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Iraq bombing: The ball is in US
hands
By B Raman
Reports
available so far on the truck-bomb explosion at a
building housing the United Nations offices in Baghdad
on Tuesday indicate that it was probably the work of
foreign jihadi elements, with some local complicity. The
modus operandi in this attack and during the
earlier car-bomb blast against the Jordanian Embassy in
Baghdad speak of some expertise in the use of improvised
explosive devices. In view of the considerable
availability of explosives and detonators all over Iraq,
more such explosions are likely, directed against
economic, infrastructure and human targets.
The
targeting of the UN is attributed by jihadi sources to
the following objectives:
To eliminate Sergio Vieira de Mello, the UN special
representative, who was viewed by the foreign jihadi and
local resistance elements as a nominee of the United
States, and whose selection for this job was allegedly
imposed by the US on the UN secretary general.
To retaliate against the UN for its endorsement of
the interim Governing Council of Iraqis chosen by the
United States. These Iraqis are viewed as US quislings.
To warn other nations not to send their troops to
Iraq to help out the US occupying forces even under a UN
mandate.
The jihadi and other resistance
elements have been saying that just as the jihad of the
1980s in Afghanistan brought about the collapse of one
superpower (the Soviet Union), the present jihad in
Iraq, which, according to them, is being waged in tandem
with that in Afghanistan, will bring about the end of
the other superpower (the United States). They claim to
have already trapped the US troops in Iraq and do not
want any other nation to come to the rescue of the
Americans, as they want to bleed them to death.
The situation in Afghanistan and Iraq is going
from bad to worse. While Afghanistan has to be analyzed
separately, the situation in Iraq demands that the US
draws the right lessons, as indicated below:
Lesson 1: The situation as it has
developed in Iraq has proved that technical intelligence
(TECHINT) alone cannot be of much help in the absence of
human intelligence (HUMINT).
Lesson 2:
There is little scope for an improvement in the
supply of HUMINT in the short term. There is so much
anger against the US that very few Iraqis will come
forward with actionable intelligence. Kurds may do so,
but they are not well informed outside their traditional
areas.
Lesson 3: Keeping in view
the possibility that the flow of actionable intelligence
will continue to be poor, the US should strengthen
physical security in order to deny repeated successes to
the terrorists and resistance fighters, even in the
absence of intelligence.
Lesson 4:
Strengthening physical security has two aspects.
Trans-border security to prevent the infiltration of
foreign jihadi elements across international borders and
the seas and protection of important infrastructure, the
local populace and foreigners, including the Americans
and the British themselves.This would involve static as
well as mobile security.
Lesson 5:
Even if the number of foreign troops deployed is
increased manifold, it would be practically impossible
to protect all infrastructure in Iraq at present. The US
should, therefore, identify what needs to be protected
and grade the degree of protection as follows: must be
protected at any cost, needs to be protected, and
protection advisable. The protection of the third
category should be left to Iraqis specially recruited
and well paid. The protection of the second category
should be done jointly by foreign and Iraqi personnel.
The responsibility for the protection of the first
category should be exclusively in US hands for the
present. The objective is to deny the terrorists and
resistance fighters repeated high-profile successes.
Special protective measures must be taken at all places
where foreign personnel are lodged to prevent attacks
with explosives by air.
Lesson 6:
The present aggressive stance of the US troops
vis-a-vis the Iraqi population is adding to the anger.
Indiscriminate arrests, trigger-happy reactions and use
of rude language and gestures by the US troops toward
the population are aggravating the situation. There are
many complaints of offensive behavior against the US
troops. Their trigger-happy attitude was reflected in
the recent killing of a news photographer.
Lesson 7: The United States and
the United Kingdom should embark on a crash program for
the restoration and protection of supplies of
electricity, water and other essential articles,
whatever be the cost, and enlist the help of whoever can
deliver quick results, instead of depending on US
companies. Similar attention to medical care is urgently
called for. Even four months after the occupation, the
state of health care available to the people is
depressingly poor.
Lesson 8: The
psychological warfare (psywar) campaign should be more
humane, with a lot of finesse. President George W Bush,
Vice President Dick Cheney, Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld and the neo-conservatives associated with the
US administration should control their rhetoric. Their
statements and remarks are often unnecessarily
provocative and adding fuel to the raging fire in Iraq.
This is the time for quiet, intelligent and
well-thought-out action and not crude rhetoric.
Lesson 9: All the anti-Saddam
Hussein dregs, such as Ahmed Chalabi and others, will
prove more a liability than an asset in dealing with the
situation. The US should have no hesitation in
discarding them and should identify and enlist the
assistance of well-meaning Iraqis inside the country,
even if they had been with Saddam in the past. The
continuing obsession with Saddam is getting in the way
of effective action to restore normalcy.
Lesson 10: The large-scale sacking
of the members of Saddam's armed forces and other public
servants without payment of their salaries was an
unbelievably shocking example of US ineptitude and
insensitivity to the feelings and hardships of the local
people. By this action alone, the United States has
driven hundreds, if not thousands, of Iraqis into the
hands of the resistance fighters. This action has to be
reversed.
Lesson 11: Bush should
make an indirect signal to the Iraqi people that he
realizes that serious policy mistakes have been made and
he is taking action to correct them. It is not necessary
to make an open mea culpa in this regard. A
better way would be to ease out some of those in the
Bush administration who are identified in the public
mind as responsible for the excesses of the US policies
and actions.
What has been outlined above are
immediate or short-term measures. These could bring the
situation under some control, but not necessarily
restore normalcy. Restoration of normalcy is unlikely so
long as the US and British troops are not replaced by a
truly international force headed by officers perceived
as independent and not as US or British stooges.
If the right lessons are not drawn and acted on
quickly, the United States is in for a serious setback
to its standing and credibility not only in Iraq, but
also in the rest of the Islamic world.
B
Raman is additional secretary (retired), Cabinet
Secretariat, government of India, and currently
director, Institute for Topical Studies, Chennai; former
member of the National Security Advisory Board of the
government of India. E-Mail: corde@vsnl.com. He
was also head of the counter-terrorism division of the
Research and Analysis Wing, India's external
intelligence agency, from 1988 to August 1994.
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