THE ROVING
EYE A constitution drenched in
blood By Pepe Escobar
This
is the new Iraq - where the process for a new democratic
constitution is greeted by the specter of civil war.
On midnight last Saturday the Iraq
Governing Council (IGC) failed to meet a deadline -
imposed by American proconsul L Paul Bremer -
to reach agreement on
a draft constitution. Bremer himself intervened,
applying heavy pressure. At 4:30am on Monday, the IGC
proclaimed that it had finally agreed on a draft. Then
on Tuesday morning the devastating anti-Shi'ite attacks
took place in Baghdad and Karbala.
As early as
Tuesday afternoon, fingers were already pointing toward
a suspect, alleged al-Qaeda operative Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi, whose purported letter was unearthed last
month on a computer disk that fell into US hands and
which supplies the perfect motive: al-Qaeda wants a
civil war in Iraq.
How did Iraq slide in 24
hours from adopting a draft constitution that could pave
the way for democracy into a state where civil war is a
definite step closer? Simple. Blame it on al-Qaeda. It's
the easy way out. But the attacks against the Shi'ites
must be interpreted in light of what happened behind the
closed doors of the US-appointed IGC during the weekend.
Divide and rule A united
Iraqi nation resisting the massive presence of US and
other foreign troops in its territory, even after the
transfer of sovereignty on June 30, would be a
troublesome prospect. So no wonder articles have already
popped up in the New York Times and the French daily Le
Figaro calling for a partition of Iraq. The argument is
that the unity of the Iraqi nation is a mirage: the
country can only be governed by brute force (Saddam
Hussein-style, but without the massacres). Over the
years, Washington figures from many sides of the
political spectrum have consistently voiced the same
opinion.
According to the British imperial maxim
of "divide and rule", three small states - Kurd, Sunni
and Shi'ite - would be much easier to control than the
Iraq construct put together by the British themselves.
The operation would also fulfill neo-conservative dreams
of deporting Palestinians from the West Bank to a
putative Sunni mini-Iraq. Defenders of the idea mention
Yugoslavia as a successful example of a modern
partition.
The drama of building a new Iraq
centers on how tribe, religion and national, regional
and ethnic identities can be integrated into a national
political system capable of incorporating all parties
and reflecting real power balances. This immense
undertaking cannot possibly be addressed by a body, the
IGC, chosen by the occupying force and totally divorced
from the general population, which calls it "the
imported government". Those who want the partition of
Iraq simply don't understand how religion,
ethno-nationalism and statehood coexist in this eastern
flank of the Arab nation. Iraqis want a united country:
they regard themselves first and foremost as Iraqis;
then as Arabs (80 percent of the population), members of
the great Arab nation; and then finally as Sunni or
Shi'ite.
Who's blaming whom?
Predictably, the IGC as a
whole follows the Pentagon screenplay and blames the
multiple carnage in Baghdad and Karbala on al-Zarqawi
- the Jordanian-born alleged al-Qaeda operative with a
US$10 million bounty on his head. Zarqawi fought in the
anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan in the 1980s, as well
as alongside the Taliban in the autumn of 2001. For US Secretary
of State Colin Powell, Zarqawi before the war on Iraq
was the missing link between Saddam and the Islamist
group Ansar al-Islam, based in Iraqi Kurdistan. Now
the Pentagon considers Zarqawi the No 1 al-Qaeda terrorist
involved with Iraq.
In the Sunni Arab world,
nobody believes in the veracity of the now-famous
Zarqawi letter found on a computer disk. It couldn't be
more convenient in the ways it outlines a full strategy
for attacks on the Shi'ites. The writer in the Zarqawi
letter lists four key enemies to be fought: Americans,
Iraqi security forces, Kurds and Shi'ites. Provoking
Shi'ites, he writes, is the way to set in motion a whole
hellish circle of retaliation. The letter reads: "If we
succeed in dragging them [Shi'ites] into the arena of
sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the
inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and
annihilating death."
It's instructive to examine
how the Shi'ites are responding to the provocation.
Among the Shi'ites on the lGC, moderate Mowaffaq
al-Rubaie has blamed the carnage on Zarqawi. But most
crucially he echoes a nationalist stance shared by most
Iraqis, irrespective of their religious belief: "Sunnis,
Shi'ites, Arabs, Kurds, Assyrians, all Iraqis are
determined to move forward. United we stand to build a
new Iraq."
Hamid al-Bayati, a top official from
the best-organized Shi'ite political party, the Supreme
Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq, also blamed
al-Qaeda, but in tandem with "Saddam loyalists". "The
people behind this act are what remains of the regime,
backed by people like al-Qaeda, with the goal of
igniting civil strife. But we are aware of this danger
and will not succumb to it."
Feelings on the
Shi'ite street are likely to be much more complex. Some
will indeed say that the carnage is a provocation to
engage them in a civil war. But they will be divided on
who ordered it.
There are
some telling signs. Shi'ite survivors of the
attacks in Baghdad instinctively hurled stones at US troops
in their Humvees and armored vehicles as they
approached the square outside the Kadhim shrine where the
attacks took place. In many hospitals in the area, some
were blaming the Americans - for the war, for the occupation,
for the lax security - and others were blaming
al-Qaeda and Wahhabi extremists. In Karbala, the Shi'ite
mob turned against Iranian pilgrims - even though the
ministry of interior in Tehran said that 40-50 Iranians were
among the dead and wounded in both cities.
Shi'ite cleric Sheik Sayyed Akeel al-Khatib
said the attacks were perpetrated by suicide bombers.
"This means they came from abroad and were not Iraqis."
Shi'ites are overwhelmingly sure that Muslims could not
possibly commit these crimes at the height of Ashura -
the 10th day of the Muslim month of Muharram, when Imam
Hussein, grandson of the Prophet Mohammed, was killed in
battle nearly 1,400 years ago. Imam Hussein's tomb is
under a golden-domed shrine in Karbala only a few steps
away from the blasts. Thaer al-Shimri, a member of the
al-Dawa Party, says that "war has been launched on
Islam". So, according to a dominant Shi'ite perception,
this had to be the work of non-believers.
US
intelligence may have thought about the possibility of
attacks during Ashura. Security apparently was improved
by the US-trained Iraqi police around Karbala and
other Shi'ite towns in the south. Karbala currently
falls under Polish control. The Polish and Iraqi police
closed the main road leading to the tomb of Imam Hussein
and installed plenty of checkpoints - to no avail. In
Beirut, Sheikh Hamed Khalaf, one of the spokesmen for
Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani, a key Iraqi Shi'ite
leader, laid the blame directly on American soldiers for
the attacks: after all, they are responsible for
security in Iraq. This can be interpreted as the Grand
Ayatollah's view.
Sources confirm to Asia Times
Online that there's a pervasive feeling in the Shi'ite
street that the multiple carnage was a bloody message by
the Americans to Sistani: stop demanding direct
elections, or else. On top of it, we have Shi'ites
indistinctly blaming the Americans and Wahhabis - a code
for al-Qaeda. This means that there is a clear
perception in the Shi'ite street that the agenda of both
Washington and al-Qaeda is the same: both sides want
civil war. The Americans can invoke chaos as a reason to
prolong the occupation and fight "terrorism". And
Islamist groups profiting from a link with the brand
name "al-Qaeda" can keep focusing Islamists everywhere
in the anti-American jihad going on in Iraq.
The
most important element in the equation is that
practically no Shi'ites are directly blaming Sunnis - or
vowing revenge. This proves once again that the
resistance against the occupation has forged its own
unity.
Will Sharia and democracy co-exist?
The two volcanic issues dividing the IGC in the
debate about the draft constitution were the role of
Islam in Iraq and Kurdish demands for federalism. It's
no secret that most in the IGC - Shi'ites but also
Sunnis - are in favor of Sharia law. The key question
was a dispute over a move to make divorce and
inheritance rights subject to Sharia. During Saddam's
regime, these were enshrined women's rights. Women at
the IGC had to lobby very hard not to lose them.
The IGC couldn't agree on Kurdish autonomy in
the north of Iraq, nor on how to share power between
Sunnis, Shi'ites and Kurds. So even before Bremer's
intervention the specter of civil war was very much
alive.
Bremer had threatened to veto any law
that included inheritance and divorce subjected to
Sharia. Young Shi'ite firebrand cleric Muqtada al-Sadr
even made vague threats of armed resistance if Bremer
used the veto. And to complicate matters further,
Shi'ites and Sunnis alike were not only against Kurdish
autonomy, but their demands to include oil-rich Kirkuk
in their Iraqi Kurdistan.
The compromise
announced may satisfy religious clerics, liberal
democrats, Kurdish autonomists and of course the
occupying power; but it only happened under the threat
of Bremer's gun. In theory, the draft constitution
guarantees the rights of women inside their families and
a quota of 25 percent of women in future Iraqi
legislative bodies. Islam is not "the" primary source of
legislation - but one of them: so any future legislation
cannot be contrary to Islamic principles.
The
key problem remains: Who will define the compatibility
between secular legislation and Sharia? And how to
ensure that no law in the new Iraq is contrary to either
democracy or Islamic principles?
Iraqi Kurdistan
will remain autonomous until an elected parliament and a
legitimate government are able to decide its future.
Shi'ites and Sunnis also anticipate the possibility that
three regions anywhere in the country may decide to form
a federation. Among the 18 Iraqi regions, three have a
Kurdish majority, three have a Sunni majority, nine have
a Shi'ite majority and three are an ethnic patchwork.
No major controversy has really been solved by this draft constitution.
It's an extremely provisional document that the
administration of US President George W Bush can brandish
like a "victory" on the path toward a new Iraq. The rules
of the game are in place for the transition between June
30 - when a local authority will come to power -
and national elections to be held by next January. Only
after this election will a constituent assembly rewrite
a definitive charter - in theory based on the draft one.
A future Iraq as a federalist state like India,
Canada or Brazil, with a system whereby regions enjoy
large autonomy, remains a project. The devil is in the
details.
Nobody knows how an Iraqi interim government
- to rule from June 30 until the elections - will
be chosen. The United States will open its largest embassy in
the world on July 1 in Baghdad. It will totally control
the interim government. And it will rely on more than
100,000 US troops stationed in Iraq. "What handover?"
asks a Shi'ite businessman in Baghdad. Millions
of Shi'ites - all of them oblivious to the non-transparent
machinations inside the IGC - fear that the
de facto occupation may last for years. The draft
constitution was due to be signed by Bremer on Wednesday
- before the IGC declared three days of mourning for the
victims of the multiple carnage. Now it will probably be
inked on Friday. The draft constitution was born, as the
White House wanted. But it was born already drenched in
Shi'ite blood.
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to reach agreement on
a draft constitution. Bremer himself intervened,
applying heavy pressure. At 4:30am on Monday, the IGC
proclaimed that it had finally agreed on a draft. Then
on Tuesday morning the devastating anti-Shi'ite attacks
took place in Baghdad and Karbala. 
