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The Red Cross marches on in Iraq
By Alexander Casella

GENEVA - While the visit made to Saddam Hussein on February 21 by two delegates of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) made international headlines, it is only the tip of the iceberg, highlighting the work undertaken in Iraq by the organization since the beginning of the American occupation.

Starting in late March 2003, as United States forces were making their way to Baghdad, the ICRC began to visit Iraqi prisoners of war (PoWs) held by the coalition. These were members of the Iraqi army taken prisoner during military operations and classified as PoWs. Subsequent to the fall of Baghdad, most of the PoWs held by the coalition were released.

Conversely, however, the ongoing security operations have netted an increasing number of Iraqi "civilian detainees". These are either non-military members of the former regime or members of the resistance captured by coalition forces. While both PoWs and "civilian detainees" come under the protection of the ICRC as provided by the Geneva Conventions, PoW status hinges on a number of specific criteria. These include being part of an organized entity, being identifiable either by a uniform or by a fixed sign such as an armband, carrying weapons openly and abiding by the customs of war.

Saddam, according to US official sources, was arrested on December 13, 2003. Shortly after his capture was announced, the ICRC requested from the Americans the right to visit him. The request was made not only on the grounds that any arrested person in Iraq is protected by the Geneva Conventions, but also more specifically because the ICRC believed that Saddam was actually entitled to PoW status. While the US did not immediately respond to this request, in mid January, one month after his capture, they recognized him as a PoW.

Though the circumstances of the capture, as presented by the US, (was Saddam carrying weapons openly and did he carry a fixed distinctive identification sign?) could have led Washington to question his PoW status, the determining element in his case was the fact that as chief of state he had been the supreme commander of the Iraqi army. Thus, the legal basis for such a decision would have been questionable and would have further fueled the controversy regarding the overall presence of the US in Iraq.

When news that Saddam had been granted PoW status spread in Iraq, it was received with a combination of disbelieve and outrage. This reaction was essentially due to a common misunderstanding regarding the very concept of PoW status.

According to the Geneva conventions, a PoW has essentially two rights. First, he has the right to be visited by the ICRS. Second, he is obliged to provide his name, rank and serial number. This does not mean that a PoW cannot be extensively interrogated, but it does mean that he is under no other obligation than to provide the element of information specified by the convention. While the conventions also specify that a PoW should not be "humiliated", which hence prohibits mistreatment, the definition of "mistreatment" is left unclear. At what point interrogation methods such as as threats or sleep deprivation become "mistreatment" is a grey area, an issue the ICRC aims to mitigate. Conversely, PoW status provides no immunity from prosecution, albeit through established and recognized legal procedures.

On February 21, consonant with the Geneva conventions, two ICRC delegates - a doctor and an Arab speaker - visited Saddam and interviewed him outside the presence of any third party. During the visit, which lasted two hours, Saddam, as provided by the convention, gave the ICRC delegates a so-called "Red Cross" message to transmit to his family. In keeping with recognized procedures, the detaining power, in this case the US, was authorized to read the message and possibly censure it. In keeping with its standard procedures when visiting prisoners, the ICRC refused to reveal the location of the visit except to say that it was held "within Iraq". Likewise, the names of the two delegates who visited Saddam were not made public. "According to our rules," commented an ICRC official in Geneva,"we do not comment publicly on PoW visits and we are not revealing the names of our two delegates simply to avoid that they be swamped with requests for interviews which they can anyhow not give."

What the ICRC will do, as a matter of course, is provide the US with a report on how they assess the conditions of detentions. The ICRC also confirms that it will request repeat visits to Saddam. According to ICRC sources, the total number of prisoners held in Iraq is difficult to assess as arrests and releases occur on a daily basis. However, by their estimates, and not counting the prisoners held by Iraqi police, the coalition is currently holding some 10 000 detainees, of whom the overwhelming majority are "civilian detainees", and no more than 100 have PoW status. Currently, the coalition has some 20 official detention centers, the largest being the Abu Ghrabi prison in Baghdad.

ICRC officials in Geneva confirm that they have had access to all of the detention centers and that they have also visited all of the "VIP" prisoners, namely those figuring on the US "card deck" of most wanted people. That these visits were neither denied nor advertised is very much in keeping with the traditional modus operandi of the ICRC. Contrary to human rights advocacy groups, who rely on publicity to advertise their cause, the publicity-shy ICRC has traditionally sought to improve the lot of prisoners and civilian populations in times of war both by patient field work and by seeking the expansion of international humanitarian law.

Visits to prisoners, be they PoWs or political detainees, are generally not advertised and the accent is put on trying to improve detention conditions rather than addressing the root causes of detention, which in most cases are beyond control. Ultimately, the ICRC, while not denying the role of human rights advocates, has essentially chosen to practice where others preach and to concentrate on improving the material lot of those in detention pending a solution to the root causes of detention. This approach is very much in keeping with the unique nature of the organization.

The ICRC's roots date to June 24, 1858 when a lone Swiss traveler, Henri Dunant from the city-state of Geneva, came across the battlefield of Solferino where the French and Austrian armies had been locked in combat. Appalled by the thousands of wounded that lay uncared for on the ground, Dunant in 1863 summoned four of his friends with the purpose of creating an organization which would seek to "humanize war". This private initiative inspired by the Protestant ethic on which the city-state of Geneva was founded, led to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which in turn gave birth to the Red Cross movement and to the concept of international humanitarian law.

Contrary to what its name might imply, the ICRC as created by Dunant was and remains a private Swiss organization incorporated under Swiss law. While its scope is international, and it has been universally recognized as the custodian of the Geneva Conventions, its governing committee is an all-Swiss assembly of 18 members who are chosen by co-option and represent a cross-section of the Swiss political, academic, industrial, military and political establishment.

Though the Swiss nature of the organization has at times been a source of endless soul searching by the committee members, it has, over the years - with its implicit aura of neutrality - served the organization well. Unencumbered by the political fetters that burden the United Nations, in more that one crisis it has been able to move faster, more effectively and at far less cost than any intergovernmental organizations.

And yet, over the years, it has hardly been smooth sailing for the ICRC. In 1943, confronted with the evidence of the holocaust in Germany, the committee chose to remain silent, fearing that any public statement would not only jeopardize its work in favor of allied PoWs but also threaten Switzerland's survival. It was a no-win situation for which even today there is no answer.

During the Vietnam war, confronted by a communist government in North Vietnam which viewed US PoW's as political pawns, an insurgent movement in the South that was basically left unprotected by the conventions and a US government whose actions fell far short of the minimum of moral standards, the committee, whose good intentions could not overcome a combination of naivety, ignorance and lack of cultural sensitivity, failed to come to grips with the multifaceted dimensions of the conflict.

In Bosnia, following the murder of its representative in Sarajevo, a shell-shocked ICRC temporarily pulled out from the embattled country in May 1992. When it returned one month later it found the ground overtaken by a massive presence of the UN refugee agency. With all warring parties showing a total disregard for international humanitarian norms, the committee remained overshadowed by a pervasive UN presence.

These glitches notwithstanding, the ICRC occupies a unique niche within the global spectrum of humanitarian work. Neither an international organization nor a non-governmental organization, it is a special entity that marches to its own drummer. Thus in Iraq, unlike the UN which pulled out after a car bomb had savaged its headquarters on August 19, 2003, the ICRC, after a similar attack on its headquarters on October 27, 2003, officially retrenched, but in practice continued to visit prisons, albeit less visibly.

With no sign that the Iraqi resistance is easing, the ICRC will undoubtedly find its presence in Iraq increasingly needed. And while it holds no claim to be in a position to solve any conflict, it continues, on the ground, doggedly and unobtrusively to endeavor, if not to make war more humane - or at least to less inhumane.

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Mar 6, 2004

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