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Saddam Hussein? Saddam Hussein
who?
By Erich Marquardt
The
capture of former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein on
December 13 offered a glimmer of hope for the United
States-led coalition that the insurgency against their
occupation would soon begin to crumble and possibly even
spontaneously implode. Now, three weeks later, it is
clear that the resistance is unaffected.
Insurgents continued their attacks only hours
after the capture of Saddam, unleashing a powerful car
bomb outside an Iraqi police station in Khaldiyah,
killing more than 15 people and wounding some 30 more.
The next day, two almost simultaneous car bombs exploded
outside two Iraqi police stations, one north of Baghdad
and the other in the western Baghdad district of
Ameriyah.
On December 24, a car bomb exploded
outside the gates of the Interior Ministry in the
Kurdish city of Arbil in northern Iraq; the explosion
killed four people and wounded more than 20. On December
25, insurgents launched rockets at the Sheraton Ishtar
Hotel in central Baghdad, close to coalition military
headquarters; though at least two rockets smashed into
the hotel, there were no major casualties from this
guerrilla strike.
On December 27, insurgents
struck three separate targets in the city of Karbala,
killing four Bulgarian soldiers, two Thai army
engineers, six civilians, and wounding dozens more
troops and civilians. Then, most ominously, on December
31, a car bomb ripped through a restaurant in the center
of Baghdad, killing at least a handful of people who
were celebrating the coming of the new year. The
restaurant was popular among Westerners, and the attack
marked the first time that insurgents were willing to
attack a purely civilian target.
In addition to
the aforementioned major attacks, troops from the US-led
coalition have been coming under constant fire while
undertaking their duties in Iraq. Therefore, these
separate attacks indicate that insurgents still retain
the operational capability to launch coordinated attacks
against US forces, troops from countries part of the
US-led coalition, and civilian targets.
The
occupation of Iraq seems to be entering yet another
critical phase. While Saddam has been captured, this
result does not affect key issues of transition that
Iraq must at some point address. For example, the Bush
administration hoped to train some 40,000 soldiers by
October for use in Iraq's new light infantry battalions.
Yet half of the initial recruits have already deserted,
citing lack of adequate pay and fear of reprisals from
insurgents. This, in turn, is linked to the amount of
attacks on US and coalition forces, as there will be a
less developed indigenous security and military
apparatus to gradually replace coalition members.
Because of this, the administration has tried a
new hardline approach in Iraq, launching Operation Iron
Hammer. While this brought immediate results, the
insurgency soon learned to adapt and slightly altered
tactics as coalition casualties continued unabated.
Various American politicians have come out
criticizing the Bush administration's strategy in Iraq,
including former Central Command chief General Anthony
Zinni, who was involved in overseeing the enforcement of
the two no-fly zones in Iraq, in addition to being a
part of the Bill Clinton administration's campaign of
air strikes against the desert country in 1998.
Zinni, who also served as the Bush
administration's special envoy to the Middle East, was
recently quoted as saying: "Iraq is in serious danger of
coming apart because of lack of planning,
underestimating the task and buying into a flawed
strategy." Zinni continued, "The longer we stubbornly
resist admitting the mistakes and not altering our
approach, the harder it will be to pull this chestnut
out of the fire."
When questioned on the capture
of Saddam, Zinni argued: "I believe the only way [US
involvement in Iraq] will work now is for the Iraqis
themselves to somehow take charge and turn things
around. Our policy, strategy, tactics, etc, are still
screwed up."
The danger for the Bush
administration is the potential for the capture of
Saddam to turn sour. Immediately following the
announcement of Saddam's capture, many felt that it was
a turning point in the conflict and even in the "war on
terrorism". But as time goes by, and the longer that
conditions in Iraq stay the same, the better the chances
that Saddam's capture will become a liability for the US
leadership, demonstrating just how little impact Saddam
was having on the happenings and mood in post-Ba'athist
Iraq.
Published with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to
content@pinr.com
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