Turkey back on side with the US
By Erich Marquardt

In the lead-up to the US-led invasion of Iraq last March, world opposition to the proposed military action was vociferous and widespread, with protests taking place all across the globe. The opposition to Washington both at home and abroad cast doubt on whether the administration of President George W Bush would make the fateful decision to send troops across the borders of Iraq.

Many world leaders hoped that the war could be averted, which was the stance in Ankara. With 90 percent of the Turkish population firmly against Washington's Iraq plans, in addition to the possible instability that such an attack could bring to the region, the parliament in Ankara narrowly rejected calls to support the proposed US-led intervention.

Despite Ankara's opposition, Washington invaded Iraq anyway, and instead of relying on Turkish troops for securing the northern part of the country, it relied on Kurdish troops. This decision gave new impetus to Kurdish nationalism, and is now working against Turkey's national interests. This avoidable circumstance was forecast before the March invasion when Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of Turkey's majority Justice and Development Party, warned: "If one is left out of the equation at the start of the operation, it may not be possible to be in a position to control developments at the end of the operation. Turkey's long-term interests and even security could be in jeopardy."

By failing to heed Erdogan's warning, Ankara now finds its long-term interests and security in jeopardy because of its failure to place itself in a position to control political developments in northern Iraq. If Ankara had participated in the US-led invasion and allowed its troops to be used in tangent with American soldiers, it could have secured Turkish influence in northern Iraq, influence that could now be used to prevent Kurdish factions from gaining power and political control.

Before the invasion, Washington offered Turkey this lucrative opportunity. Even though the various Kurdish factions were against Washington's proposition to Turkey, there was little they could do. Faced with threats from Ankara in the north and Baghdad in the south, Kurdish leaders in northern Iraq were dependent on US support, demonstrated through the "no fly zones" that Washington established shortly after the 1991 Gulf War. 

Because of Turkish refusal to assist the US-led invasion, Kurdish leaders received an unexpected boon to their interests and a major boost to their power. Shortly after the invasion, Kurdish troops swarmed into the oil-rich cities of Kirkuk and Mosul, re-establishing their control. In the months that followed, Kurdish leaders forcefully retook areas that they once held before Saddam Hussein had relocated and cleansed them during the 1980s. They are also expanding their political infrastructure in the region, laying claim to a future of either a federal Kurdish state partially governed by Baghdad or a completely independent state of Kurdistan.

While these actions are certain to evoke political controversy in the region, there is little that can be done immediately to prevent Kurdish aspirations, since Washington relies on the Kurds for keeping northern Iraq stable and controlled. Indeed, facing violence and a growing insurgency in central Iraq, Washington's primary concern was, and still is, to prevent other areas of Iraq from falling into chaos, hence its support of Kurdish leaders and its willingness to compromise with Shi'ite leader Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, who has the power to create violence and turmoil in southern Iraq.

To highlight just how precarious this situation is, over the weekend northern Iraq suffered from a series of attacks: suicide bombers simultaneously attacked the offices of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the Kurdistan Democratic Party in Irbil, killing more than 60 people and bringing the instability further north.

Now, because of these political developments, Turkey has been excluded from shaping post-Saddam Iraq, a situation that is putting its interests at stake. With the Kurds in northern Iraq keeping the area relatively stable, Washington no longer has any real need for Turkish troops; in fact, their introduction in any significant scale would be certain to destabilize northern Iraq, since Turkish and Kurdish troops would probably engage each other.

Erdogan reiterated his concern last week during a speech at the Council on Foreign Relations in the United States. He said: "There is a demand to establish a federation in the north of Iraq. We approve of neither an ethnic nor religious-based federation. These developments will cause a difficult situation for Iraq in the future."

In light of this, Ankara is desperately trying to improve its relations with the United States. It has now offered to help the US in Iraq, offering access to Turkish bases for US military operations in the country. Ankara's attempts have helped to moderate Washington's tone, with L Paul Bremer, the head of the Coalition Provisional Authority in Baghdad, announcing last week that the US-led coalition considers the Kurdistan Workers' Party to be a terrorist organization.

A broader timeline is useful to discover what the likely conclusion of this clash of interests between the Turks and Kurds will be. Washington's strategic support for the Kurds is a short-term interest, since it is only concerned with preventing northern Iraq from falling into violence. Washington's strategic support for Turkey, however, is a long-term interest, since Turkey straddles Europe, the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East. Washington will not swap its relations with Ankara, a longtime US strategic ally, for Kurdish aspirations of statehood.

Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.