| |
COMMENTARY
In Iraq, 'v' doesn't stand for
victory
By Ehsan Ahrari
Vietnam
and Watergate are two overwhelming metaphors of the
American political lexicon with which no sitting
president wants any association. The first one is
related to the United States's rather humiliating
withdrawal from South Vietnam, and the second axiom
epitomizes political corruption that led to the
ignominious ouster of a president from office. That is
one reason why the administration of President George W
Bush is fighting an uphill battle to nip in the bud all
the suggestions of similarities between its presence in
Iraq and the Vietnamese imbroglio. But there are
similarities, to be sure, and they are intensifying.
Shadows of the ghosts of Vietnam are growing tall.
To start, America is an occupying force in Iraq
- as much as it was in South Vietnam, or it was so
depicted by the communist rulers in Hanoi - no matter
how much the top public officials in Washington insist
on being labeled as "liberators". Here is one of the
great ironies. US forces brought about an end to a
tyrannical rule, but they were perceived as liberators
for only a fleeting period. That feeling was epitomized
in the comments of a nameless Iraqi when he said to an
American soldier in the immediate aftermath of the
toppling of Saddam Hussein, "Thank you for liberating
us, now please go home."
But America could not
have gone home. Much work had to be done. An entire
national infrastructure had to be rebuilt; one of the
most intricate tasks was recreating a political
authority in Iraq, so that it could never again be
atrophied into a tyranny for its people and an aggressor
to its neighbors.
Those tasks did not have to be
carried out directly by the US and the United Kingdom,
but by the United Nations, with an active and visible
participation of the Arab League. However, in the
post-September 11, 2001 environment, Bush had the
ambition of redesigning the Muslim Middle East in
America's image. Those who have the slightest doubt
about this characterization should read his National
Security Strategy, his West Point speech of June 2002,
and the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2002.
Consequently, only a secondary or a tertiary role was to
be given to the UN, but the Arab League was to play no
role whatsoever. Contrary to the advice given to the
Bush administration by those experts who wrote a number
of historical narratives on the Middle East - in a
region where national sovereignties have been
systematically trampled by a number of Western
colonialists in the previous era - no occupying power
was to be given a warm welcome. How can the Iraqi
people, after living an undignified life under Saddam
for so long, be expected to accept an equally unbecoming
proposition of living under a Western occupier?
The whole issue of nation-building got embroiled
in a highly publicized controversy when some big
American corporations with high-level government
contacts - Bechtel and Halliburton, etc - were allowed
to bid for lucrative contracts, with the exclusion of
companies from France and Russia - who opposed the
American invasion of Iraq - and even from Britain. That
was a wrong way of starting America's role as an
occupying force in Iraq. This issue was watched with
rapt attention in the Middle East and Europe, thereby
giving ample credibility to the already prevailing rumor
that the invasion of Iraq was about the control of oil.
After the successful dismantlement of the Iraqi
government, the US and Britain returned to the UN with
demands that the world body's economic sanctions on Iraq
be removed, so that they could become the sole
determiners of how to spend Iraqi oil funds.
From a bureaucratic perspective, that measure
may be seen as necessary. After all, the governance and
rebuilding of Iraq required enormous capital that could
be generated by selling Iraqi oil. However, from the
perspective of the already prevailing suspicions about
US's motives underlying the invasion - "the greed
factor" - the strong-arming of the world body into
giving in to Washington's demands of controlling Iraq's
oil funds further convinced the Iraqis that the purpose
of the invasion of their country was to create an
Anglo-American system of plundering the enormous oil
reserves of their country for the benefit of big Western
business enterprises.
Now, US forces are
encountering almost daily violence and death. However,
their response is exactly the same two-pronged strategy
as it was in the early days of Vietnam conflict. The US
occupying authority is trying to rebuild Iraq and "win
over its people at the same time is applying force to
crush insurgents". The US officials are also claiming
that the resistance force in that country "is made up of
small bands of insurgents ..." and that they "don't
enjoy popular support ...." Operation Sidewinder - whose
purpose is to root out insurgent elements in Iraq - will
go down in the annals of American occupation as a major
reason for the unraveling of whatever goodwill it had
accumulated among the Iraqi populace after toppling
Saddam. Maher Jalil al-Haboush, brother of a senior
Ba'ath Party official, is reported to have stated that
American and British troops storm into private homes,
arrest innocent men, and embarrass the women. "They
inspect even the diapers of the babies." From the
perspective of force protection, that type of action may
be deemed necessary; however, it was precisely that type
of operation that also acutely alienated the civilian
population in Vietnam.
Another reminder of the
Vietnam debacle is the phrase "quagmire". Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld clearly chafes over any
comparisons between Iraq and Vietnam. In a briefing on
June 30, he growled, "It's a different time. It's a
different era. It's a different place." American
senators, and British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw,
during their separate visits to Iraq made a point of
downplaying the "concerns that the US-led occupation
risked descending into a Vietnam-style quagmire". "A
quagmire?" asked Straw, and answered his own question,
"No, these actions against coalition forces won't
succeed and will be dealt with." But those tepid denials
were preceded by a candid observation by retired Major
General William Nash, who is a veteran of the Vietnam
conflict, the Gulf War of 1991, and Bosnia. He told the
London Observer that the US "lost its window of
opportunity" after the fall of Saddam. Even though he
was reluctant to make comparisons with Vietnam, he
observed, "There are far more things that were different
about Vietnam than there are similarities." "Except," he
added, "perhaps the word 'quagmire'. Maybe that is the
only thing that is the same."
Another phrase
from the Vietnam conflict that is becoming relevant in
Iraq is "guerrilla warfare". Rumsfeld is also sensitive
about such a depiction of the pervasive violence against
American forces. But an American diplomat who also is
serving as a provisional mayor of Baghdad, Ted Morris,
stated as recently as July 3, "This [the worsening
security situation] is no longer the kind of
unit-to-unit war, but it is definitely a guerrilla war
and sabotage that is going on."
There also are
similarities between the Vietnam conflict and the Iraqi
situation at the presidential level. The most
significant, but least talked about, is the commitment
and resolve of president Lyndon B Johnson then, and Bush
now, to win, no matter the cost. Johnson envisioned
America's commitment to defend South Vietnam as part of
his country's larger obligation to anti-communism,
liberty and freedom. By the same token, Bush envisions
his mission in the Middle East to promote the
Jeffersonian and Wilsonian predilection for democracy
and self-determination. Bush was unflappable in the wake
of daily American deaths in Iraq, and taunted the
perpetrators of violence by saying "bring them on". This
statement was against the background of the death of six
British and 26 American soldiers since May 1 - when Bush
declared that combat in Iraq was over - and in the wake
of a statement made by Major General Ricardo Sanchez,
commander of the coalition forces, that the number of
shooting incidents against American forces is averaging
13 a day.
During the Vietnam conflict, America
was determined to forestall the possibility of the
"falling dominos", a phrase that described the potential
fall of neighboring countries if South Vietnam were
allowed to be taken over militarily by the communists of
North Vietnam. Bush envisions the invasion of Iraq in
the context of a reverse domino theory. He stated during
his speech at the UN on September 2002, "The people of
Iraq can shake off their captivity. They can one day
join a democratic Afghanistan and a democratic
Palestine, inspiring reforms throughout the Muslim
world."
The question now is, what will shake the
resolve of America's top civilian leadership before it
revisits the proposition of remaining as an occupying
force in Iraq? Unfortunately, any such radical
reconsideration will be done only in the aftermath of
continued and heightened violence against American
forces. One of the main reasons underlying a sustained
public support regarding the US's invasion of Iraq was
Saddam himself. Now that he's out of sight, the American
public will start to ask how long will US forces stay in
Iraq? Such questioning will come in the shortest
possible period, if those hated "body bags" - another
portentous phrase of the Vietnam conflict - were to
start coming home from Iraq with increased regularity or
in increased numbers.
One great advantage the US
civilian leadership enjoys thus far is that the American
public believes the speculation that Saddam is very much
behind the attacks against the occupying forces; that
the Iraqis in general do not really support the violent
attacks against the Americans; and that, once Saddam and
his sons are captured or killed, these attacks would at
least subside, if not disappear entirely. But the tenure
of believability of these explanations is not an
indefinite one.
One variable that will determine
the scope and intensity of violence against American
forces in Iraq in the coming months is the modality of
the interim government. What groups will be allowed to
participate? Who will be excluded? How much emphasis
will be placed on having a secular government, as
opposed to having a moderate Islamic democracy? These
are heady issues on which L Paul Bremer, the civilian
American ruler of Iraq, must work assiduously to reflect
the preferences of the Iraqis, and not that of Bush. Can
he or will he do that? My thought is no, but I hope he
will. But I also know that, when it comes to realities
regarding Iraq, hope is not likely to be one of the
options.
Evolving a model that is acceptable to
the largest groups of Iraqis - even as a lesser of the
two or three evils - is better than imposing the
American preference of making Iraq a secular
Western-style democracy. The best model for Iraq is not
the one that is developed anywhere other than in the
political environment of that troubled country.
Since World War II, the American public has yet
to manifest much fortitude for a continuous loss of its
troops anywhere in the world, no matter the ostensible
nobility of the cause. That is why that war is still
described as the "last good war". Fighting terrorism
came close to being perceived as a cause worth
sacrificing America's youth in far off places. The US
occupation of Iraq may not be regarded as part of that
cause for long, no matter how hard the Bush
administration attempts to package it as such. The
ghosts of Vietnam, like the proverbial Dracula, will
grow strong with the continued spilling of American
blood in the streets of Iraq.
Ehsan
Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based
independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright
2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
Please contact
content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
|
| |
|
|
 |
|
