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Iran's case for nuclear
weapons
By Erich Marquardt
For
more than two decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has
been at odds with the foreign policy of the United
States. But the bad blood started long before the
Islamic Revolution.
The most significant clash
between Iran and the US began shortly after the election
of premier Mohammed Mossadeq, who took power in Tehran
in 1951. Mossadeq, a nationalist, nationalized the oil
industry and formed the National Iranian Oil Co. Because
of this action, the United States and Britain engineered
a coup in August 1953, overthrowing the democratically
elected leader and replacing Mossadeq with Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, referred to as the Shah, who ruled for 25
years. Shortly after taking power, the Shah allowed an
international consortium of US, British, French and
Dutch oil companies to operate its oil facilities and
reap 50 percent of the profits.
Despite the
Shah's close, friendly relationship with Washington and
other Western governments, his brutal, autocratic
methods of violently quelling domestic dissent with his
dreaded security apparatus, the SAVAK (Sazamane Etelaat
Va Amniate Kechvar, or Security and Intelligence
Service), sparked a revolution in Iranian society led by
conservative religious leaders. By overthrowing the
US-supported government, therefore threatening US
interests in the region, the new Iranian leaders quickly
became enemies of successive US administrations.
Moreover, on top of earning the disregard of the
world's only superpower, Iran also has found itself in a
geographically volatile region. During the 1980s, Iraq,
under the leadership of Saddam Hussein and the Ba'ath
Party, invaded Iran in an attempt to conquer valuable
territory such as the disputed Shatt al-Arab waterway.
The war was devastating to both the Iraqis and the
Iranians. Since the end of that conflict in 1988, Iran
and Iraq have had tense relations.
In addition
to Iraq, Iran is also threatened by the region's most
powerful state, Israel, which has a carefully defended
nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. In 1981, Israel
launched a surprise air attack on Iraq's Osirak nuclear
reactor in an attempt to dash Baghdad's goal of
developing nuclear arms; Israel's aim was to preserve
its nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. It is clear
that Israel would seriously consider similar action in
Iran should Tehran come closer to developing nuclear
arms.
To add to its security woes, Iran has been
facing a rapidly changing balance of power directly on
its borders. In 2001, the United States overthrew the
Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. While the Taliban was
still in power, Iran had little to fear from its eastern
border; it faced an unorganized state constantly in the
throes of civil war. Yet with the removal of the Taliban
from power, Iran now faces a border area littered with
US troops hostile to Tehran. In addition to Afghanistan,
Iran also faces threats along its western flank with
Iraq. While Tehran certainly did not bemoan the fall of
the Ba'ath Party, it is justifiably concerned about its
replacement: a US occupational force situated on its
western border. Furthermore, if US objectives are
realized in Afghanistan and Iraq, Iran's current
leadership will face a perilous future of being
enveloped by unfriendly states beholden to US interests.
It is for these security concerns that the
Iranian state would want to develop and acquire nuclear
weapons. Already Iran has greatly improved its
warhead-delivery capabilities, with the potential of
launching missiles into Afghanistan, Iraq and Israel. If
Tehran were to become nuclear-armed, it would end
Israel's nuclear monopoly in the Middle East and also
give Iran the capability of launching nuclear strikes on
surrounding states. However, even with such a nuclear
arsenal, Iran, like all nuclear-armed states, would most
likely use its nuclear capability as a deterrent and not
as an offensive weapon. Becoming nuclear-armed would
increase Iran's foreign-policy leverage in dealing with
US forces on its eastern and western borders, the State
of Israel, and whatever new governments may form in both
Afghanistan and Iraq.
In addition to being
concerned about US troops on its eastern and western
borders, Tehran is worried about covert activities by US
intelligence agencies in their quest to further the
George W Bush administration's much-touted "regime
change" policy in Iran, which was classified by the
White House as being part of an "axis of evil". Such
rhetoric began with the election of President Bush in
2000, in which a group of administration officials took
office that had been abnormally antagonistic to the
Iranian government and uncharacteristically friendly
with the current hardline Likud government in Israel.
These officials, often categorized as neo-conservatives,
openly seek to remove the leadership in Tehran in an
attempt to foster a US-friendly government in the
oil-rich state, along with removing a potential threat
to Israel, a firm US ally in the region.
Tehran
is concerned that US and British support will bolster
the power of Iranian rebels operating from Iraq. In
fact, in 1997 Iran executed a series of air attacks in
Iraqi territory in order to weaken these rebel groups;
such an overt policy would be impossible now because of
the US and British occupation.
Finally, with the
unilateral invasions of both Afghanistan and Iraq - with
the latter invasion taking place in direct opposition to
the United Nations and the global population - Tehran
remains in the dark about the Bush administration's next
move. Learning from these examples, Iran, like North
Korea, another state that is part of the Bush
administration's "axis of evil", knows that should it
acquire nuclear weapons, it would be much more difficult
for Washington to attack it. Any assault by Iran's
current adversaries - the United States and Israel -
would have to take into account the possible
repercussions that come with attacking a nuclear-armed
state capable of causing extensive damage to its
opponents either with conventional or nuclear weapons.
While Iran's adversaries could attempt to launch
a massive strike that would destroy its nuclear arsenal
or its delivery systems, such a strike would require a
100 percent success ratio in order to be certain that a
devastating retaliatory blow would not occur. Failure to
eliminate a nuclear-armed state's second-strike
capability could lead to unacceptable consequences on
the side of the attacking state. If an offshore power
such as the United States were to launch an attack, Iran
could not initiate a conventional or nuclear attack on
the US mainland, but it could easily strike US troops in
either Afghanistan or Iraq.
Therefore, it is
clear that developing nuclear weapons is in the national
interests of Tehran. While Tehran cannot openly develop
nuclear weapons - because of the international outcry it
would warrant - it can continue its research into
peaceful nuclear energy while preparing for a possible
day when it could quickly develop its first nuclear
weapons and become a nuclear-armed state. Such status
would shield Iran from a variety of outside threats -
including ones emanating from its traditional rivals,
the United States and Israel, but also from the newly
formed governments in Kabul and Baghdad.
It will
be important to monitor the reactions of the United
States and Israel to Iran's pursuit of nuclear
technology. How will these two states seek to preserve
their power in the region? Does the Bush administration
still retain the political leverage within the US
domestic population to transform its current rhetoric
into a tangible policy of removing Tehran's leadership?
And will the State of Israel risk the potentially
disastrous political and military consequences of
attempting to preserve its nuclear monopoly in the
region? It is these questions that will grow
increasingly important in the coming months.
Published with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com
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