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Occupation case studies: Algeria and
Turkey
By K Gajendra Singh
"We studied history at school that taught us
to say freedom or death. I think you know well that we
as a people have our experience with the
colonialists." - US ambassador April Glaspie to
Saddam Hussein in Baghdad on July 25, 1990.
While formulating foreign policy options,
political leaders also look to history for guidance.
Unfortunately, the United State's history is only two
centuries old, and to meet the challenge of terrorism,
Frankenstein monsters partly of its own creation, the
mujahideen, jihadis, the Taliban and al-Qaeda , the US
can only recall a long genocidal war against its native
Americans.
Those who resisted were called
"terrorists" for defending their native land and way of
life against foreign invaders. There are Hollywood films
galore that depict the "American Indians" as savages to
be hunted down by the US cavalry.
The same
cavalry units now force Iraqis daily to lie face down in
the land of their ancestors and describe those fighting
to free their country from the occupying forces as
"terrorists". The Iraqis, other Arabs and Iranians are
the new "American Indians", and those who collaborate
with the Bush administration are like the good Indians
who helped the Americans fight and defeat bad Indians.
So the display of a seemingly drugged and
unwashed Saddam Hussein was to assert white Christian
supremacy over the natives. US policy in Iraq and the
region is pure and simple, blatant neo-colonization.
After Vietnam and Afghanistan, the Middle East
is the new American West. The US administration, scared
of Islamic fundamentalism and religious fanatics, has
yet to evolve a coherent policy to counter it. But it is
turning occupied Iraq into an oligarchy of crony
capitalism, after an ill-advised and illegal war on
Iraq, set off and egged on by Christian fundamentalists
at the core of the administration.
The idea of
nationalism - developed by the West - socialism, rule of
law, fraternity and equality, have been abolished in the
discourse since September 11. But the sturdy plant of
nationalism in Iraq cannot be eliminated by going into
denial mode. According to Iraqi opposition and other
sources, there are perhaps more than 50 different
resistance organizations, including Ba'athists,
communists, nationalists, cashiered soldiers discarded
by the occupation, and Sunni and Shi'ite religious
groups, as well as foreign elements. In reality, almost
everyone is opposed to foreign occupation.
In an
era of nation states based on patriotism and shared
history, people just hate occupying powers. While
Vietnam's example and its people's fight for freedom and
making it a quagmire for US forces has been talked
about, Iraq's comparison with post World War 2 Germany
and Japan shows little historic understanding. The
ground situation and the evolution of the war for
independence in Muslim, Arab, and till now secular Iraq,
is closer to the wars of independence in Algeria and
Turkey.
In a November 2003 report by MEDACT, the
London-based affiliate of International Physicians for
the Prevention of Nuclear War and Physicians for Social
Responsibility, it was estimated that the number of
Iraqis killed since the invasion in March was between
20,000 and 55,000, including at least 8,000 civilians,
with upwards of 20,000 civilian casualties.
The
Algerian war of independence lasted from 1954 to 1962,
in which almost every family lost a member, a son, a
cousin, a nephew, willingly or unwillingly sacrificed at
the alter of freedom, self respect and dignity. After
its defeat in World War 1, when the Ottoman empire lay
supine under the heels of Allied power in its capital
Istanbul with the Sultan Caliph a captive, the national
leadership, led by Mustapha Kemal and his comrades,
mostly former Ottoman soldiers, aroused the masses of
Anatolia to make yet another supreme effort to expel the
Greeks and other occupying powers.
Algerian
case study
When I arrived in Algeria in 1964
from Egypt as a young diplomat, one saw very few young
men between the ages of 14 and 40 years in the streets
of Algiers, its capital . One million Algerians out of a
population of 11 million had been killed in the war for
independence against France. When president Ahmed Ben
Bella was ousted by his defense minister Colonel Houari
Boumedienne in June 1965, there was almost no violence.
Algerians had had enough bloodletting. Ben Bella was
quietly taken away from the president's palace, just
across from my 4th floor apartment. The Battle of
Algiers, now being screened for the benefit of US
decision makers, was filmed in 1965.
Like
Operation Iraqi Freedom and other US claims to usher
democracy into Iraq and the Middle East now, during
World War 2, Allied and Axis powers in their Arabic
radio broadcasts promised freedom and a new world for
the natives. Ferhat Abbas drafted an Algerian manifesto
in December 1942 for presentation to Allied and French
authorities for political autonomy for Algeria.
Following General Charles de Gaulle's promise in 1943
for their loyalty, some categories of Muslims in North
Africa were granted French citizenship, but this did not
go far enough to satisfy Algerian aspirations. When
Algerian nationalist flags were displayed at Sitif in
May 1945, French authorities fired on demonstrators. In
a spontaneous uprising, 84 European settlers were
massacred. The violence and suppression that followed
resulted in the death of about 8,000 Muslims (according
to French sources) or as many as 45,000 (according to
Algerian sources). That laid the foundations for the
Algerian War of Independence, which began in earnest 10
years later.
A number of nationalist groups and
parties were organized in Algeria even before World War
2, which became increasingly radicalized when peaceful
means failed to obtain freedom. A radical paramilitary
group, the Special Organization (Organization Spiciale;
OS) formed in the mid 1940s was discovered in 1950 and
many of its leaders imprisoned. In 1954, a group of
former OS members formed the Revolutionary Committee of
Unity and Action (Comiti Rivolutionaire d'Uniti et
d'Action; CRUA). This organization, later to become the
FLN, made preparations for military action. The leading
members of the CRUA became the so-called chefs
historiques (historical leaders) of the Algerian War
of Independence: Hocine Aot-Ahmed, Larbi Ben M'Hidi,
Moustapha Ben Boulaid, Mohamed Boudiaf, Mourad Didouche,
Belkacem Krim, Mohamed Khider, Rabah Bitat, and Ahmed
Ben Bella. They organized and led several hundred men in
the first armed confrontations.
The Algerian war
of Independence was ignited in 1954 in the Aures
mountains. It was at first dismissed as just colonial
trouble. The armed uprising soon intensified and spread,
gradually affecting larger parts of the country, and
some regions - notably the northeastern parts of Little
Kabylia and parts of the Aurhs Mountains - became
guerrilla strongholds that were beyond French control.
France became more involved in the conflict, drafting
some 2 million conscripts over the course of the war. To
counter the spread of the uprising, the French National
Assembly declared a state of emergency.
Jacques
Soustelle arrived in Algiers as the new governor-general
in February 1955, but his new plan was ineffective. Soon
the situation developed into a full-scale war with
French military rule, censorship and terrorism and
torture. White French and European settlers known as
pied noires (black feet) thrice challenged the
central government in Paris.
The white European
settler population was part of Algeria for generations,
perhaps much longer than any other settler community in
Africa, with the mother country just across the
Mediterranean. The French were almost as numerous as the
Muslim Algerians in the main cities and had rendered
conspicuous services to Algeria.
A decisive turn
in the war for independence took place in August 1955,
when a widespread armed outbreak in Skikda, north of the
Constantine region, led to the killings of nearly 100
Europeans and Muslim officials. Countermeasures by both
the French army and settlers claimed the lives of
somewhere between 1,200 (according to French sources)
and 12,000 (according to Algerian sources) Algerians. A
French army of 500,000 troops was sent to Algeria to
counter the rebel strongholds in the more distant
portions of the country, while the rebels collected
money for their cause and took reprisals against fellow
Muslims who would not cooperate with them. By the spring
of 1956 a majority of previously non-committed political
leaders, such as Ferhat Abbas and Tawfiq al-Madani,
joined FLN leaders in Cairo, where the group established
its headquarters.
The first FLN congress took
place in August-September 1956 in the Soummam Valley
between Great and Little Kabylia and brought together
the FLN leadership in an appraisal of the war and its
objectives. Algeria was divided into six autonomous
zones (wilayat ), each led by guerrilla
commanders who later played key political roles in the
country. The congress also produced a written program on
the aims and objectives of the war and set up the
National Council for the Algerian Revolution (Conseil
National de la Rivolution Algirienne) and the Committee
of Coordination and Enforcement (Comiti de Coordination
et d'Exicution), the latter acting as the executive
branch of the FLN.
Externally, the major event
of 1956 was the French decision to grant full
independence to Morocco and Tunisia and to concentrate
on retaining "French Algeria". The Moroccan sultan and
premier Habib Bourguiba of Tunisia, hoping to find an
acceptable solution to the Algerian problem, called for
a meeting in Tunis with important Algerian leaders
(including Ben Bella, Boudiaf, Khider and Aot-Ahmed) who
were the guests of the sultan in Rabat. French
intelligence officers, however, hijacked the plane
chartered by the Moroccan government to Oran instead of
Tunis. The Algerian leaders were arrested and imprisoned
in France for the rest of the war. This act hardened the
resolve of the Algerian leadership and provoked an
attack on Meknhs, Morocco, that cost the lives of 40
French settlers before the Moroccan government could
restore order.
After the meeting with the
Moroccan sultan at Rabat at the end of 1957, Bourguiba
again offered to mediate, but the French, deceived into
optimism by some recent successes in the field,
declined. Bourguiba wanted a peaceful solution, because
of growing links between the FLN and Egypt. A Maghrib
federation to include an independent Algeria, Morocco
and Tunisia was also discussed.
From the
beginning of 1956 and lasting until the summer of the
following year, the FLN tried to paralyze the
administration of Algiers through what has come to be
known as the Battle of Algiers. Attacks by the FLN
against both military and civilian European targets were
countered by paratroopers led by General Jacques Massu.
To stem the tide of FLN attacks, the French military
resorted to the torture and summary execution of
hundreds of suspects. The entire leadership of the FLN
was eventually eliminated or forced to flee. The French
also cut Algeria off from independent Tunisia and
Morocco by erecting barbed wire fences that were
illuminated at night by searchlights. This separated the
Algerian resistance bands within the country from some
30,000 armed Algerians on the frontiers of Tunisia and
Morocco.
Constitutionally declared a part of
metropolitan France, the Frenchmen maintained a stubborn
belief that Algeria was French, while others wondered
why the French were unable to see that their days as
rulers in Algeria were numbered. Like other colonists,
the sudden descent from the first rank world colonial
power was too much. The British in the Middle East after
the retreat from India also made the mistake by hanging
on to Egypt and even invaded it along with France and
Israel in 1956. It ended in disaster.
After
their retreat from Indo-China, senior French officers in
Algeria took their role with a sense of mission which
distorted their sense of proportion and led them in the
end to jettison their oaths of allegiance and violation
of human rights.
The settler French community
arrogated to itself an authority which belonged rightly
to Paris. The weaknesses and divisions of the
governments of the Fourth Republic in Paris allowed this
authority to be enhanced and exercised in Algiers
recklessly until the return of General de Gaulle in
1958. Some French governor-generals in Algeria did try
to alleviate their repression of nationalism with some
economic developments and reforms, but the nationalists'
aim was full independence.
In the first phase of
the revolt after the defeat of the Faure government in
November 1955, a fresh general election installed a
minority government led by Guy Mollet. Mollet went to
Algiers where he was pelted with garbage by pied
noirs, while talks with the FLN leaders remained
totally unproductive. A widely respected and liberal
General Catroux appointed governor general by Mollet
resigned his office without even leaving France.
By May 1956, Mollet felt that he had taken
enough risks and in a trial of strength between Paris
and the Europeans in Algeria, and Paris might not win.
During the next 18 months political attitudes remained
rigid, the French army and the FLN established positions
in which neither could defeat the other. Terrorism
mounted on both sides and even spread to Paris and other
cities in France. Torture became a regular instrument of
government, with retaliation by the FLN. The impasse
seemed to be complete, politically and militarily. The
European community's preoccupation with repression left
little room for anything else.
On May 28, 1958,
Pierre Pflimlin, the last prime minister of the Fourth
French Republic, resigned, becoming the sixth victim of
the Algerian war. On May 13, Algiers had rebelled
against Paris planning to seize power in Paris by a coup
on May 30. Most of Corsica had accepted the rebel regime
and half the commanders of the military regions in
France were believed to be disloyal. Then on June 1
emerged General de Gaulle, World War 2 hero of the
French resistance who was invested with full powers. He
flew to Algiers on June 4, but kept his cards close to
his chest, but he probably saw the inevitable.
By a mixture of authority and ambiguity, he
imposed his will and gradually acquired the power to
impose a solution. It was a masterly performance, but it
took him nearly four years. He did enough to retain the
initiative, but would not reveal his plans, thus
preventing potentially hostile groups from acting
against him until it was too late. He normalized
relations with Tunisia and Morocco, agreeing to withdraw
French forces from both countries (except from the
Tunisian naval base at Bizerta). He transferred from
Algeria many senior officers who could not disobey the
general. General Salan, a prime rallying point for
rebels and leader of the May putsch, temporarily
retained his command, but was relieved of his civilian
duties.
After preliminary moves and with
cautious deliberation, de Gaulle delivered his first
major statement on the future status of Algeria in
September 1959. He offered a choice (similar to France's
colonies in western and central Africa in 1958)between
independence, integration with France and association
with France. The choice was to be made within four years
from the end of hostilities, defined as any year in
which fewer than 200 people were killed in fighting or
by terrorism. It was followed by another pied
noires revolt on January 24, 1960 when the European
community opposed even de Gaulle. The revolt was a
failure because the French government acted quickly in
Algeria and at home. But to Algerians, de Gaulle's offer
was no more than a half-way house. The FLN wanted full
independence. Support for de Gaulle in France was more
widespread in 1960 than in 1958. People felt that the
war had gone on for too long and they were opposed to
the violent means used.
Henri Alleg's book La
Question focused on the use of torture by units of
the French army. The trial of Alleg in 1960, followed by
the disappearance and murder of the French communist and
university lecturer Maurice Audin, the trial in 1961 of
the Algerian girl Djamila Boupacha, protests by Roman
Catholic cardinals occupying French sees and a manifesto
signed by 121 leading intellectuals all contributed to
turn French opinion against the settler French community
and the French army in Algeria.
Toward the end
of 1960 the leaders of the January revolt were
themselves put on trial. But still one more settler
rebellion occurred, in April 1961, led by four generals,
which lasted for four days. Two of the four generals,
Salan and Jouhaud, were subsequently sentenced to death
in absentia and the other two, Challe and Zeller, who
surrendered, were given 15 years imprisonment - all
sentences were eventually reduced.
Out of the
failed rebellion rose the Organization de l'Armee
Secrete (OAS) which resorted to terrorism and by
creating among the European population fears of
reprisals by an independent Algerian government,
provoked (as independence became inevitable ) an exodus
which deprived the country of much-needed skills in
administration, education and other public services. The
lesson was well learnt by leaders in South Africa when
it became independent at the end of an apartheid regime.
De Gaulle's efforts in Algeria did not improve
relations with the nationalist forces. In September
1959, the FLN proclaimed a provisional Algerian
government with Ferhat Abbas as prime minister and the
imprisoned Ben Bella as his deputy. It then turned for
help to Moscow and Beijing. During 1960 it became
apparent that the non-combatant Algerians favored the
FLN and its unequivocal demand for independence, which
made de Gaulle turn to negotiations with the FLN.
In July de Gaulle, in a televised speech,
unequivocally accepted Algerian independence, but the
FLN adopted a more assertive line when Yusuf Ben Khedda
succeeded a moderate Ferhat Abbas as the head of the
provisional Algerian government. In the same month the
OAS made an unsuccessful attempt on de Gaulle's life as
its activities increased throughout France and Algeria,
with rumors of the proclamation of a dissident French
republic under General Salan in northern Algeria.
The first secret negotiations held at Melun in
June were a failure, but after discussions between de
Gaulle and Bourguiba, between FLN leaders and Georges
Pompidou (then a private banker) and between the FLN and
Moroccans, Tunisians and Egyptians, a conference was
called at Evian in Switzerland .The problems were the
FLN's claim to be recognized as a government, the right
of the imprisoned Ben Bella to attend the conference,
guarantees for the French who might wish to remain in
Algeria, continuing French rights in the naval base at
Mers-el-Kebir, Saharan oil, and the conditions under
which the proposed referendum on the status of Algeria
would be held.
Negotiations were opened in
France with representatives of the Algerian provisional
government ( GPRA) in May 1961. GPRA had long been
recognized by the Arab and communist states, from which
it received aid, though it (communism) was never been
able to establish itself on Algerian soil. Negotiations
were broken off in July, after which Abbas was replaced
as premier by the much younger Ben Youssef Ben Khedda.
Settler opposition around the OAS began to employ random
acts of terror to disrupt peace negotiations.
The second Evian conference took place in March
1962. On March 18, a ceasefire agreement was signed. The
conference also agreed on the terms for the referendum
and presuming that the result would favor independence,
further agreed (among other things), that French troops
would be withdrawn progressively over three years,
except from Mers-el-Kebir. France might continue its
nuclear tests in the Sahara and retain its airfields
there for five years and would continue its economic
activities in the Saharan oilfields. France also agreed
to continue technical and financial aid to Algeria for
at least three years.
This announcement produced
a violent outburst of OAS terrorism, but in May it
subsided as it became obvious that such actions were
futile. A referendum held in Algeria in July 1962
recorded some 6 million votes in favor of independence
and only 16,000 against it. After three days of
continuous Algerian rejoicing, the GPRA entered Algiers
in triumph, as settler Europeans began to depart.
Algeria becomes Independent
On July
3, 1962 Algeria became an independent sovereign state.
But its leaders could not remain together. Ben Bella
returned to Algiers after six years' absence in prison
and joined hands with army chief Colonel Houari
Boumedienne to become the first president . But perhaps
he alienated colleagues and followers by trying to
reorganize the FLN on communist lines and playing a
leading role in African and Afro-Asian affairs to the
neglect of urgent domestic problems. In June 1965 Ben
Bella tried to sideline conservative Boumedienne, now
defense minister, but was himself overthrown, with the
latter becoming the president. Ben Bella was imprisoned
until 1978 and remained under house arrest until 1990.
But Algeria remains a violent place and in the bloody
confrontation between FLN/army and radical Islamic
groups 100,000 Algerians were killed during the 1990s.
Civil wars and Turkey's war of
Independence
After the Allied powers' victory in
World War 1, the Ottoman government in Istanbul under
the 36th and last Ottoman Sultan Caliph Mehmed VI
Vahideddin (1918-22) decided that resistance to Allied
demands was futile, but there remained many pockets of
resistance in Anatolia. These consisted of bands of
irregulars and deserters, a number of intact Ottoman
units and various societies for the "defense of rights".
At this time, Mustafa Kemal (he became Ataturk
"Father of Turks" later ), a hero of the Gallipoli front
in the war was sent as Inspector of the army to eastern
Turkey. Landing at Samsun on May 19, 1919, he
immediately began to organize resistance and was soon
joined by other military leaders like Ali Fuat Cebesoy,
Kasim Karabekir, Ruaf Orbay, Refet Bele and others with
their troops. The Association for the Defense of the
Rights of Eastern Anatolia was founded and a congress at
Erzurum (July-August) summoned. It was followed by a
second congress at Sivas with delegates representing the
whole country. A new Association for the Defense of the
Rights of Anatolia and Rumelia elected Mustafa Kemal as
the chairman of its executive committee to organize
national resistance.
But the fire of resistance
really flared up when the hated Greeks, with British
encouragement, occupied Izmir (May 15, 1919). The Allied
plans imposed in the Treaty of Sevres, which the Ottoman
representative signed, would have created an independent
Armenia, an autonomous Kurdish region, demilitarization
and international control over the Straits and Istanbul,
with the rest of the country parceled to the Greeks, the
French and the Italians. Only a barren northeast rump of
Anatolia would have remained with the Turks.
Negotiations were arranged between the Istanbul
government and the Kemalists. A new parliament was
elected, which met in Istanbul in January 1920. Kemal
was against the meeting in Istanbul and stayed back in
Ankara. The new parliament passed the National Pact,
formulated at Erzurum and Sivas, which called for
independence roughly within the October 1918 armistice
lines. In response the Allies enlarged the area of
occupation in Istanbul (March 16, 1920), arrested and
deported many deputies and set out to crush the
Kemalists. Most deputies escaped to Ankara and the die
was cast.
To establish a legitimate basis of
action the Grand National Assembly (parliament) met at
Ankara on April 23 and asserted that the Sultan's
government was under infidel control. It was the duty of
Muslims to resist foreign encroachment. In the
Fundamental Law of January 20, 1921, the assembly
declared that sovereignty belonged to the nation and
that the assembly was the "true and only representative
of the nation". The name of the state was declared to be
Turkey, and executive power was entrusted to an
executive council, headed by Mustafa Kemal, who could
now concentrate on the war of independence. Soon the
Kemalists were faced with local uprisings, official
Ottoman forces and Greek hostility supported by the
Allies.
In response to the declarations of the
Grand National Assembly in Ankara, the Istanbul
government appointed its own extraordinary Anatolian
general inspector and a new Security Army, later called
the Caliphal Army, in 1920 to enforce its rule and fight
the nationalists with British support. The Istanbul and
Ankara governments issued fatwas against each
other, specially against Kemal. Thus the stage was set
for a full civil war. The situation was similar to the
chaos in Anatolia in the early 15th century after
Bayezit's defeat by Tamerlane, when rival Ottoman
governments in Europe and Ankara contested control over
Anatolia. The empire was threatened by foreign invasion
and the land was infested by local rebellions and
roaming bands. And in both cases it was the heartland of
Turkish life and tradition, Anatolia, that produced the
victor.
In this chaotic and lawless situation,
many bands rose to seek wealth and power for themselves,
in alliance with one or the other of the governments,
sometimes at the instigation of the Greeks, the British,
or even the communists. Sometimes the bands represented
large landowners who were seeking to regain their power.
Most degenerated into little more than bandit forces,
manned by a motley assortment of dispossessed peasants,
Tatars from the Crimea and Central Asia and Turkish and
Kurdish nomads, always ready for a good fight against
whoever was in power. These armies became so powerful
that on April 29, 1920, the Grand National Assembly
passed a law that prohibited "crimes against the nation"
and set up independence courts (Istiklal
Mahkemeleri) to try and execute on the spot. These
courts became a major instrument of the Ankara
government to suppress opposition long after
independence was achieved.
Most famous of the
private armies operating in Anatolia during the civil
war was the Green Army (Yesil Ordu), which posed
a major threat to all sides. It was organized during the
winter of 1920 "to evict from Asia the penetration and
occupation of European imperialism". Its members were
former unionists, known to and respected by Mustafa
Kemal, including its secretary general, Hakki Behic, Bey
and Yunus Nadi, an influential Istanbul journalist,
whose journal Yeni Gun (New Day) had just been closed by
the British. Nadi in 1924 founded the leading newspaper
of republican Turkey, Cumhuriyet (The Republic). Its
objective was to counter the reactionary propaganda
spread in Anatolia by agents of the Istanbul government
and the Allies and to popularize the national movement
and mobilize the Turkish peasants' support.
So
the Green Army was supported and encouraged by Kemal.
But many of its members wished to combine unionism,
Pan-Islam and socialism and "establish a socialist union
in the world of Islam by modifying the Russian
Revolution". Soon it attracted a number of groups
opposed to the Ankara government, including not only
supporters of the Istanbul government but also
anti-Kemalist unionists and communists connected with
the Third International. This led Kemal to get Hakki
Behic to disband the organization late in 1920, though
its various anti-Kemalist elements continued to act on
their own during the next two years.
There were
two other independent armies, both led by Circassians,
which were very active. They were mostly formed of Tatar
and Circassian refugees driven into Anatolia by the
Russians. A left-leaning guerrilla movement led by
Cerkes Ethem was at first quite successful against the
Greeks near Izmir in 1919. It supported the national
movement for some time against the reactionary Caliphal
army and the anti-Ankara movements that were active in
the eastern Marmara region in 1920.
The other
Circassian, Ahmet Anzavur, led a more conservative
movement and force with money and arms provided by the
Istanbul government and the British. He led two major
revolts against the nationalists in the areas of
Baliksir and Gonen in October-December 1919 and again
from February to June 1920. For a time he even led the
Caliphal army and his bands began to ravage the
countryside. Kemal chose Cerkes Ethem, who was still
with him to defeat and send Aznur on the run in April
1920. Anzavur soon raised a new army, but was defeated
and killed and his army dispersed by the nationalists in
May, 1920.
Ultimately, Cerkes Ethem became too
big for his boots and increasingly rapacious towards the
civilian population, Muslim and non-Muslim alike. He had
allied with the Green Army, sometimes he supported
various communist manifestos being circulated. And he
was not inclined to follow Ankara's plans so essential
for the success of the new nationalist army being
raised. Finally, Kemal sent a major force to destroy
Cerkes Ethem's army in January 1921, forcing him to flee
to the Greeks and eventually to Italy into exile.
There were also strong local rebellions around
Bolu, Yozgat, and Duzce, (halfway between Ankara and
Istanbul). The last was led by the Capanoglu Derebey
family, which tried to restore its old power. He and his
followers were hunted down and dispersed by the
nationalists. Its leading members were hanged in Amasya
in August 1920. Such movements and revolts did not
subside, even after the establishment of the republic.
It took time to reduce the old family and tribal forces
that were revived by the civil wars.
And finally
there were the communists, with Russia sending
propaganda literature into Anatolia. Kemal was opposed
in principle but took little action initially as he
needed the Bolsheviks' help. He even tolerated a number
of communist activities during 1920, including a new
joint communist-unionist organization in Ankara called
the People's Communist Party (Tiirkiye Halk Istirakiyun
Firkasi), which enabled the communists to come out
publicly in Turkey for the first time.
It had
some connection with the Green Army. On October 18,
1920, to please the Russians, Ataturk even allowed the
formation of a separate Turkish Communist Party
(Tiirkiye Komiinist Firkasi). But it was manned mainly
by some of his close associates from the assembly. It
was less radical than the first group and was used by
the government as a tool to divide and confuse the
communist movement and its supporters.
But when
the former became too active it was suppressed. It had
issued a joint declaration with the Green Army and
Cerkes Ethem that they had "approved the Bolshevik party
program passed by the Third International ... and joined
to unite all the social revolutionary movements in the
country", and adopted the name Turkish People's
Collectivist Bolshevik Party. Communist agents became
active around Ankara and Eskisehir and cooperated with
unionist groups in Erzurum and Trabzon, which were
centers of Enver Pasha's supporters throughout the war
for independence.
This forced Ataturk to
criticize the communists for working outside the organ
of the people, the Grand National Assembly. After
crushing the Green Army and chasing out Cerkes Ethem, he
now turned on the communists. Their leaders were tried,
but the final sentences were suspended until after a
treaty was signed with Moscow in March 1921. As Russian
support was important, the sentences were relatively
light. The only violent action against the Turkish
communists came when communist Mustafa Suphi and others
entered Anatolia via Kars in December 1920. Though they
met with top nationalist leaders like Ali Fuat and Kazim
Karabekir at Kars in January 1921, they were arrested
soon and sent by boat to Erzurum for trial. On the way
they were assassinated by a group of pro-Enver
supporters from Trabzon, apparently because of the fear
that Suphi might expose Enver's plans.
As for
the dashing Enver Pasha and his colleagues Cemal and
Talat, who had led the Ottoman empire into World War 1,
they fled from Istanbul on November 2, 1918, on a German
freighter going to Odessa. Then they went over to
Berlin, but lived under assumed names, since the victors
had demanded their extradition for the "crimes" of their
regime. Soon they were invited by Karl Radek to continue
their work in Moscow, with full Bolshevik support for
the "Turkish national struggle". Talat, who remained in
Germany, was killed by an Armenian assassin on March 15,
1921. Cemal and Enver went to Moscow and later to
Central Asia, where they undertook a series of political
activities with the ultimate intention of using the
Bolsheviks to regain power in Turkey once the
nationalists were defeated.
With Bolshevik
encouragement, Enver proclaimed the organization of the
Union of Islamic Revolutionary Societies (Islam Ihtilal
Cemiyetleri Ittihadi) and an affiliated Party of
People's Councils (Halk 'uralar Firkasi), the former as
the international Muslim revolutionary organization, the
latter as its Turkish branch.
In early September
1920, he attended the Congress of the Peoples of the
East at Baku. But while Ataturk generally encouraged
Enver, hoping to use him to get Bolshevik aid, he never
trusted him. Enver had some groups of supporters in
Anatolia, including about 40 secret unionists in the
assembly, working to install Enver in Ataturk's place at
an opportune moment. Enver moved from Moscow to Batum in
the summer of 1921 when the Greek offensive began,
hoping to enter Anatolia if Ataturk nationalist forces
were defeated. But following Kemal's victory over the
Greeks at Sakarya (September 1921), Enver abandoned
Turkey and went into Central Asia to lead its Muslims
against both the British and the Russians. He was killed
in a battle with Russian forces near Ceken while
pursuing his pan-Turanian mission.
What was the
role of the Sultan in the conflict? According to Sir
Horace Rumbold, British ambassador in Istanbul, the
Sultan did not understand the nationalists or their
movement. He thought a handful of brigands had
established complete ascendancy and stranglehold on the
people as a whole. The Ankara leaders were men without
any real stake in the country, with which they had no
connection of blood or anything else. Kemal was a
Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origins. Bekir Sami
was a Circassian. They were all the same, Albanians,
Circassians, anything but Turks. There was not a real
Turk among them. The real Turks were loyal to the
Sultan, who had been hoodwinked by fantastic
misrepresentations, like his own captivity. They looked
for external support and found it in the Bolsheviks. The
Angora leaders might discover and regret too late that
they would bring on Turkey the fate of Azerbaijan.(which
was taken over by the Bolsheviks).
In the
meantime, Kemal organized his national army to fight for
Anatolia's independence, trained, disciplined and armed
at a new officers' school established in Ankara. Russian
arms and ammunition began to flow across the Black Sea
in increasing amounts. In Istanbul after the Allied
occupation a new and well-spread group was organized
among the remaining civil servants and officers and
called the National Defense Organization (Mudafaa-i
Milliye Tefkildtt) to send information, arms and
equipment to the nationalists.
During 1920-1921,
the Greeks had made major advances, almost to Ankara,
but were defeated at the Battle of the Sakarya River
(August 24, 1921) and began a long and hasty retreat
that ended in the Turks regaining Izmir (September 9,
1922) and the expulsion of Greek forces from Anatolia.
The total dead in the war was; for Turks, 10,000 dead in
fighting and 22,000 from disease. Greek dead and wounded
were estimated at 100,000. During World War 1, with the
front with Russian forces shifting in northeast Anatolia
where Armenians were encouraged and hopeful of an
independent state, terrible killings took place
involving all sides. It continued even after wars. In
the World War 580,000 Ottoman soldiers died, half from
disease. Turkish official history calculates that
300,000 Armenians were killed. An Ottoman war crimes
tribunal set up by the victors gives a figure of
800,000. But Armenian historians allege that 1.5 million
died, practically the entire Armenian population in
Anatolia.
The Kemalists had already begun to
gain European recognition. On March 16, 1921, the
Soviet-Turkish Treaty gave Turkey a favorable settlement
of its eastern frontier by restoring Kars and Ardahan.
Problems at home induced Italy to withdraw from the
territory it occupied; and by the Treaty of Ankara
(Franklin-Bouillon Agreement, October 20, 1921), France
agreed to evacuate Cilicia (Adana region). Finally, by
the Armistice of Mudanya, the Allies agreed to Turkish
reoccupation of Istanbul and eastern Thrace.
A
comprehensive settlement was eventually achieved at the
Lausanne Conference (November 1922 - July 1923) which
negated the Treaty of Sevres. The Turkish frontier in
Thrace was established on the Maritsa River and Greece
returned the islands of Gokge and Bozca. A compulsory
exchange of populations was arranged, as a result of
which an estimated 1,300,000 Greeks left Turkey in
return for 400,000 Turks. The question of oil rich Mosul
was left to the League of Nations, which in 1925
recommended its retention by Iraq. But Turks have never
been reconciled to the loss of Mosul. The Lausanne
Treaty also provided for the apportionment of the
Ottoman public debt, for the gradual abolition of the
Capitulations (Turkey regained tariff autonomy in 1929),
and for an international regime for the Straits. Turkey
recovered complete control of the Straits by the 1936
Montreux Convention.
On October 29, 1923, Turkey
was declared to be a republic and elected Mustafa Kemal
as its first president. The Caliphate was finally
abolished on March 3, 1924, and all members of the
Ottoman dynasty were expelled from Turkey. A full
republican constitution was adopted on April 20, 1924;
it retained Islam as the state religion, but in April
1928 this clause was removed and Turkey became a
laic (secular) republic.
K Gajendra
Singh, Indian ambassador (retired), served as
ambassador to Turkey from August 1992 to April 1996.
Prior to that, he served terms as ambassador to Jordan,
Romania and Senegal. He is currently chairman of the
Foundation for Indo-Turkic Studies. Email
Gajendrak@hotmail.com
(Copyright 2004 Asia
Times Online Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
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