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Iraq and Vietnam: Battles of
will
By Erich Marquardt
US
officials have gone to great lengths to make sure the
American people understand that the US military cannot
possibly be defeated in Iraq. "I want to emphasize to
the people that there is no military threat in Iraq that
can drive us out," assured General John Abizaid, the
commander of US Central Command. "We have the
best-equipped, best-trained army in the world positioned
in the most difficult areas we have to deal with ...
They are confident, they are capable, they know what
they are doing."
General Abizaid is correct: the
attacks launched against US forces in Iraq are not the
type required or intended to defeat the United States
militarily. But the general cannot dismiss the fact that
Washington is not operating in a military vacuum. The
strength of the US military means little when faced with
an increasingly skeptical US public who have the
potential to force Washington to pull its troops out of
Iraq. In addition, while Washington cannot be
overwhelmed by sheer force, there is no evidence that
the guerrilla fighters in Iraq can be defeated that way
either.
In Vietnam, Washington faced a similar
predicament. There was an increasingly organized and
brash guerrilla force preventing the United States from
bringing stability to South Vietnam. Due to the massive
technology gap, Vietnamese guerrillas and the North
Vietnamese Army (NVA) stood little chance of defeating
the US militarily. Just the same, however, Washington
stood little chance of defeating the Vietnamese
guerrilla movement militarily. While US forces killed
and maimed large numbers of the Viet Cong, they never
addressed the fundamental land and wealth inequality
that led to the popularity of the Viet Cong and the
National Liberation Front in the countryside.
The effective guerrilla tactics of the Viet Cong
and the NVA were a military strategy in and of
themselves, aimed at sapping the political will from the
US public. This was well known at the time and was often
articulated in the speeches of president John F Kennedy.
Always aware of US public opinion, Vietnamese military
and guerrilla leaders worked to undermine Washington.
When they launched the massive Tet Offensive in more
than 100 different cities of South Vietnam on January
31, 1968 - successfully storming and occupying the US
Embassy in Saigon - the attack was orchestrated shortly
after US military leaders and politicians claimed that
the war in Vietnam was almost over.
For example,
near the end of 1967, General William Westmoreland, the
commander of US forces in Vietnam, told the American
people that he could see the "light at the end of the
tunnel". Westmoreland argued that US forces had the
Vietnamese guerrillas on the run, telling an American
journalist, "I hope they try something, because we are
looking for a fight." Even though the Tet Offensive
resulted in a military failure for the insurgency, in
the end it turned the tide of US public opinion against
US involvement in Vietnam; the American public could
simply no longer reconcile the "credibility gap" between
Washington's rhetoric and the reality on the ground.
The strategy of Vietnamese resistance fighters
proved to be successful, and it looks as if resistance
fighters in Iraq are following a similar one; more
recent guerrilla conflicts in Afghanistan and Chechnya
fought by the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation
provide historical precedents for the viability of such
guerrilla methods.
Iraqi guerrillas are most
likely aware that they will not be able to crush the US
military occupation in Iraq. They do know, however, that
if they continue to kill and maim US soldiers, it will
only be a matter of time until the American public
demands a return of the troops and applies political
pressure to the administration of President George W
Bush. General Abizaid admitted as much, recently
warning, "The goal of the enemy is not to defeat us
militarily. The goal of the enemy is to break the will
of the United States of America, to make us leave."
It is evident that the Iraqi guerrillas have
been somewhat successful in this goal. According to a
CBS News poll released on November 13, only 50 percent
of the American public now believe that removing Saddam
Hussein was worth the loss of American lives and other
costs of attacking Iraq. If the losses of US troops
continue to mount, this number can be expected to drop
further, endangering the re-election prospects of the
Bush administration. If President Bush is voted out of
office in 2004, his administration's strategy in Iraq
may leave the White House with him, since most of his
contenders have been critical of US involvement there.
Therefore, the strategy of anti-US guerrillas in
Iraq will be to launch high profile attacks on US and
also coalition troops, such as the one that may have
targeted US Deputy Defense Secretary Paul Wolfowitz
while he was staying at the al-Rasheed Hotel in downtown
Baghdad. The recent targeting of US helicopters is also
part of this strategy, as each successful attack can
cause far more casualties than most other guerrilla
methods. The bomb attacks on major installations - such
as the explosion at the Italian Carabinieri base in the
southern city of Nasiriyah on November 12, which killed
19 Italians - also work to erode domestic and
international confidence in the US occupation.
Whether or not Washington is able to bring
stability to Iraq before the US public becomes
disenchanted with US objectives there largely depends on
the size and capacity of the guerrilla movement. Abizaid
claimed on November 13 that the insurgency against the
US occupation "does not exceed 5,000". Yet, at the same
time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) released an
"appraisal of situation", written by the CIA station
chief in Baghdad, which contradicted Abizaid's claims,
warning that the insurgency could contain 50,000
guerrillas.
Furthermore, the CIA report
concluded that more and more ordinary Iraqis were siding
with the insurgency because of their disillusionment
with the US occupation and the instability plaguing the
country since Saddam Hussein's fall from power. These
assessments indicate that the occupation is becoming
increasingly precarious, and it is not yet clear how the
US public will respond to deadlier and bolder attacks
launched on US forces.
Published with
permission of the Power and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed to content@pinr.com.
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