There is an ongoing race between the United
States resolve to bring about transition of sovereignty
to Iraqis by June 30, and the determination of the
insurgent forces in Iraq to shatter the willingness and
capabilities of indigenous security persons. Tuesday's
attacks in Karbala and Baghdad that resulted in more
than 140 deaths and 400 injuries of Shi'ites is very
much part of that campaign. Its purpose: entangling the
American Gulliver in Iraq.
The success of the US
will bring about the defeat of the insurgents. However,
if the insurgents were to get an upper hand, all plans
related to the emergence of a stable Iraq will be
postponed indefinitely. The insurgents hope to
demoralize the Iraqi security personnel, thereby
creating mass desertion, which, they anticipate, would
result in the heightened exposure of American troops to
become the target of their attacks. US officials are
fully aware of what is at stake. But plans for
transition of power must be executed, no matter the
cost.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld
recently concluded a very important trip to Iraq. Its
purpose was to discuss the modalities of the transfer of
control to Iraqi authorities in the wake of persistent
insurgency. Prior and during this trip, violent
incidents in Iraq were abound. In fact, the helicopter
that carried the defense secretary and his party
reportedly fired off two flares designed to divert
heat-seeking missiles. Afterwards, the military
authority reported that his helicopter did not appear to
have come under fire.
US officials also know
that it is not sufficient that transfer of power alone
is materialized. What is direly needed is an Iraq where
most security details are manned by credible indigenous
forces. That is one reason why Rumsfeld toured Iraqi
training academies for the police and Civil Defense
Corps. US officials were touting the fact that there are
more than 21,000 trainees in these facilities, all of
them recruited in the past few months.
As the
date for transfer of sovereignty edges closer, the
"coalition strategy" (read American strategy) has been
to turn over more control to Iraqi security forces and
the forces of other nations. There is a fledgling force
of 200,000 Iraqis. These include army, Civil Defense
Corps, border patrol and forces to man various
facilities. In addition, there are 20,000 other
coalition troops. Consequently, 105,000 American troops
are gradually being pulled back from points of high risk
and casualty in Iraq, including street patrols and
manning facilities. Baghdad is currently reported to
have 36,000 American troops. That number is expected to
go down to 24,000 by April, and Iraqi personnel will
take charge of security.
That is one reason -
indeed, the main reason - why insurgents are so intent
on blowing up Iraqi security personnel, and even killing
civilians, knowing full well that if they thus shatter
the morale of Iraqi forces, then the Coalition
Provisional Authority will have no other option but to
use American forces to maintain order. That is what the
insurgents really want. They know that a sure way of
bringing about American departure from Iraq is to create
consistently high American casualty figures, whereas
killing Iraqi security forces, even in large numbers,
would only prolong the American stay in Iraq.
In
view of the preceding, a natural question is whether the
insurgents are attaining their objective of shattering
the morale of the Iraqi security personnel. As expected,
US officials portray a picture of Iraqi bravado by
underscoring a feeling of determination among the
security forces stemming from patriotism and dedication
to do their job. However, the reality is, according to
one source, "a more confusing jumble of emotions than
patriotism ...."
A sticky point before the
transfer of power is what is called "the status of
forces agreement". In the case of Iraq, it will govern
the future role of the US military. To underscore how
potentially explosive that issue could be, no one in the
current Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) wishes to conduct
negotiations governing it. The IGC wants the
transitional government to conclude that agreement. A
spokesman of chief administrator L Paul Bremer stated:
"Whether they [the IGC] want to negotiate the status of
US forces here now or later, there is a pretty strong
consensus that they want US forces here going forward."
Notwithstanding that alleged consensus, the future role
of US forces in Iraq will not only remain a major source
of controversy, but it will also determine how the
succeeding government will be perceived by other major
competing forces in Iraq.
The Bush
administration made no secret of the fact that it wishes
Iraq to remain a state allied with the US. For Iraqi
nationalists, that is merely an euphemism for keeping
their country a permanent American colony. Thus, even if
the US succeeds in gaining an upper hand over the Iraqi
insurgents and transfers power smoothly now, violent
clashes in the country are likely to occur for a long
time. Iraq is much too important an Arab state to become
an American ally (colony). As the Iraqi insurgents see
it, they will have plenty of opportunities to tackle the
American Gulliver, even if they do not succeed between
now and June 30.
Ehsan Ahrari, PhD, is
an Alexandria, Virginia, US-based independent strategic
analyst.
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