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Al-Hakim: No shortage of suspects
By Kathleen Ridolfo
A symbolic funeral was
held in the holy city of Najaf in Iraq on Tuesday in
memory of Iraqi Shi'ite cleric, Grand Ayatollah Mohammed
Baqr al-Hakim. The ayatollah was killed in a car bombing
on August 29 as he left the Imam Ali Mosque in Najaf
following a noon Friday prayers sermon. Some 80 Iraqis
were killed and more than 100 injured in the incident.
Al-Hakim's body has yet to be identified, and mourners
carried a casket containing only his wristwatch, ring
and pieces of his turban in a three-day procession from
Baghdad to Najaf.
The tension in the holy city
is a reflection of the environment of turmoil seen in
other Iraqi towns, where acts of sabotage and terrorism
occur far too often in the post-Saddam Hussein era. Just
one week before al-Hakim's killing, his nephew, Muhammad
Sa'id al-Hakim, was targeted when his office in Najaf
was bombed. He escaped uninjured. While Iraqi police
claim that they already have suspects for the August 29
car bombing in custody, there would be no shortage of
non-Iraqi suspects. Al-Hakim was indeed a target for
Saddam loyalists, but he also could have died at the
hands of Iranians, rival Shi'ite groups, or Islamist
militants.
Al-Hakim came from a prominent Iraqi
Shi'ite family, and like many of his relatives he was a
leading opponent of the Ba'athist regime. He was jailed
in 1972, 1977 and 1979. On his release in 1980, he
sought refuge in Iran and in 1982 founded the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI),
which became the most prominent Iraqi Shi'ite group.
SCIRI enjoyed Iranian political and financial support,
and used Tehran as a base for operations for its armed
wing, the Badr Brigades. Prior to the US-led war in Iraq
this year, the SCIRI claimed to have some 10,000 armed
men inside Iraq.
The group had contacts with the
US and participated in the pre-war meetings of Iraqi
opposition groups. After the downfall of the Saddam
regime, many Badr fighters returned to Iraq and
established a presence there. The armed wing was
reportedly disarmed by the US in early June, although a
small number of men remained armed to provide security
for high-ranking SCIRI members. Al-Hakim returned to
Iraq in May and reinstated himself as a leading
ayatollah at the al-Hawzah al-Ilmiyah Shi'ite seminary
in Najaf. He told reporters that month that he would not
seek a political role in Iraq, but would remain the
spiritual leader of SCIRI.
But in the holy city
of Najaf, things were not peaceful. A fierce power
struggle erupted between the older, established clerics
and the younger generation of clerics, none more vocal
than Muqtada al-Sadr, the young son of slain grand
ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, who was gunned down
along with Muqtada's two older brothers, reportedly by
Saddam's men, in 1999. Muqtada's followers, the
Sadriyun, are thought to be responsible for the April 10
killing of US-supported cleric Abd al-Majid al-Khoi, who
was killed in a bloody attack just steps from where
al-Hakim was assassinated at the Imam Ali Mosque.
Accounts vary, but it is believed that al-Khoi was
killed when assailants attacked him and the mosque's
custodian, an Iraqi Sunni cleric who might have been
collaborating with the Saddam regime, as the two men
emerged following a meeting of reconciliation. It is
unknown whether al-Khoi or the Sunni cleric was the
target of the attack.
Muqtada al-Sadr denied
that the Sadriyun had any role in the attack. He has
since become increasingly critical of the US-led
occupation, and has established the Imam al-Mahdi Army,
a volunteer movement that he claims will protect the
Shi'ite seminary in Najaf and spur a nonviolent movement
to rid Iraq of coalition forces. Al-Sadr has also
clashed with more prominent Shi'ite clerics in Najaf,
largely because of doctrinal differences, and has openly
criticized clerics who are on good terms with the US. A
cleric of little standing, al-Sadr attached himself to
Qom-based cleric Ayatollah Kazim al-Ha'iri and relies on
the elder cleric to issue fatwas, or religious
edicts, that support his agenda. Soon after al-Khoi's
death, al-Sadr criticized Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
for meeting with US officials, which might have prompted
the ayatollah to announce that he would have no
relations with the US-led coalition. Al-Sistani promptly
took refuge inside the Al-Hawzah, refusing visitors and
interviews.
Al-Sadr was equally critical of
al-Hakim and the SCIRI, particularly when the
ayatollah's brother, Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, assumed a
seat on the 25-member Iraqi Governing Council, which
al-Sadr refused to recognize as it was set up by the
Americans. Furthermore, al-Sadr, while of little
religious standing, reportedly claims thousands more
followers than the SCIRI, and is particularly popular
with the young, the poor and the disenfranchised. But,
while al-Sadr and his Sadriyun have a motive, it is
unlikely that he would sanction a terrorist attack of
this kind just steps from the holiest mosque to Shi'ites
in Iraq.
Another possibility is that elements
within the Iranian regime targeted al-Hakim. While
al-Hakim and his men lived under the patronage of
Iranian clerics for more than 20 years, his return to
Iraq was reportedly viewed in Tehran as a loss for the
clerics in Qom, both in standing and in financial terms,
since Qom had become the center of Shi'ite theology over
the past two decades. Furthermore, the decision of the
Najaf clerics to welcome Hossein Khomeini, the grandson
of Iran's 1979 revolution leader Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini - who moved from the Qom-based al-Hawzah
al-Ilmiyah in Iran to the Najaf Hawzah in early August -
might also have ruffled the feathers of some clerics in
Qom.
Khomeini, who said that he moved to Najaf
to continue his religious training and to teach, quickly
made a name for himself by criticizing the Iranian
clerics. International press reported that the move
reflected a growing division in Iran between some
Qom-based clerics and the Iranian religious authorities.
Moreover, Khomeini praised the US-led war in Iraq, and
claimed that Iranians were ready to topple their regime,
and might even welcome the assistance of the US in doing
so.
Arab militants have also been suspected in
the attack on al-Hakim. While the number of foreign
militants inside Iraq is unclear, US government
officials continue to claim that foreign fighters -
particularly from Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia -
infiltrate Iraq on a daily basis. A leading Saudi cleric
told Associated Press (AP) on August 31 that the
militants, once shielded and supported by the Saudi
regime, are now under fire at home due to US pressure on
Saudi Arabia to crack down on terrorist cells. "Most
youths think the only safe road is to go to Iraq,"
Muhsin al-Awajy said. "They are trapped between the
international campaign against terrorism and this
campaign at home."
Kuwait's alwatan.com.kw
reported on August 27 that Iraqi Patriotic Union of
Kurdistan sources claim that some 1,200 foreign fighters
linked to al-Qaeda had made their way into northern Iraq
from Afghanistan via Iran in recent days. A senior Iraqi
police official told AP that there were nine key
suspects in the bombing in custody, including two Saudis
and one Palestinian carrying a Jordanian passport. The
official said all nine, the remainder being Iraqis,
admitted ties to al-Qaeda, the news agency reported.
Muhammad Husayn al-Hakim, the son of Muhammad
Sa'id, may have unwittingly foretold the attack on
Mohammed Baqr al-Hakim when he was quoted in the same
article as saying, "We ask the American forces to set up
numerous border posts," alluding to the possible
involvement of foreigners in terrorist attacks on the UN
and Jordanian embassy. "If they managed to reach and
attack UN headquarters, they can carry out assaults in
Karbala and [Najaf]," he said.
Saddam loyalists
have also been blamed for the assassination of al-Hakim,
and, as noted earlier, there was no love lost between
the ayatollah and deposed Iraqi president. The governor
of Najaf province has said that the number of Iraqis
being held after the bombing is fewer than five and that
all are Iraqis tied to the former regime. It is also
possible that al-Qaeda fighters have teamed up with
Saddam loyalists to launch attacks to sow discord and
chaos in Iraq.
Saddam has purportedly denied any
involvement in the incident in an audiotape released to
Arab satellite channels on September 1. However, the
type and amount of explosives used indicate the
involvement of regime forces. Moreover, nearly every
leading Shi'ite figure blamed Saddam loyalists for the
attack, with many expressing disbelief that any rival
faction - be it Shi'ite or Sunni - could carry out such
a deadly attack on a site revered by both sects. Shi'ite
leaders - in fact all Iraqi leaders - agree that the
loyalists' motive is to stir up discord among Iraqis in
the hope of setting off a civil war in the country. The
US has yet to comment, but the Federal Bureau of
Investigation is assisting in the investigation.
In his final sermon on August 29, the slain
cleric denounced Saddam loyalists. "The Ba'athist regime
targeted the marjiya [leading Shi'ite religious
leaders] and carried out acts of aggression against the
marjiya. It killed ... [Grand Ayatollah Ali]
al-Gharawi, and Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr, and targeted
al-Sistani and Bachir al-Najafi [leading
marjiya]," Agence France Presse quoted al-Hakim
as saying. "The men of the ousted regime are those who
are now targeting the marjiya," he said. He might
have been right.
Copyright (c) 2002, RFE/RL
Inc. Reprinted with the permission of Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty, 1201 Connecticut Ave
NW, Washington DC 20036
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