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Al-Qaeda: Overestimate at
your peril
By Erich Marquardt
While the Islamic militant organization al-Qaeda
is no doubt an effective fighting force, it is unlikely
that it is as powerful and extensive as its opponents
argue. Since the September 11, 2001, attacks, the United
States has blamed nearly all acts of aggression by
Islamic radicals in some part on al-Qaeda; whether these
attacks take place in Afghanistan, Iraq, Israel, Iraq or
the Philippines makes no difference.
Chief
opponents of al-Qaeda - mainly the United States, the
group's prime target - are attempting to exaggerate its
power, scope and threat in order to create the
perception that all attacks against the US and its
allies are the result of al-Qaeda. This simplified
attitude creates an "us vs them" phenomenon, giving the
administration of US President George W Bush more
leverage and support, both at home and abroad, in
furthering its foreign-policy objectives.
The
current US intervention in Iraq is a good example of
this simplification. Before the toppling of Saddam
Hussein's Ba'ath Party government in Iraq, the country
was a secular state that was a major opponent of Islamic
radical groups such as al-Qaeda. Indeed, al-Qaeda leader
Osama bin Laden frequently denounced Saddam's regime,
castigating the fascist leader as an "infidel".
However, despite animosity between the two, the
Bush administration's main focus before the invasion of
Iraq was to paint these two ideological rivals as allies
in a crusade against the US and the West. Once Saddam
was toppled, the Bush administration failed to show
evidence tying his regime to al-Qaeda, simply because
that evidence most likely does not exist or, if it did,
would be highly anecdotal.
Since the fall of
Saddam, the US occupation of Iraq has been challenged by
constant attacks. The Bush administration has
continuously attempted to link al-Qaeda to any
individuals or groups attacking US interests in the
war-torn country. Most of the time the evidence used to
make this connection is based on assertion, rather than
fact.
For example, recently the top US
administrator for Iraq, L Paul Bremer, argued that
al-Qaeda is alive and well in Iraq because US forces
have "seen foreign fighters who sort of fit the al-Qaeda
profile - people traveling on documents from Syria,
Yemen, Sudan, in some cases Saudi Arabia".
In
addition to Bremer, Bush himself has tried to tie
attacks against the United States' main ally in the
Middle East, Israel, to al-Qaeda. He recently claimed in
his weekly radio address that the devastating suicide
blast in Jerusalem was part of a terrorist campaign to
establish Taliban-style governments across the Middle
East.
Given these examples, one would believe
that al-Qaeda was a powerful force that could send
militants to countries all over the globe, from Central
Asia to the Middle East to Southeast Asia, in a highly
orchestrated and efficient manner. However, it is
extremely doubtful that al-Qaeda is indeed this
powerful.
For instance, in Iraq, the chief of US
Central Command, General John Abizaid, has not claimed
that US occupational troops were under attack on a daily
basis by al-Qaeda, but instead said they were victims of
a "classical guerrilla-type campaign". These guerrilla
tactics are being followed by individuals who know the
terrain and who are able to gain support from the Iraqi
populace; while foreign fighters may be operating in
Iraq, it would be an exaggeration to claim that many
such fighters are connected to al-Qaeda.
In
Israel, attacks by Palestinian militant groups have a
long history, dating well before the formation of
al-Qaeda. Furthermore, Palestinian militant groups call
for a Palestinian state or, in extreme cases, the
dissolution of the state of Israel, not the
Taliban-style government that the Bush administration
claims is their intention.
In the Philippines
and Southeast Asia, the US has contended that al-Qaeda
may have been involved in multiple bombings throughout
the area through its alleged link with the Indonesian
group Jemaah Islamiya. However, most of the militant
activity in the area is completely independent of
al-Qaeda and is ensconced in its own political and
social contexts. Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic
Liberation Front are examples of such groups.
Therefore, the argument that the main opponent
of US interests is al-Qaeda is based more on assertion
than actual evidence. Instead, what the United States is
facing is a series of internal revolts and movements
targeted at US-friendly governments and, when possible,
the US itself. The aim of each disparate group is
different according to its location - sometimes the goal
is establishing an Islamic government, other times it
merely happens to be Muslims fighting for a certain
cause but willing to target and kill civilians to reach
their end goal.
The fact that there are
multiple, diverse groups threatening US interests
highlights the extreme weaknesses found in the United
States' "war on terrorism". Without a clear enemy, there
can be no clear strategy to achieve victory. Dismantling
one militant group, such as al-Qaeda, will do nothing to
stop attacks from other militant groups. If the Bush
administration continues its current policies, it may
find itself getting involved in a plethora of internal
movements and revolutions in which intervention and
interference by the US will merely make it a target for
local armies.
Indeed, members of the Defense
Science Board, who report directly to the US secretary
of defense, released a 1997 report warning that
"historical data show a strong correlation between US
involvement in international situations and an increase
in terrorist attacks against the United States".
Therefore, such an interventionist foreign
policy will amplify the threats to US interests and make
the "war on terrorism" a war with far too many fronts to
fight on and too many enemies to defeat.
Published with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com
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