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Why the US is begging for UN backing in
Iraq
By Phyllis Bennis
(Posted with permission from Foreign
Policy in Focus)
The United States is eager
for the United Nations to return to Iraq to provide
political cover for its occupation. The quagmire on the
ground in Iraq, plus recognition that the rest of the
world, and most Iraqis themselves, reject Washington's
claim of legitimacy, is the basis for the Bush
administration reversing its earlier anti-UN positions
to beg the international organization for help.
UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's decision to
send a technical investigative team to Iraq is partly in
response to mounting pressure from the US, but was also
a response to shifting sentiments among Iraqis,
particularly the call from Shi'ite leader Ayatollah
al-Sistani for a UN assessment of political conditions.
While Annan indicated he was responding to the request
of the US occupation authorities and its hand-picked
"governing council" to determine whether elections could
be held by Washington's June 30 deadline, he left open
the possibility of a broader definition of "what
alternative arrangement would be acceptable" if not.
Why is the administration set on a June 30
handover?
1) The deadline is driven far more by
US desperation - electoral and economic/corporate - than
by any concern about "returning sovereignty" to Iraq.
The administration of President George W Bush is lying
about the deadline, claiming that it will lead to a
"transfer of sovereignty" and the "end of US occupation"
in Iraq. A real "end to occupation" requires the
withdrawal of US troops. Transferring nominal authority
from one US-selected Iraqi agency to another US-vetted
Iraqi organization does not equal an end to occupation.
2) The Bush administration wants to be
able to claim "the occupation is over" and "troops are
being withdrawn" as summer campaigning for the November
presidential election in the United States heats up.
Under the current plan, the reality will be the
continuation of military occupation, with a US-backed
"sovereign" government "requesting" that US troops
remain. The US will withdraw 20,000-25,000 troops with
great fanfare, hoping the voters will forget about the
100,000 or so US troops that will remain, and the likely
continuation of significant casualties among US troops.
3) US plans for massive privatization in
Iraq have faltered because of a lack of potential
buyers. Profiteers are concerned that without something
resembling an official government in Iraq, US efforts to
sell off Iraqi assets will be recognized as illegal
under international law and could be overturned when
something closer to a truly legitimate and
representative government takes over. So the US has
every interest in ensuring that a transitional phase
includes something that can be called a "sovereign Iraqi
government", but which in fact remains under US control,
to make sure the privatization plan goes ahead before a
real end to the occupation.
Why did the
administration change its line on the UN?
1) The
utter and all-too-public failure of the US occupation
(especially the continuing deaths and mounting injuries
of US soldiers) in Iraq seems to have led to an internal
power shift within the Bush administration, with the
Pentagon ideologues tactically (and almost certainly
temporarily) giving way to electorally focused
considerations. In the battle between Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld/Vice President Dick Cheney and
Karl Rove, Bush's chief adviser, the Rumsfeld/Cheney
team seems to have blinked first.
2)
There is no doubt that unilateralist, anti-UN sentiments
continue to dominate the Bush White House. But hypocrisy
aside, changes are afoot. One piece of evidence is
Cheney's unexpected European foray. While arrogantly
refusing even to hint at an apology for launching
Washington's war in the face of UN and broad
international opposition, the fact that he left his
undisclosed location at all to travel to European
capitals urging greater international support for the
United States in Iraq, even calling on (though only
once) the UN to respond to the request of the Iraqis,
indicates a significant level of pressure on Cheney's
long-standing antagonism to multilateralism and the UN.
What did Kofi Annan agree to?
1) The
secretary general agreed to "send a technical mission to
Iraq to establish whether elections for a transitional
national assembly can be held before the transfer of
sovereignty on 30 June and, if not, what alternative
arrangement would be acceptable".
2) The
language is significant, since "alternative
arrangements" could refer to a wide range of possible
alternatives, in essence broadening the US-defined
mandate. Those alternatives could include not only the
nature of the elections but also a challenge to the
validity of the US-imposed deadline itself. That is, the
UN mission could conclude that elections are possible at
a time beyond June 30. An internal UN study in Iraq from
last August determined that it would take six months to
organize elections.
3) It is clear that
Annan's decision was partly based on the call from
Iraqis beyond the US-appointed Governing Council.
Specifically, it is clear that al-Sistani's call for the
UN to determine the feasibility of elections played a
part in his decision.
Why did Ayatollah
al-Sistani ask for UN help?
1) While al-Sistani
represents a Shi'ite current that does not call for
complete clerical control of government, he is eager to
realize the likely political potential inherent in the
60 percent Shi'ite majority in Iraq .
2)
The US-proposed selection system for choosing an Iraqi
parliament would not only privilege the US-selected
Iraqi Governing Council, which would choose most of the
assembly members, it would give a functional veto to the
US occupation officials themselves. (In each of the 18
regions, the Coalition Provisional Authority - Bremer
and company - would appoint five of the 15 members.
Since 11 votes would be needed to approve candidates,
the CPA would hold an effective veto over anyone it
didn't like.)
What is the danger to the
United Nations?
1) If the UN completely rejects
the US proposal that it return to Iraq under the
auspices of the occupation, it faces the possibility of
escalating marginalization by the Bush administration,
further threats to its independence, and the likelihood
of being deemed "irrelevant" by the world's sole
superpower. Washington might make additional cuts in
dues to the world organization and the humanitarian
agencies, reduce its already insufficient political
support, and increase its threats against and
punishments of UN member states who stand defiant.
2) If the UN agrees to return to Iraq
under terms set by the US occupation, the dangers are
even higher. The global organization risks a serious
loss of international credibility, and the danger of
being deemed an agent for or facilitator of occupation.
Aside from the credibility factor itself, UN staff in
Iraq would again face the likely possibility of physical
attack, based on the opposition's view that the UN was
acting as an agent of an illegitimate occupation. Passed
under extreme US pressure, Security Council Resolution
1483 arguably provides a kind of forced legality to the
US occupation of Iraq; it does not provide any
legitimacy.
So what should be done?
1)
There should be an immediate end to US occupation, and
withdrawal of US troops. Because the US invasion
destroyed the governing capacity in Baghdad and
undermined security for civilians throughout much of the
country, the withdrawal of the US forces should be
followed by a temporary combined mandate for the UN, the
Arab League, and the Organization of the Islamic
Conference to provide direct support for Iraq's
reclaiming of sovereignty. That would include election
assistance, humanitarian and reconstruction aid
(including control over all international funds,
including those coming from the US Congress, designated
for Iraqi rebuilding), and peacekeeping/security
deployment.
2) The UN investigation team
should reject the artificial US-imposed June 30
deadline, and broaden its mandate to examine what
conditions would have to change before an election could
be organized, assess what time frame would be required
to accomplish those changes, and determine whether any
election conducted under foreign military occupation
could be free and fair.
Phyllis
Bennis (pbennis@compuserve.com)
is a Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies and is a
contributor to Foreign Policy in Focus.
(Posted with permission from Foreign
Policy in Focus)
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