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House of Saud in a bind
By Erich Marquardt
On August 2, 1990, Iraq
invaded the small, oil-rich country of Kuwait. Saudi
Arabia, which borders both Kuwait and Iraq, feared the
powerful Iraqi state's next move. It was at this time
that Osama bin Laden, a Saudi national, offered his
support to the Saudi defense minister to mobilize
fighters from the 1979-1989 Soviet-Afghani war to defend
Saudi Arabia against Iraq. Riyadh rejected his offer,
instead choosing to use the United States to protect its
national interests. This policy decision resulted in the
protection of Saudi Arabia's territorial and
governmental integrity through the massive influx of US
military forces that soon flooded the kingdom's desert
sands.
To protect the leadership in Riyadh, and
to attack Iraqi forces that had invaded Kuwait, the
Pentagon sent about 500,000 US troops to Saudi Arabia in
1991. The decision by the kingdom to allow US troops on
Saudi soil - which is home to some of Islam's holiest
sites - and the desire of the US to use Saudi Arabia as
a staging ground for its attack on Iraq, infuriated many
Islamic fundamentalist groups in Saudi Arabia and
elsewhere in the Middle East.
Bin Laden, in
particular, was enraged, as it brought the US directly
into the affairs of the Middle East. In February of
1998, bin Laden explained this anger, saying that "for
over seven years the United States has been occupying
the lands of Islam in the holiest of places, the Arabian
Peninsula, plundering its riches, dictating to its
rulers, humiliating its people, terrorizing its
neighbors, and turning its bases in the peninsula into a
spearhead through which to fight the neighboring Muslim
peoples."
Yet the US maintained its presence in
Saudi Arabia and the Middle East, using the Prince
Sultan Base to launch sorties against the Iraqi state
with the objective of keeping it in a perpetual
condition of weakness. By the start of Operation Iraqi
Freedom in March of 2003, about 286,000 flight missions
against Iraq had been launched from this air base.
In a major act of retaliation, bin Laden and his
al-Qaeda network managed to strike two devastating blows
into the heart of the US on September 11. The attacks on
New York and Washington were in line with bin Laden's
objective of removing US influence from the Middle East.
Indeed, in 1998 when bin Laden issued a fatwa
calling for the killing of US military personnel and
civilians, he reiterated these demands:
"The
ruling to kill the Americans and their allies -
civilians and military - is an individual duty for every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is
possible to do it, in order to liberate the al-Aqsa
Mosque and the holy mosque [Mecca] from their grip, and
in order for their armies to move out of all the lands
of Islam, defeated and unable to threaten any Muslim."
Yet after the attacks, the US continued its
influence in the Middle East; in fact, the Bush
administration chose to increase its power and presence
in the region. In doing so, the administration
recognized the danger that Islamic militant groups pose
to US interests at home and abroad. The administration
paid attention to the fact that 15 out of the 19
hijackers that attacked the US on September 11 were
Saudi nationals. Therefore, the administration warned
Saudi Arabia that it would have to crack down on
militant segments of its own population, a task not so
simple for the Saudi leadership.
Punishing
Islamists within its society is difficult for the Saudi
monarchy because it has managed to stay in power due to
its support of Islamic tradition and its promotion of
the more traditional Wahhabi sect of Islam throughout
the world. For example, the monarchy has spent billions
of its oil wealth to fund missionary campaigns across
the globe. Yet much of this support is likely to have
fallen into the hands of religious extremists intent on
dealing devastating blows to enemy states. Furthermore,
the lack of a political will to crack down on these
militants - who refrain from using their power against
the Saudi leadership - has resulted in the militants'
ability to use Saudi Arabia as a staging ground to
launch attacks on foreign states.
Even outside
its borders, Saudi Arabia has been funding militant
groups. In Israel, generous amounts of Saudi funds have
poured into the coffers of the two Palestinian
organizations Hamas and Islamic Jihad. While these
groups provide essential social services to the
Palestinian people, they are also involved in frequent
attacks on Israeli civilians - most notably, their
infamous suicide bomb attacks. Up until recently,
Washington has been willing to accept this state of
affairs.
But now the Bush administration has
recognized the conundrum caused by the Saudi
government's acquiescence on issues of religious
extremism and has applied pressure on the House of Saud
to crack down on its internal militants. Fearing the
danger in losing the US as a key ally, Riyadh responded
by clamping down on militant groups within its society.
Riyadh also aimed to dry up financial support to these
groups by limiting the amount of cash donations given by
Saudi society to charities.
Throughout Saudi
Arabia - such as in mosques and shopping centers -
charity boxes can be found, in which passing Saudi
Muslims give their zakat, sharing a percentage of
their earnings with the less fortunate. Also, since
Saudis do not pay income tax - due to the vast oil
wealth distributed to society by the government - they
cannot donate to charities through their taxes, making
many of their contributions completely unaccountable.
Because anonymous donations sometimes end up in the
hands of militants, the government in Riyadh has been
eliminating these boxes.
Yet in disposing of
charity boxes, the government is also undermining the
poor that these charities support. Sheik Salman
al-Omari, who operates a charity that cares for the
poor, recently told Associated Press writer Adnan Malik
that the removal of the cash boxes "is in line with
America's anti-Islam strategy". Indeed, Riyadh's
attempts to dry up financial support for militants
within its society, coupled with its domestic tactics of
eliminating these groups, has caused these militant
organizations to target the power of the Saudi ruling
family. This was most evident on May 12, when Saudi
militants used car bombs to attack two housing compounds
home to many American and Western defense contractors
and advisors to the Saudi Arabian National Guard, in
addition to other Saudi military units.
Therefore, the House of Saud finds itself split
between two antagonistic forces. On the one hand, it
desires to keep the US as an ally, and certainly not as
an enemy. In order to do this, it must crack down on the
militancy brewing within Saudi society. On the other
hand, by tightening the leash on militant groups within
Saudi society - both physically and financially - Riyadh
makes itself a target for these groups, thus risking
domestic stability.
Due to this difficult
situation in which Riyadh now finds itself, the Saud
ruling family has been attempting to fight on both sides
of the war. While this has been arguably effective so
far, it is not clear how long this state of affairs can
continue. If the Middle East continues to destabilize,
and the US begins to look like even more of a villain,
the House of Saud will have a harder time justifying its
relationship with Washington.
Yet if Riyadh
continues this relationship, it could quickly find
itself facing increasing cases of armed insurrection by
its own population; such rebellion will threaten to
destroy the Saudi ruling family's long lasting
leadership.
But if Riyadh ignores Washington's
demands, and looks to be supporting terrorism, it could
end up in the crosshairs of the Bush administration's
"regime change" policy. While Washington does not have
the political clout - or current military resources - to
deal too forcefully with the kingdom, any weakening of
ties with the US will be looked at negatively by the
Saudi leadership. Considering these circumstances, the
best Riyadh can hope for is it to have the US limit its
involvement in the Middle East - which would quell anger
among militant Saudis - yet continue to be an avid
protector and collaborator of the Saudi monarch.
Otherwise, the House of Saud will have to decide which
side of the war they want to fight on, or else their
indecision will cause them to be attacked by both.
Published with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com
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