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US among the 'ruins' of Arab
nationalism
By Ashraf Fahim
LONDON -
Since the occupation of Iraq last April, analysts have
puzzled over what impact this new reality will have on
Arab nationalism, as well as on political Islam, the two
ideological pillars t
hat shape
the Arab world. If Chinese leader Zhou Enlai said in the
1970s that it was too soon to discern the impact of the
French Revolution (late 18th century), then quantifying
the outcome of Iraq's occupation 10 months on may be
precipitous. But it is safe to assume that these two
ideologies are too ingrained in the political landscape
to be uprooted as easily as Saddam Hussein's statue was
pulled down by a US Army M88 Hercules in Baghdad's
Paradise Square.
While it's generally
acknowledged that political Islam retains its vibrancy,
some observers contended that Arab nationalism was
already on life support, and now identify April 9, 2003,
the day Baghdad fell, as the official time of death. The
veracity of their post mortem matters, because American
soldiers now occupy a historical center of Arab
aspirations. And the aspirations of the Arabs have been
embodied largely by Arab nationalism - the political
ideology that privileges the unity of Arabic-speaking
peoples and which coalesced into "the Arab awakening"
after World War I.
As the United States attempts
to impose democracy US-style in Iraq and beyond in the
Middle East, it may find that indigenous ideologies,
like Arab nationalism, are more resilient than it had
expected.
Too soon for a eulogy?
How
Arab nationalism is defined is crucial to predicting
its, and Iraq's, future. Those who see its demise in the
fall of Saddam tend to define it narrowly. Scholars such
as Fouad Ajami and Adeed Dawisha see the collapse of the
high politics of Arab unity, from the "pipe dream" of an
Arab superstate from the Atlantic Ocean to the Arabian
Gulf, to the inability of Arab governments to cooperate,
as a damnation of the entire movement.
The
failed attempts to confront Israel, the humbling of
Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, the bungled unity
projects, Egypt's Westward turn, and Saddam's follies
all signaled the decline. And the fall of Saddam's
pan-Arab Ba'ath regime closed the circle. After all,
what could be more poignant than the fact that the tomb
of Michel Aflaq, founder of the Ba'ath Party, lies
inside the Coalition Provisional Authority's (CPA)
headquarters?
Much indicates, however, that
reports of the death of Arab nationalism are
exaggerated. The eulogists define it so narrowly as to
equate the failures of nationalist regimes with the
alleged failure of the ideology. And they dismiss the
solidarity of the Arab masses as all but irrelevant.
Anthony Gorman, professor of modern Middle Eastern
history at the University of London's School of Oriental
and African Studies, told Asia Times Online that Ajami
"goes too far, because he doesn't recognize that Arab
nationalism is still a very powerful idiom". The
politics of Arab unity at the state level might be on
the back heel, but the aspiration to Arab solidarity at
the popular level remains strong.
In short,
Arabs still care what happens to other Arabs, and don't
feel that their governments represent that concern. The
public's Arab nationalism is simply the collective good
based around the Arab identity. It is a way to meet the
challenges of underdevelopment, unrepresentative
regimes, and foreign interference. Arab nationalism may
no longer move mountains, but it still moves hearts and
minds.
The huge popularity of satellite
television stations with a distinct pan-Arab agenda,
such as Qatar-based alJazeera, is evidence of the
philosophy's resilient appeal. And when the al-Aqsa
intifada was brutally suppressed, it was the Arab
public, not their governments, that imposed an
unofficial boycott on US companies in solidarity with
the Palestinians. The hunger of Arabs for leaders who
will represent the Arab collective and not foreign
interests can be seen by the spontaneity with which the
Arab populace reacted to Syrian President Bashar
al-Assad's vocal opposition to the invasion of Iraq.
"Bashar, Bashar, set the world on fire!" crowds in Cairo
chanted.
While Arab nationalism competes at the
popular level with political Islam, and has been
overtaken by it in many ways, together they remain the
focal point of political dialogue in the Arab world.
"There are two major political forces in the Middle
East," said Walid Khadduri, editor-in-chief of Middle
East Economic Survey, in an interview with Asia Times
Online. "They rise, they fall, they're on the back
burner for some time, but they are there. And one has to
deal with them." These ideologies have been stifled by
authoritarianism, and the democratization of Iraq could,
ironically, breathe new life into them. They are not
necessarily hostile to the West, but they aren't what US
Vice President Dick Cheney had in mind when he proposed
a "forward strategy for freedom", either.
Iraq as paradigm
Iraq, the throne of
the Abbasid empire, is one of the birthplaces of Arab
nationalism. "To many Arab nationalists in the 1920s and
1930s," wrote Dawisha in Arab Nationalism in the 20th
Century, "Iraq seemed best equipped to play the
heroic role played by Prussia in uniting the
German-speaking people into one unified German state."
The fact that opposition to the CPA continues after
Saddam's capture suggests that Sunni insurgents are more
loyal to that legacy than they are to Saddam's regime.
Their Shi'ite counterparts in the south likewise appear
more partial to Iranian-born Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani
than Ahmed Chalabi, the would-be Shi'ite prophet of
neo-liberalism.
Arab nationalism, like Islam, is
Iraq's heritage, and it will likely shape the political
transformation as much as it is shaped by it. Iraqi
school textbooks once conceived by Abu Khaldun Sati'
al-Husri, the great philosopher of Arab nationalism, may
now be edited by the US Agency for International
Development, but the lessons Iraqi children learn should
eventually evolve to reflect the world view of their
parents. And when the CPA is finished de-Ba'athifying
Iraq, it may find that Ba'athism has simply been
rebranded and joined the political process. In this
regard, Khadduri suggests the former Soviet Union and
Eastern Europe as the correct paradigm for Iraq's
future, not Nazi Germany, as some neo-conservatives and
former Iraqi exiles have suggested. "Communist parties
changed names and also much of their identity, but kept
certain principles and moved on," he recalls.
Iraqis understand that Saddam was not Arab
nationalism, and Arab nationalism was not Saddam. They
can differentiate between the failures of the man and
the deficiencies of the ideology. And the ideology,
unlike the man, is still at large. Indigenous ideology
was obviously not foremost in the thoughts of US
President George W Bush's strategists who blithely
imagined Saddam's fall as the first tipping domino of
the Arab fold.
Rather than discredit these
forces, real democracy might release them, and in a way
not guaranteed to defer to US interests. After all, the
United States' embrace of Iraq "has fueled anti-American
feeling in the Arab world", Gorman pointed out. The
dream of Iraq as a neo-liberal "beacon" that will
transcend identity politics may be fanciful, especially
given that, as critics of Arab nationalism correctly
point out, changes in one part of the Arab system no
longer influence the rest as strongly as they once did.
For the neo-con architects of the invasion,
"Iraqi exceptionalism", the belief that Iraqis were
immune to "anti-Western rhetoric" because of Saddam's
oppression, as George Packer wrote in the New York Times
Magazine last March, marked it out as an ideal launch
pad for remaking the Arab world. And indeed Saddam's
uncommonly cruel faux-Arab nationalist regime was
singularly emblematic of the failures of republican
leaders, and the hollowness of their rhetoric. These
leaders failed to adjust to global changes or those in
their own societies, says Khadduri, neglecting
minorities and Islamic sentiment. "The atrocities some
of them committed, the lack of freedom, the corruption,
nepotism," combined to bring "the whole Arab nationalist
philosophy and movement into disarray."
But for
all their suffering under Saddam, Iraqis, even the
majority Shi'ites, hardly seem enamored of their
American "liberators", and are still prone to
anti-Western sentiment, rhetorical or not. Iraq is an
extraordinarily complex ethnic mosaic, and it may well
have been chosen by the Bush administration in the hopes
that it would therefore be easier to control. Whatever
their ideological biases, however, Iraq's basic
communities have broad areas of consensus as well. "Take
for example the question of the Arab-Israeli issue,"
says Khadduri. "There is a common denominator there
between, let's say, the Arab nationalists, the
Ba'athists, and Shi'ite leaders like Sistani and
[Muqtada al-]Sadr."
Continued Iraqi concern with
events in Israel-Palestine illuminates an essential
point. Many of the challenges that defined the
nationalist struggle, whether secular pan-Arab or
Islamist, remain. The failure of Saddam to confront
Israel doesn't affect the desire of the Arab collective
to achieve justice for the Palestinians, for instance.
And ideologies that coalesced around Ottoman occupation
and European colonialism may be reoriented to confront
the intrusions of the 21st century.
Death and
rebirth
The Arab world is in a period of profound
change, and Arab nationalism and political Islam are in
flux. Ultimately, their continued relevance depends on
their ability to adapt to evolving internal and external
challenges. Unlike political Islam, Arab nationalism has
been written off by numerous observers. But while the
dream of a single Arab state may be dead, there is the
potential for other, more practical forms of political
amalgamation that rely on transnational currents such as
trade, and the solidarity of citizens and civil society.
With not only Iraq but the major Arab powers
such as Syria, Egypt and Saudi Arabia very much in a
state of transition, predictions of any kind are risky.
But it is possible that, rather than killing Arab
nationalism, the removal of Saddam and regional "reform"
might simply release its genie from the bondage of
rhetoric.
Ashraf Fahim is a freelance
writer on Middle Eastern affairs based in New York and
London.
(Copyright 2004 Asia Times Online
Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact content@atimes.com for
information on our sales and syndication
policies.)
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