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When all else fails, reorganize
By Ehsan Ahrari

Coming back from a week long vacation, when I forced myself away from almost all means of global connectivity, it appeared that I left the world around me in "freeze" mode. The United States is still acutely embroiled in Iraq. Nothing seems to be going right in that country. Afghanistan is an equally unstable place.

In fact, Amnesty International issued a report that portrays a very gloomy picture of female suffering in that troubled land. Women are still being brutalized, suppressed and even raped, while the US is the chief occupier, with NATO forces taking the lead in peacekeeping. For those women, the dream of a better life after the Taliban remains a delusion.

For the third time in the past six months or so, the White House announced on October 6 a new regrouping or reorganization in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as if the problem is not due to failed policies in those countries, but is merely of an administrative nature.

Accepting that the post-conflict US involvement in Iraq ("phase four" in the military parlance) has been a miserable failure will provide ample fodder for a number of Democratic candidates, who are already escalating their criticism of US President George W Bush and his hapless foreign policy in the Middle East. Thus, the administration is heavily relying on using politically correct euphemisms in order to soft-peddle its wrongheaded policies.

The mission of nation building in Iraq is going nowhere, attacks on the American soldiers are continuing, and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) are nowhere to be found. But David Kay, head of Iraq Survey Group, is still refusing to admit that there might not be any WMD left. Instead, he opted to raise the concern of those who are still listening to him by claiming that Iraq may have hidden chemical munitions among vast piles of conventional munitions buried at various locations.

Now the Bush administration is going through significant gyrations by announcing that it will overhaul its missions in Afghanistan and Iraq.

We are told that a new entity, the Iraq Stabilization Group, will be responsible for subsiding violence in Iraq and Afghanistan, and will also spearhead nation building in those countries. The person in charge is Condoleezza Rice, Bush's National Security Adviser. A very interesting aspect of this development is that Bush is reported to have been frustrated with the handling of the modalities of the US involvement in Iraq by the Department of State and the Pentagon. In other words, according to this description, he sees nothing wrong with the US presence in Afghanistan and Iraq. Rather, he envisions the incessant setbacks that his administration is facing as outcomes of bureaucratic maladies and dysfunctionalities.

Like the rest of the leading US bureaucrats who are conducting US foreign policy, Rice also refuses to admit any failure related to the nature of US commitment or its handling of the occupation of Iraq and Afghanistan. In a statement that ought to worry most leaders of the world, it dawned on Rice only now that "we are in a different phase" of that conflict. She said that reorganization efforts are devised by herself, Vice President Dick Cheney, Secretary of State Colin Powell, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld as an outcome of a discussion they held with the President last August.

The thinking underlying this reorganization is that by diminishing the authority of the Department of State and the Ministry of Defense, Bush would see promising results in Afghanistan and Iraq, and soon. The pundits in Washington are also quite sanguine about couching this reorganization in the context of bureaucratic tug-and-pull. This new measure is seen as resulting in diminution of authority of Powell, as well as Rumsfeld. The new major player is Rice. The creation of the Iraq Stabilization Group promises to give her more direct control. It is also a major shift in her role from a provider of quiet advice to Bush - a role that Rice has clearly preferred - to a direct implementor of two of the most intricate issues of foreign policy, similar to that of Henry Kissinger when he was the National Security Adviser during the presidency of Richard Nixon. Four of Rice's deputies will head coordinating committees on counter terrorism, economic development, political affairs in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the "creation of clearer messages to the media" in Iraq.

The fact of the matter is that the massive regrouping or reorganizing efforts in Washington do not go to the heart of the problems in Afghanistan and Iraq. Afghanistan has been a political and economic basket case before the US carried out its military campaign in 2001, and is likely to remain so. The type of massive assistance and attention that country alone requires before it emerges as a halfway decent polity is beyond the capability of the US and its NATO allies. Only the commitment of the international community over several decades might alleviate its misery - and the operative phrase here is "might".

Iraq was a mess of a different sort before the US invaded it. As nefarious as dictators are, they have a record of keeping a multiethnic caldron from boiling over. Josip Tito of Yugoslavia and Saddam Hussein come to mind. Now Iraq resembles Afghanistan. Indeed, Iraq has become a gathering place for global jihadis who have nothing but death and destruction to offer to the American forces and to anyone who goes there even pretending to be siding with America.

The recent news that Turkey might send its peacekeeping troops to Iraq promises to add one more group to the ongoing death and mayhem. This time, the Kurds are likely to do their utmost to settle their own ancient scores with the Turks. But the US badly needs the Turkish participation in order to have a visible Muslim presence, and also to alleviate the chances of further deaths of its own troops.

The solution to endless death and misery in Iraq is the painful decision to hand over the rule of that country to the UN. The US must consider lowering its presence, authority, and, most important of all, its aspirations in Iraq. These observations might sound like a broken record to the Bush administration, but they bear repeating as long as young GIs are dying, and Iraqis of all walks of life are making it their national pastime to cause injury to the occupiers of their country. Even the current attempt to reorganize the US mission in Iraq is akin to saving a sinking ship by appointing a new leader of the crew whose mission is to bail the rising level of water. Instead, the objective of the US ought to be to bail out while it still can.

Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic analyst.

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Oct 8, 2003




The many voices of US foreign policy (Aug  5, '03)

Iraq: Why the US should let the UN take over (Aug 2, '03)

 

 
   
         
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