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OPINION
Get smart or lose the
war
By Xiao Xi
BEIJING -
Intelligence is one thing that separates humans and
animals, and, it seems, success and failure in the
present "war on terror". The attacks on the British
consulate in Istanbul and the Italian barracks in
Nasiryah, Iraq, show an appalling lack of intelligence,
in its broadest sense. And there is a strong possibility
that the anti-terrorist forces are losing the war.
Three years ago, after the September 11 attacks,
the world was in awe and fear of the terrorist
offensive, as well as the imminent American response.
Afghanistan was a mess, a black hole spreading infection
all over Central Asia, but Iraq was contained, and so in
general was the Middle East, where Syria and Iran, whose
governments were not amicable with the West, were
restraining their aggression.
Three years later,
Afghanistan is no longer a safe haven for terrorists,
but spreads drugs all over the world. The warlords who
helped defeat the Taliban and drive out Osama bin Laden
reap the fruits of the victory by selling opium and
heroin. Iraq has been rid of Saddam Hussein, but it
looks like a quagmire where no less than 200,000
soldiers must be committed lest their own security is
endangered. Experts reckon that having fewer than
150,000 soldiers in Iraq would escalate the number of
casualties.
The attacks in Istanbul, like the
bomb in Bali, show that al-Qaeda has the clout to
convince local extremists to side with it in sensitive
territories like Indonesia or Turkey, craftily chosen as
weak links in the allied chain - Muslim states with
extremist potential yet siding with the West.
Post-war operations in Afghanistan, Iraq and in
Kosovo (yes, Kosovo has not been pacified) are engaging
some 250-300,000 soldiers from the US and other
countries, draining the human resources of America, not
to mention its money and energy. The result is that the
US has no energy to tackle other, possibly greater,
threats such as North Korea. Talk of expanding US action
from Iraq to other troubled neighboring countries, like
Syria for instance, has become subdued.
Meanwhile, the forces of terror are trying to
destabilize those neighbors who are siding with the US.
In other words, the US is on the defensive whereas the
terrorists are on the offensive, both in and around
Iraq. And there is no solution in sight.
Attacks
on the US and its allies are growing in number and
intensity, not decreasing. More anti-terror forces are
being committed to combat this, but their quality is
decreasing. The new US troops who are going to Baghdad
are from the National Guard. They will live in their
barracks, completely separated from the rest of Iraq,
feeling more and more besieged, more and more in hostile
territory, more and more controlled by the enemy.
Besides, it is not clear whether there is an exit
strategy.
How can America stabilize this Iraq?
The growing number of attacks proves that the US-led
forces know less and less about what is going on in
Iraq, not more. Iraq, in other words, looks like a trap
about which the US and its allies, their soldiers and
their people know little. They don't know about the
country its rules and customs, its intricacies, its
snares. In short, they lack intelligence.
Al-Qaeda managed the September 11 attacks not
because of its powerful military but because it beguiled
US intelligence. The US failed to preempt September 11
not because of lack of guns, but because of lack of
intelligence in the broad sense. In Iraq, the situation
grows worse by the day for the same reason: the US
certainly has enough guns, but not enough intelligence.
North Atlantic Treaty Organization General Fabio Mini,
in his latest book, La Guerra dopo la Guerra,
stresses that the threat of global terrorism has to be
met with much better information networks. John Keegan
in his The First World War points out that the
armies had enough shells to kill each other many times
over, but lacked information on where to direct their
shells.
This seems to be happening in Iraq now.
Soldiers are busy defending themselves and people are
coming from outside to join Saddam's supporters.
Why don't we know? How can we know? How can we
use the knowledge to win over the uncertain and isolate
the die-hard enemies? These questions have to be
addressed very seriously as they are more important than
any quarrel about the number of people in the field.
(Copyright 2003 Asia Times Online Ltd. All
rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication policies.)
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