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THE ROVING EYE
SISTANI'S
WAY
Part 1: Democracy,
colonial-style
By Pepe Escobar
Much more than George W Bush vs
the-yet-unknown-Democrat-who-would-be-king, this is the
ultimate confrontation of 2004. In one corner, the
military might of United States power. In the other, the
white-bearded, black-turbaned Grand Ayatollah Ali
al-Sistani, 74, three wives, three sons and spiritual
leader of 15 million Iraqi Shi'ites.
As things
stand, the Bush re-election scenario for Iraq goes like
this: the Medusa - Saddam Hussein - has been decapitated
by Perseus - Bush - the war hero. On July 1 there will
be a transfer of sovereignty to some sort of Iraqi
authority. This would mark the official, theoretical end
of the American occupation of Iraq. The stage will then
be set for the first round of American troops to be sent
back home. And as Bush's economic policy consists of
little else than a successful Iraqi policy, non-stop
spinning and propaganda will be enough to secure a
second term in the White House.
The Sistani
scenario does not involve campaigning, spinning or
propaganda. Its political agenda is monothematic: free,
direct, one-man, one-vote elections in Iraq as soon as
possible. In case free, direct elections are deemed to
be impossible - both by the occupying power and a
mission to be sent in by the United Nations - "this does
not mean that we will accept the principle of
designation" of members of the future Iraqi provisional
National Assembly, as Sheikh Abdel Mehdi al-Karbalai,
one of Ayatollah Sistani's spokesmen, made it clear in
Najaf over the weekend.
Things are changing fast
in Mesopotamia. On April 9, 2003 Saddam Hussein's statue
on Paradise Square in Baghdad was toppled. It was
replaced by a monument which is now topped by a yellow
flag inscribed with a Shi'ite slogan.
Time is
running out - and the calendar is littered with
pitfalls. By the end of February, the 25 members of the
current Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) will have to adopt
a law which will define the boundaries of the next
transitional government, as well as the procedures to
elect the delegates of the convention which will appoint
the provisional national assembly. This law will be
enforced until late 2005. By the end of March, another
law will deal with the all-important issue of security.
And before May 31, the transitional national assembly
must be designated.
This is the crucial issue.
In each of Iraq's 18 provinces, the Americans want to
impose an "organizing committee" of 15 members: five
designated by the IGC, five named by provincial councils
and five named by municipal councils of the five largest
cities. These 250 indirectly-appointed people will then
select the candidates for the national assembly,
according to fuzzy criteria which have not been made
public. And the new assembly will then name a new Iraqi
government. It's fair to estimate that by applying this
criteria, the Americans will be able to choose at least
two-thirds of the members of the new assembly.
Shi'ites have seen through the scheme - and have
been denouncing it with all their power. Street slogans
in a series of demonstrations are clear: "We want a
constitution written by Iraqi hands, not by the
occupying powers or the IGC." Shi'ites also cannot
accept that general elections would only happen around
December 31, 2005.
It's no wonder the occupying
power privileges a system of 18 regional caucuses to
form the provisional national assembly. The whole
process - and practically all the participants - are
controlled by the Americans and by American-appointed
Iraqi officials and formerly exiled politicians with
absolutely no popular respect or support inside Iraq.
The IGC was appointed by the Americans, and includes
people like Ahmad Chalabi, a convicted fraudster in
Jordan. Many Iraqis - Sunni and Shi'ite alike - call the
IGC "the imported government". Heads of provincial and
municipal councils were also American-appointed.
On January 12, Sistani said: "We want free and
popular elections, not nominations." On January 16, he
reiterated that "it's possible to have elections in the
next few months with an acceptable level of transparence
and credibility". Sistani even proposed as electoral
identities the rationing cards held by practically all
Iraqi families for the duration of the UN oil-for-food
program.
The official American excuse for not
holding direct elections - as expressed by Iraqi
proconsul L Paul Bremer's minions in Baghdad - is lack
of time. No wonder. The occupying power has not taken a
single measure since last April to even give the
impression it was interested in organizing direct
elections. The July 1 deadline cannot be postponed
because it falls four months before the American
presidential election - and Bush and the neo-cons must
as soon as possible, according to the ideal scenario,
furnish proof to the electorate that the American
military adventure in Iraq may be over soon.
Why
is this 74-year-old ayatollah, an Iraqi born in Iran, so
dangerous? He is dangerous because he has destabilized
the three-way pillar supposed to assure an
easily-pliable and controlled post-occupation Iraq: the
provisional constitution, the electoral system and the
security agreements through which the Americans wanted
to permanently install, before the end of March, their
military bases - all of this before handing over power
to the new Iraqi government, an unknown entity.
Sistani could not have been more straight to the
point. He bound 15 million Iraqi Shi'ites to his word
when he said he is against any agreement which
authorizes the presence of foreign troops in Iraq after
July 1, 2004. So much for the neo-cons' dream of a
"democratic" oil colony under an American military
umbrella.
Now it's UN Secretary General Kofi
Annan's call - and it was Sistani who put him on the
spot. Sistani never agreed to as much as be in the same
room with Bremer - although he met the UN's former
special envoy Sergio Vieira de Mello. Sistani will only
agree to a modified version of the the American plan if
UN experts confirm the impossibility of organizing the
elections. Kurds and Sunnis favor the Americans in this
case. The Kurds have made it clear they will not
tolerate concessions to the Shi'ites unless they are
able to preserve their autonomy. Sunnis are afraid at
the prospect of losing the power they have exercised in
Iraq since the 1920s.
There are 13 Shi'ites in
the IGC. Already despised by the majority of the Iraqi
population, the IGC may well implode as it is squeezed
between Bremer's agenda and Sistani's free election
calls. The IGC is now betting everything on Annan's
mediation. More interesting is the Shi'ite reaction
outside the IGC - reflecting the opinion of the poorest
of the poor in Iraq. Popular firebrand mullah Muqtada
al-Sadr - Sistani's young rival - says he is against any
UN role because "the UN is a servant of the United
States".
Bush and his neo-conservative entourage
did everything in their power to bypass the UN to get
inside Iraq. Now they need the UN to get out. But it's
not the UN that holds the magic key. It is Grand
Ayatollah Sistani. If he issues a fatwa
(religious edict) condemning the caucuses and the
future, indirectly-appointed national assembly, 15
million Shi'ites will follow - and whatever government
chosen indirectly will be considered a fake. Sistani has
also made it very clear that only a government chosen by
free, direct elections will have the legitimacy to
negotiate the crucial issue with the Americans: when the
occupying troops will actually leave.
But what
do Sistani and the Shi'ites ultimately want? It is not a
theocratic state modelled on Iran, where the principle
of Velayat-e-Faqih - politics subordinated to
religion - is paramount. They want a democracy, with
Shi'ite politicians holding most of the levels of power
- something consistent with the fact that Shi'ites make
up 62 percent of the national population. And crucially,
they want no political involvement by Islamic clerics.
But no one in Washington seems to be listening.
Tomorrow: Part 2, The marja and
the procounsul
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