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Saddam
is history, but who is the real
enemy?
By Jim Lobe and Peyman Pejman
DUBAI and WASHINGTON - Neither the US Commander
in Chief, President George W Bush, nor the commander of
the US forces in Iraq believe that the capture of Saddam
Hussein will bring about a quick end to the insurgency.
But what should become clearer in the coming weeks and
months is whether the insurgency consists largely of
Saddam and Ba'ath loyalists, as the US administration
insists.
And while Saddam's arrest closes a long
chapter, it poses new challenges for the US-led forces
in their relations with Iraqi officials and people.
When L Paul Bremer, the US civilian
administrator in Iraq appeared before a press conference
Sunday to speak his long-to-be-remembered words, "Ladies
and gentlemen, we got him," even Iraqi journalists were
euphoric.
It was an historic breakthrough, but
not the end of the Saddam story.
Coalition
forces in Iraq and US officials in Washington had long
argued that closing the chapter on Saddam Hussein was
necessary. This was primarily for two reasons.
First, many US military commanders believed that
as long as Saddam was on the run he would at least
psychologically contribute to the ongoing attacks on
coalition forces. The commander of the US forces in
Iraq, Lt Gen Ricardo Sanchez, told a recent press
conference that one reason more Iraqis had not come
forward to offer information on guerrilla leaders was
the fear they would be punished by Saddam and his
followers.
The second reason was that many
Iraqis could not accept that a new page was turned April
9 when Baghdad fell to the coalition forces. "As long as
Saddam has not been killed or arrested, there will
remain a shadow for many Iraqis as to whether they can
move on with their lives, whether they can start
rebuilding their country and re-map their own lives,"
Intifahd Qanbar, spokesman for the Iraqi National
Congress, told Inter Press Service in Baghdad in
October.
The capture of Saddam is likely to
solve at least the second problem. But Sanchez says the
arrest is not likely to end attacks against coalition
forces. And the normally cocky Bush, who addressed the
US by television from the White House, stressed that the
former Iraqi dictator's arrest would not mean a quick
end to the occupation's armed resistance.
"The
capture of Saddam Hussein does not mean the end of
violence in Iraq," Bush declared solemnly at the
conclusion of a short statement that described Saddam's
detention as "crucial to the rise of a free Iraq".
Bush's resignation to more resistance reflected
much of the reaction to the day's news, as lawmakers and
analysts described the capture as a potentially major
breakthrough that would not necessarily prove decisive.
Indeed, some specialists warned even before
Sunday's announcement that Saddam's death or detention
would prove largely irrelevant to the difficult problems
faced by US and coalition forces in Iraq, both because
loyalty to Hussein - or even to his Ba'ath Party - had
ceased to be a catalyst for the insurgency, and, in any
event, the complex internal political situation in Iraq
had begun to fuel more tension and violence.
Some even suggested that Saddam's capture might
actually create new problems for the occupation by
empowering sectors in the Shi'ite community to test the
occupation and back up their demands for direct
elections to a new Iraqi government with more militant
tactics.
"Now that it is perfectly clear that
[Saddam] is finished," noted Iraq specialist Juan Cole,
who teaches history at the University of Michigan, "the
Shiites may be emboldened. Those [Shiites] who dislike
US policies or who are opposed to the idea of occupation
no longer need be apprehensive that the US will suddenly
leave and allow Saddam to come back to power.
"They may therefore now gradually throw off
their political timidity, and come out more forcefully
into the streets when they disagree."
Although
military commanders have long insisted that resistance
to the occupation was being carried out primarily by
"Saddam loyalists", they had never ascribed to him any
actual leadership role, apart from his status as a
symbol, particularly for Ba'athists.
That
appeared to be borne out by the circumstances of his
capture. Not only was Saddam bedraggled, he also lacked
any apparent means of electronic or satellite
communication, such as a telephone. For some observers,
this proved the resistance was clearly operating
independently of Saddam. "Given the location and
circumstances of his capture, it makes clear that Saddam
was not managing the insurgency, and that he had very
little control or influence," said Senator Jay
Rockefeller, the Democratic leader on the Senate
Intelligence Committee.
"That is significant and
disturbing because it means the insurgents are not
fighting for Saddam; they're fighting against the United
States," he added.
Others argued that,
regardless of Saddam's relevance to resistance
operations, his capture was bound to have a demoralizing
effect on the insurgents.
"I think Saddam's
capture will give Iraqis the courage and the
psychological boost not to tolerate any more [Saddam
loyalists or criminals] within their own society,"
Judith Kipper, a Middle East specialist at the Council
on Foreign Relations (CFR), told Inter Press Service. At
the same time she also stressed that it will not "solve
the problem of the insurgency, of the political chaos or
of the reconstruction".
Retired General William
Nash, also of CFR, told National Public Radio that the
capture could lead many Iraqis in the so-called Sunni
Triangle to cooperate more with occupation authorities.
With the achievement of such a key objective, "everybody
[will] want to get on the bandwagon", he said.
That might be overly optimistic, according to
others, including Cole, who wrote that Saddam "was
probably already irrelevant".
"The Sunni Arab
resisters to US occupation in the country's heartland
had long since jettisoned Saddam and the Ba'ath as
symbols," he stressed.
"They are fighting for
local reasons. Some are Sunni fundamentalists, who
despised the Ba'ath. Others are Arab nationalists who
weep at the idea of their country being occupied. Some
had relatives killed or humiliated by US troops and are
pursuing a clan vendetta. Some fear a Shi'ite and
Kurdish-dominated Iraq will reduce them to second-class
citizens."
Both this thesis, as well as the
administration's continued insistence that the
insurgency consists mainly of Saddam and Ba'ath
loyalists, criminals, and foreign "jihadis", will be
tested in the coming weeks and months.
Aside
from the military aspect, the coalition forces now face
a political challenge: what to do with Saddam.
For months, both coalition officials and members
of the governing council have said Saddam would be tried
in a special Iraqi human rights court. But in their
press conference in Baghdad Sunday, both Bremer and
Sanchez refused to make commitments on Saddam's future.
Asked whether the former Iraqi leader would be
turned over to Iraqi forces, the two US officials said
interrogation of Saddam would continue, and that other
matters would be decided later.
Less than an
hour later, members of the Iraqi governing council were
saying something different. "He will be provided a
lawyer, the trial will be Iraqi and it will be a fair
trial," said the acting president of the governing
council, Adnan Pacheche.
That may be easier said
than done, and coalition forces will likely be walking a
tightrope.
Many Iraqis want Saddam to be put on
trial soon, but it is unlikely his interrogators will
let go of him in a hurry. In a country where many are
already complaining about the coalition forces' record,
choosing the right balance between providing a speedy
trial and getting whatever information they need could
prove difficult.
While Iraqis promise a fair
trial for Saddam and others in their custody, it is
unlikely that Iraq's new and fledgling legal system can
produce a human rights court competent to try Saddam.
The governing council signed a bill last week to set up
a war crimes tribunal, but establishing a court to try
Saddam will take time and money.
(Inter Press
Service)
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