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How Tehran outmaneuvered
Washington
By Erich Marquardt
From the beginning, Iran's decision to comply
with the International Atomic Energy Agency's (IAEA)
latest stipulations on its nuclear research program was
an attempt to politically outmaneuver Washington. Tehran
agreed to temporarily cease its uranium enrichment
program and to allow for more stringent inspections of
its nuclear facilities. The Bush administration has been
pushing for international pressure to be placed on Iran
in the hopes of stunting the country's nuclear research
program. Washington fears that Iran's growing nuclear
knowledge and sophisticated nuclear facilities will
allow the country to develop nuclear weapons, a scenario
that would greatly increase Iran's power potential in
the Middle East and Central Asia.
On the face of
it, this outcome looks to have worked in Washington's
favor, but the latest set of demands by the IAEA are
much too weak to have any significant effect on Iran's
nuclear research program. The stipulations that Iran
agreed to are considered temporary, as is only too
evident by statements made in Tehran shortly after its
decision to comply with the IAEA. Hassan Rowhani,
secretary of Iran's Supreme National Security Council,
assured observers that Iran's suspension of its
enrichment program "could last for one day or one year;
it depends on us".
Diverging
interests
The differing geopolitical interests in
Europe and in the US can best explain why the IAEA
promoted such a watered down set of demands. Unlike the
US, the EU does not consider Iran to be a "rogue state".
The EU has important diplomatic and economic ties with
Tehran; it is Iran's biggest trading partner, especially
the EU states of the United Kingdom, France and Germany.
This growing relationship explains why these three
countries sent their foreign ministers to help negotiate
Iran's decision to comply with the IAEA.
Even
more disturbing to Washington policymakers was how these
three EU countries also promised Tehran that if it
complied with IAEA demands, the EU would be willing to
assist Iran's nuclear research program by giving it
greater access to modern technology and supplies. This
would allow Iran to buy nuclear technology that has been
kept out of its grasp due to 20 years of sanctions.
Nikolai Shingaryov, spokesman of the Russian Atomic
Energy Ministry, made a similar offer, telling Itar-Tass
that the IAEA resolution on Iran "gives an opportunity
to step up Russian-Iranian cooperation in nuclear power
engineering".
Other regionally significant
countries, such as Russia, are also unwilling to support
a hardline US policy towards Iran. In contrast to US
strategy, Russia is currently building a nuclear reactor
in the city of Bushehr in southern Iran. Moscow also has
provided massive supplies of military equipment to
Tehran, such as MiG-29 fighter aircraft, Su-24 fighter
bombers, T-72 tanks and Kilo class attack submarines.
Moscow is pursuing the prospect of building more nuclear
reactors and facilities in Iran, a development that
would help Russia earn much-needed financial capital.
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov summarized Moscow's
commitment to Iran, recently saying in a CNN interview:
"I see no grounds for imposing sanctions against Iran.
On the contrary, if it carries out its obligations to
the IAEA, the world community, on the basis of
international agreements, is obliged to assist Iran in
developing its nuclear program for peaceful aims."
Additionally, Russia does not want Iran to be
weakened by the US, since Washington is already
encroaching on Russia's southern border in Central Asia.
If Washington were able to orchestrate a change of
government in Tehran - one that complied with American
interests rather than Russian interests - it would cause
a further deterioration in Moscow's security environment
across its southern border. Furthermore, it would allow
Washington to have increased influence in the rich oil
and gas areas of the Caspian Sea - an outcome that
Russia would like to avoid. These geopolitical
differences explain why the European Union intervened
and fostered an agreement that would place temporary,
rather than permanent, limits on Iran's nuclear research
program.
Concern in
Washington
Washington's fear over Iran developing
nuclear weapons is not contrived. Washington is
attempting to preserve the current power balance in the
Middle East and Central Asia. If Iran were to become a
nuclear-armed state, it would greatly increase the
Persian country's foreign policy leverage. A
nuclear-armed Iran, coupled with its already sizeable
military, would greatly increase the country's defensive
capabilities and limit the ability of rival states to
threaten Iran's territorial and governmental integrity;
moreover, it would also prove more difficult to check
Iran's regional ambitions. Indeed, this is why the
leadership in Tehran has been so keen on furthering its
nuclear research program.
Iran has demanded that
it be able to enrich uranium for the purposes of
providing fuel to its nuclear reactors, a process
necessary for the development of nuclear energy.
Enriching uranium is also a process, however, that can
be used to provide nuclear material required for the
production of nuclear weapons. Because Iran has the
legal right to control the entire nuclear fuel cycle for
the purposes of peaceful nuclear research, the US has
been trying to bind Iran to an agreement where Tehran
would only import enriched uranium, rather than enrich
it independently. This would allow greater transparency
of Iran's nuclear research program and make it more
difficult for Iran to covertly develop nuclear arms.
With the agreement designed by the EU, this
stipulation was not proposed. Now, the only legal way to
prevent Iran from enriching uranium is for international
observers to prove that the country is using the uranium
for nuclear weapons, rather than for research and energy
purposes. Finding proof to make a case against a country
that may be secretly developing nuclear weapons has
always proved difficult.
Take, for instance,
Israel, which began a covert program to develop nuclear
weapons in 1952. When US weapons inspectors visited
Israel's Dimona nuclear reactor in the 1960s, they were
unable to detect that Israel was secretly developing
nuclear weapons. According to the Federation of American
Scientists, in order to hide their nuclear weapons
program, Israeli engineers had installed "false control
room panels and [placing] brick over elevators and
hallways that accessed certain areas of the facility."
Viewed in this context, the agreement between
the EU and Iran may only delay Iran's development of
nuclear arms. If inspectors fail to find that Iran has a
covert nuclear weapons program - which is likely - then
the country will eventually be allowed to enrich uranium
and handle all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle.
Regional implications
A nuclear-armed
Iran would threaten Washington's ability to alter the
power balance in the Middle East since it would limit
Washington's political and military leverage in the
region. A nuclear-armed Iran would also subdue Israel's
power projection capabilities; presently Israel has a
nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, being the only
state that has developed nuclear weapons. Israeli
Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz, speaking in the US, argued
that a nuclear-armed Iran would be "intolerable".
Tehran has watched as Washington increased US
influence in the entire region; first by establishing
military bases in Afghanistan, and second by
establishing them in Iraq. This explains why Tehran has
been unwilling to compromise on the future of its
nuclear research program. Shortly after agreeing to the
EU's provisions, Rowhani was quick to assert that Iran
would remain sovereign over all aspects of its nuclear
research program. Rowhani stated: "We believe that
stopping enriching uranium is totally unacceptable and
we think nobody agrees with [doing] that in Iran."
Then, in recent days, Rowhani continued to
assert Iran's nuclear mandate: "Our decision to suspend
uranium enrichment is voluntary and temporary. Uranium
enrichment is Iran's natural right, and [Iran] will
reserve for itself this right. ... There has been and
there will be no question of a permanent suspension or
halt at all." Rowhani continued: "We want to control the
whole fuel cycle ... Today, we can produce centrifugal
parts ourselves. We possess the technology."
Therefore, as long as the EU and other
significant states that have influence in Tehran - such
as Russia - are unwilling to unite with Washington's
desired hardline policy towards Iran, the leadership in
Tehran may be able to outmaneuver Bush administration
policymakers and come closer to their goal of acquiring
nuclear weapons.
Published with permission of
the Power and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed to content@pinr.com
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