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Multilateralism or not, Iraq is a
mess
By Ehsan Ahrari
How much
ill-will President George W Bush has created for the
United States over his predilection for unilateralism in
Iraq is becoming apparent when Secretary of State Colin
Powell is given the lead in damage control. Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld has to accept a lower profile,
at least for now. In a quintessential diplomatic tone,
Powell rejected France's demands - that the Iraqi
constitution be written and elections be held within a
matter of months - as "interesting but not executable".
But there are trends in and out of Iraq that bear
watching, for they bode nothing but trouble for US plans
for stabilizing and democratizing Iraq.
First
and foremost, there is little doubt that Washington
intends to stay in Iraq for at least two years. The
official rationale is that the process of writing the
constitution and electing national government officials
is time-consuming and cannot be accelerated merely for
expedient reasons. That is not a bad rationale; however,
the trouble is that the US is in dire need of gaining
legitimacy of its occupation from its European and Asian
allies and friends, who are unwilling to offer it
without a price. That price is sharing the ruling
authority in Iraq with the United Nations. The fact that
the French are once again in the lead in insisting on
curtailing the scope of US rule in Iraq is beginning to
look like a non-starter in the intricate negotiating
process.
On Sunday, the Bush administration made
Vice President Dick Cheney available to the national
media to explain the thinking of its inner sanctum on
how far it is willing to go in accommodating the demands
of France, Germany and Russia on the issue of sharing
the ruling authority with the UN and with other
potential contributors to peacekeeping in Iraq. Cheney
stated that no further changes in Iraq policy were
warranted. Instead, he talked about "major success and
major progress" in that country. In an obvious attempt
to counter the position of those who stated that even US
intelligence did not find credible linkage between
Saddam Hussein and al-Qaeda, Cheney insisted that Iraq
was the "geographic base" for the perpetrators of
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United
States.
Even a casual observer of US strategic
affairs knows how important Cheney is in reflecting the
thinking of neo-conservatives on, inter alia, the
dynamics of US policy in the Middle East. Way back in
March 2002, he made his well-publicized tour of that
region in an attempt to conjure up support of the Arab
regimes for toppling Saddam. The fact that he failed did
not discourage the Bush administration from carrying out
that objective without Arab support, and even at the
expense of creating a major rift in trans-Atlantic ties.
There is little doubt that France, Germany and
Russia paid high attention to Cheney's interview on
Sunday. What lessons these countries would draw from
that interview will become clear only in the specifics
of their response on the issue of cooperating with the
US on Iraq. My strong sense is that no cooperation from
their side is forthcoming unless the Bush administration
decides to accommodate their demands about sharing
ruling authority in Iraq. It should also be clearly
understood that the United States is not likely to bring
about such changes in its position unless the security
situation in Iraq deteriorates further. On their part,
France, Germany and Russia need concessions to be
persuaded that the Bush administration is earnest about
moving toward multilateralism.
Second, regardless
of whether the Bush administration moves toward
multilateralism or remains loyal to its natural
instincts related to unilateralism, a mounting
preference of the Iraqis is to see the end of foreign
presence in their homeland. That predilection is the
driving force behind attacks not only on the US forces,
but also on the UN. Given that earlier weapons
inspections were carried out under the auspices of the
UN, and given that Iraq remained under sanctions of one
sort or another since 1991, most Iraqis see the world
body as a puppet of the United States. Even for those
who are somewhat neutral about the UN, it is only
because they deem it as a lesser of the two evils, the
US being on top of their list of "bad actors". Of
course, the Kurds are an exception to these
observations. They formulate the lone pro-American
ethnic group in Iraq. As such, they see the US presence
as a guarantor of their autonomous rule in the proposed
federal governing arrangement.
The mutuality of
interests between the US and the Kurds remains a source
of consternation and irritation between Washington and
Ankara. Turkey is in no mood to let America's strategic
objectives in Iraq result in the creation of an
autonomous governing arrangement for the Kurds, since
that is considered a prelude to a potential creation of
an independent Kurdish state. It is worth noting that
Turkey and Iran are in complete agreement on this issue.
However, now that the United States is very much in need
of Turkish peacekeeping troops, it has to walk a fine
line between getting help from its Turkish allies and,
at the same time, not antagonizing the Kurds. Washington
places great stock on not antagonizing the Turks, since
it needs Turkish support for its occupation of Muslim
Iraq.
Third, the politics of the Iraqi Governing
Council has remained Machiavellian and dirty,
characteristics that might turn out to be highly
deleterious from the perspective of the United States.
According to the original US plan, representatives of
five parties - Ahmad Chalabi of the Iraqi Congress, Adel
Abdel-Mehdi of the Supreme Council of Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI), Ayad Alawi of the Iraqi National
Accord, and Jalal Talabani and Masoud Barzani, the two
Kurdish leaders - were to lead the transitional
government. That was the promise retired
Lieutenant-General Jay Garner, the first US civil
administrator, made to them. But when L Paul Bremer
replaced Garner, an entirely new plan was implemented
whereby the Governing Council was formulated, and these
five individuals became part of that entity. Another
major difference from the original scheme was that the
25-member Governing Council is only to advise Bremer on
issues of governance, while he is the ultimate executive
authority as the head of the Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA).
The preceding developments
caused ample resentment among the five members, each of
whom fancied himself to be the new executive of Iraq.
Bremer negotiated a formula with the council whereby the
five members shared the presidency, trading off every
month. The independent members of the Governing Council,
on their part, also strongly resented the five members,
thereby creating a situation whereby any potential
diminution of Bremer's authority promises to create
chaos. That such a situation has not occurred thus far
does not mean it will not happen in the future.
Some members of the Governing Council
periodically demand a fast transfer of authority. While
such a demand might be based on the personal aspirations
of one or more members, it clearly runs counter to the
reconstruction strategy of the Bush administration. That
strategy envisages US control over Iraq until the
constitution is ratified and an elected government is in
power. However, from the Shi'ite side, the issue of the
Governing Council - a US-nominated body that is also
seen as a puppet entity - writing the constitution to
elect the government has remained highly controversial.
While the CPA is not oblivious to the Shi'ite
resentment, it has done nothing to circumvent such an
option.
Given the preceding rather partial
description of the ominous and ever-changing
complexities in Iraq, one wonders whether the Bush
administration really understood what it was getting
into when it decided to topple Saddam, or if the fervor
related to ousting a heinous dictator entangled the US
in a situation from which it will find it difficult to
extricate itself. There is no indication yet that Bush
has even the slightest doubt about the correctness of
his decision to invade Iraq. But the way things are
going for the United States, I wonder how long it will
be before someone will ask him to declare victory and
get out of Iraq. Senator George Aiken advised presidents
Lyndon B Johnson and Richard M Nixon to that effect
during the Vietnam conflict.
Ehsan
Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based
independent strategic analyst.
(Copyright
2003 Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved.
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