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US troops on the march - out the
army
By Erich Marquardt
In
the lead-up to the invasion of Iraq, the Bush
administration likely planned on stationing United
States troops in the country years after an established
peace. US military interventions have traditionally been
followed by a period in which US troops remain in the
host country in order to influence future developments
there. Even more importantly, interventions that take
place in countries located in strategically vital
regions give Washington the wherewithal to play a
central role in the affairs of those regions. The
invasion of Iraq in March of 2003 followed this trend,
although not exactly in the manner that Washington
policymakers initially hoped for.
Dispelling any
notion that US troops were planning on leaving Iraq
quickly, various Bush administration and Pentagon
spokespeople stated early on that US troops would remain
in Iraq for an indefinite period of time. As late as
December, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
General Richard B Myers, assured that US troops were not
planning on leaving Iraq any time soon: "It's going to
depend on events over the next couple of years. It's to
be determined."
Myers' suggestion that US troops
will remain in Iraq until possibly 2006 was confirmed by
recent comments made by British Foreign Secretary Jack
Straw. Speaking with BBC Radio, Straw said that he had
no idea when British troops were going to leave Iraq: "I
can't say whether it's going to be 2006, 2007. It's not
going to be months, for sure."
But while it was
expected that contingents of US troops would remain in
Iraq for years after the US occupation was completed, it
was not expected that over 100,000 troops would be
needed for this mission. The US military, which is
composed of an all-volunteer force, is not suited to
handle large-scale missions - such as this one - for
long periods of time. As US Representative John Spratt
of South Carolina warned late last year: "We are pushing
the envelope. We are using our troops pretty much to
their maximum utility."
A report released by the
Congressional Budget Office recognized this dilemma,
concluding that the active army would be unable to
maintain current troop levels in Iraq "beyond about
March 2004 if it chose not to keep individual units
deployed to Iraq for longer than one year without
relief". Indeed, the Pentagon will now be relying on
reserve soldiers for combat missions, rather than for
their traditional combat support roles. This state of
affairs has a broad array of implications.
For
one, by having such a significant amount of its forces
stationed in one country, Washington has less leverage
to deal with other world developments that may require a
deployment of US troops. It also adds strain to US
deployments in other strategically significant states,
such as South Korea and Afghanistan. Even though
stationing troops in the center of the Middle East gives
Washington significant influence in the region, the
amount of troops currently needed, in addition to the
losses that they are enduring, is not desirable or
sustainable.
As a result of the extra strain
imposed on US forces due to the length of their
deployments, it is becoming harder for the Pentagon to
rely on an all-volunteer military force to handle the
White House's foreign policy initiatives. Many soldiers
in the military originally enlisted during times of
relative peace and did not expect to be deployed for
months at a time in the Middle East, let alone being
placed in a country that is sending body bags and
stretchers home on a daily basis.
This current
reality has concerned Washington policymakers as there
is a justified fear that troop retention rates will
decline and that less individuals will sign up for
military service. The idea of an all-volunteer military
is now being tested in a manner not experienced before.
Lieutenant-General James Helmly, chief of the
250,000-member Army Reserve, told USA Today in the Fall
of last year: "Retention is what I am most worried
about. It is my number one concern. This is the first
extended-duration war the country has fought with an
all-volunteer force." Helmly assured that he and other
Pentagon officials would be carefully monitoring
retention rates in 2004.
There are a few
principal reasons why Pentagon officials are concerned
about troop retention rates. Even though National Guard
and reserve troops were sent to the 1991 war in Iraq and
the war in Afghanistan, they rarely were deployed on the
front lines, and were instead relegated to combat
support roles. With the new troop deployment rotation
planned by the Pentagon, these troops will serve on the
front lines and will certainly see casualties among
their ranks.
Additionally, the long troop
deployments add quite a burden to the lives of National
Guard and reserve troops since these soldiers usually
have full-time civilian jobs and only perform military
training one weekend a month and for two weeks in the
summer. After spending many months away from their
civilian jobs, getting reacquainted with the life that
they left becomes difficult. While their employers are
obliged by law to take them back once they return, they
often find that their work opportunities suffer as a
result of their extended time away.
Washington
policymakers have drafted a number of plans to combat
the possibility of decreasing retention rates. One
policy decision, which went into effect at the start of
2004, prevents active duty and reserve troops deployed
to Iraq and Kuwait from leaving the army before serving
12 months on the ground, plus another three months once
they return from their tours. This order is aimed at
preventing soldiers from retiring from the army as soon
as they fulfill the duration of their initial
commitment.
The other proposal that has been
decided in Washington offers economic bonuses of up to
US$10,000 to soldiers who are willing to reenlist in the
army for an additional three years, and serve in Iraq,
Kuwait or Afghanistan.
While these proposals may
alleviate troop retention concerns, they may prove to be
largely ineffective. The decision to prevent active duty
and reserve troops from retiring from the military at
the end of their original commitment is, in a way,
similar to forced conscription. This was highlighted by
Ted Carpenter, an analyst with the Washington-based Cato
Institute, who told Reuters: "Clearly, if large numbers
of personnel have their terms extended against their
will, that violates the principle of volunteerism. It
also suggests just how strained the military is in
trying to provide for the Iraqi occupation plus all the
other US obligations around the world."
The
other proposal, that of providing financial rewards to
soldiers willing to reenlist for an additional three
years, also may have limited success. Associated Press
writer Matthew Rosenberg, who interviewed US troops in
Baqouba, Iraq about the proposed reenlistment bonus,
wrote that the idea "evoked laughter from a few
bored-looking troopers", one of whom said: "There's not
enough money in the world to make me stay a month
longer."
If Washington continues to fail in the
pacification of Iraq, and therefore cannot reduce its
current troop levels there, it will have to seriously
consider how to resolve the present strain on US forces.
Two primary options, such as pulling troops out of Iraq
prematurely, or reintroducing conscription, are not at
all desirable to the administration since the former
could result in a dramatic blow to US interests, while
the latter would open up a political hornet's nest.
Published with permission of the Power and
Interest News Report, an analysis-based
publication that seeks to provide insight into various
conflicts, regions and points of interest around the
globe. All comments should be directed to
content@pinr.com
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