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Pre-emptive strikes carry hidden
dangers
By Erich Marquardt
As
Iran continues its development of nuclear technology,
powerful rival states such as the United States and
Israel have publicly considered the viability of
launching an air strike against Iran's nuclear
facilities should Tehran come closer to developing the
ability to create nuclear weapons.
Israel, for
example, has a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East and
has shown its willingness to prevent other Middle
Eastern states from acquiring nuclear arms. In 1981,
when France was assisting Iraq in its quest for nuclear
technology, Tel Aviv launched an air strike on Iraq's
Osirak nuclear reactor. This accomplished its primary
objective of putting a dent in Baghdad's nuclear
research program. Would a similar attack on Iran's
nuclear facilities yield similar results?
A
military air strike on Iran's nuclear facilities would
have a much lower success ratio than the Osirak attack
had in 1981. Then, Iraq's nuclear research program was
concentrated at the Tuwaitha nuclear center just outside
of Baghdad. Baghdad's failure to disperse the different
aspects of its nuclear program to multiple facilities
made it an easy target for an air strike.
Dr
Imad Khadduri, a former Iraqi nuclear scientist who was
the head of the scientific experimentation group before
the Israeli air strike, confirmed to the Power and
Interest News Report, "Indeed, in 1981 all of our work
was centered at the Tuwaitha site." In order to prevent
such attacks from occurring in the future, Baghdad took
prompt action after Israel's successful air strike.
Khadduri explained, "We began to disperse our nuclear
facilities to end up with eight or nine sites for
production, processing, enrichment design and research."
Aware of Baghdad's failure to spread its nuclear
program to multiple facilities, Tehran has adopted a
safer approach. Realizing that other countries which
have military power in the region - such as the US and
Israel - may attempt to take military action against
their nuclear research program, Tehran has likely spread
its program into multiple facilities throughout the
country. This dispersal strategy will make it very
difficult for an outside country to launch a successful
air strike.
Dr David Albright, president of the
Institute for Science and International Security,
recently explained to the Power and Interest News Report
the methods that Tehran has taken to protect its nuclear
research program. Albright warned that "while military
strikes can hurt Iran's nuclear capabilities, they
cannot stop them ... There are likely other facilities
that are unknown and would escape damage." Khadduri,
too, pointed to the difficulties involved in an attempt
to destroy Iran's nuclear research program: "Unless the
attacking country would have human spies infiltrating
the Iranian nuclear team, it would be very difficult to
pinpoint what to hit in the event of an air attack."
In addition to the operational difficulties in
destroying Iran's nuclear research program, there are
also serious political risks involved. In 1981, when
Israel attacked Iraq's Osirak reactor, Tel Aviv's move
caused Baghdad to accelerate its quest for nuclear arms.
By demonstrating Iraq's military weakness in its failure
to prevent an Israeli air strike, Tel Aviv's decision
merely caused the leadership in Baghdad to believe even
more strongly that they needed nuclear weapons to shield
against future aggression from hostile states. By
acquiring nuclear arms, states are able to increase
their defense capabilities since other states are
hesitant to take military action against a nuclear-armed
rival. As Khadduri writes in his recent book describing
Iraq's nuclear research program, after Israel attacked
the Osirak reactor, "Saddam took the political decision
to initiate a full-fledged weapons program immediately
afterwards."
President Saddam Hussein's decision
in 1981 to accelerate Iraq's nuclear weapons program
displays the danger that would be involved in attacking
Iran's nuclear research program. Any attack would prove
to Tehran that its military was too weak to defend the
Iranian state from outside threats; just like Baghdad in
1981, this realization would lead Tehran to accelerate
its nuclear weapons program, thus creating an even
bigger problem for rival states. Albright asserts that
after a military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities,
Iran could "quickly restart a gas centrifuge program in
secret that would be extremely difficult to detect or
stop".
The diplomatic anger that would be
created by attacking Iran's nuclear research program
would also be fierce. Tehran has extensive diplomatic
and economic ties with a variety of states, such as
members of the European Union, Russia and India. Russia
has been earning much-needed capital by assisting Iran's
nuclear research program. Russian engineers have been
building Iran's main nuclear reactor at the southern
city of Bushehr. While Moscow has expressed public
concern regarding accusations that Tehran may be
attempting to develop nuclear arms, it has been
unwilling to cease its assistance to Tehran. Along with
nuclear assistance, Moscow has been providing Iran with
conventional arms. According to "Conventional Arms
Transfers to Developing Nations", an annual report
provided to the US Congress by Richard Grimmett, in the
past decade Moscow has provided Tehran with MiG-20
fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter bombers, T-72 tanks and
Kilo class attack submarines.
India also has
important ties with Iran. India's strategic concerns
over its rival state, Pakistan, are shared in part by
Iran; therefore, instability in Iran could weaken
India's foreign policy leverage when dealing with the
leadership in Islamabad. New Delhi and Tehran have also
been collaborating with Russia's state-owned gas
company, Gazprom, to build a pipeline that would export
gas from Iran to India.
Taking these factors
into account, the prospect of launching a successful air
strike that would thwart Tehran's pursuit of nuclear
technology is not a viable strategy. In addition to the
logistical difficulties involved in destroying Tehran's
nuclear facilities, there is also the fear that such an
attack would only accelerate Tehran's pursuit of nuclear
arms. Finally, the political reverberations that would
be felt by such an attack would be severe, and the
attacking state would likely be held accountable for its
actions.
Published with permission of the
Power
and Interest News Report, an
analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight
into various conflicts, regions and points of interest
around the globe. All comments should be directed to
content@pinr.com
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