
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