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The truth behind the US's 'Iron Fist'
By David Isenberg
Remember
the Third Infantry Division? The "Iron Fist" of the
United States Army's 18th Airborne Corps was one of the
primary combat units during Operation Iraqi Freedom. It
saw action from the first crossing of the Iraqi border
to the final days of fighting in Baghdad, and was hailed
as the new model for the vision of a transformed
military; one that could fight flexibly and lethally
over long distances. But there was both more and less
to its story, as it turns out.
Recently, the
division's official after-action report was obtained by
the Alexandria, Virginia-based group
GlobalSecurity.org and posted on its website. The 281-page report
is notable for its dispassionate warts and a record of
how it performed during the war. While it does not stint
on praising itself for things that went well, it does
not avoid discussing the things that went badly and the
need for improvements.
The report shows that
despite the proliferation of hi-tech weaponry and
military equipment in US military units, the basics are
still as important as ever; namely training. It notes,
"The requirement for tough realistic training has not
changed in the past 227 years. The division lived under
the 'train as you fight' motto for the 12 months
preceding the war."
And, in light of all the
current publicity given to former US army prisoner of
war Jessica Lynch, it is interesting to note that it was
the ambitious nature of Operation Iraqi Freedom itself
that exposed her unit to attack. In the words of the
report, "The continuous pace and extended distance of
OIF [Operation Iraqi Freedom] taxed the division's
logistics systems to the maximum extent. In anticipation
of the ambitious maneuver and expected austerity of the
theater logistics environment, the division commander
accepted risk in some classes of supply in order to
accommodate the burden of independence and ensure the
flexibility required to exploit success."
Although many commentators claimed that the
Iraqis did not fight, or at least not as fiercely as
anticipated, the report states that the battlefield was
often more dangerous than noted at the time. The report
states, "All commanders faced a multifaceted threat.
Throughout the operation, units fought conventional
regular army and Republican Guard forces, as well as
paramilitary and terrorist threats ... The extended
battlespace created a nonlinear battlefield. All units
of the division were on the 'front lines'. There was no
sanctuary on the battlefield. Virtually every element of
the division was engaged at some point in the fight."
Especially in light of the ongoing insurgency in
Iraq, details in the report concerning postwar planning,
or lack thereof, are especially revealing. Although it
is hardly a novel insight at this point in time, the
report confirms that planning for post-major combat
operations was inadequate. The report states that the
division "did not have a fully developed plan for the
transition to SASO [stability and support operations]
and civil military operations in Baghdad prior to
entering the city".
The report also supports
those who criticized Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld
and other Pentagon officials for not sending a larger
force to Iraq. According to the report, "As the division
transitioned to SASO, it did not have sufficient forces
or effective rules of engagement to control civilian
looting and rioting throughout the city [of Baghdad].
Looting by the local civilians was a significant
obstacle to the reestablishment of order in such a
heavily populated area."
The division also came
up short in terms of particular specialties that were
critical to being able to do reconstruction quickly and
effectively. That is something that the US is not only
obligated to do as an occupying power, but would have
done much to gain the confidence and cooperation of the
Iraqi people. For example, it suffered an acute shortage
of explosive ordinance detachment personnel to clear
enemy weapons caches and unexploded ordnances, of which
there are hundreds of thousands of tons.
Also,
in terms of dealing with damage to infrastructure,
combat engineers were simply out of their league. While
it is true that such tasks are not their primary, or
even secondary, mission, there was much that they did do
in terms of rebuilding. But they could have done much
more if adequate prewar planning had taken place. The
report notes, "If the final objective of an operation
includes existing buildings and facilities, there needs
to be a clear plan for the occupation of the facilities
as well as a plan for the re-establishment of the basic
infrastructure needs."
Not surprisingly, given
that this is the report of an army unit, it found that
"shock and awe" was not something that was the exclusive
realm of air power. It found, contrary to the
predictions of some, that armor units could operate
effectively in urban areas. "The lethality of a
mechanized force enables the attacking force to not only
destroy the enemy, but also create a shock effect that
destroys his will to fight."
However, that is
not say it could do so without costs. As human rights
groups have documented, there was much unintentional
targeting of civilians. The report notes that both the
Army Tactical Missile System and Multiple Launch Rocket
System were used to engage artillery and
surface-to-surface missiles in Iraqi cities, but caused
heavy collateral damage.
Perhaps the most
striking section of the report, considering the Bush
administration's generally hostile relationship with the
media, was the effort they put into developing a
trusting relationship with the embedded media. The
division devoted great efforts to "team building"
between the various units in the division and the media
who were assigned to them. Not only did it conduct
extensive training exercises prior to deployment, but
two days before the start of the war it provided the
media a broad overview of the plan, including tentative
timelines. The "media were allowed unprecedented access
to plans. We know of no media that violated the trust
during the entire operation".
(Copyright 2003
Asia Times Online Co, Ltd. All rights reserved. Please
contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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