Iran's 'right to enrich'
uranium By Erich Marquardt
In
recent days, Iran has reaffirmed its commitment toward
its goal of gaining complete control over the nuclear
fuel cycle. Tehran's desire to research and control
every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle required for
producing nuclear energy has been hotly contested by the
United States. The aspect of Tehran's nuclear research
program that has drawn the most flak is the uranium
enrichment program.
In order to create fuel for
a nuclear reactor, it is necessary to produce
low-enriched uranium. At the same time, however,
high-enriched uranium can be used to create nuclear
weapons. It is for this reason that the US has made
every attempt to prevent Iran undertaking the
uranium-enrichment process and has attempted to forge a
coalition of states demanding that Iran only import
enriched uranium, rather than produce it independently.
The political wrestling between the two states
culminated in an accord signed by Tehran last October
21. The United Kingdom, France and Germany intervened
and compromised with Iran, causing Tehran to sign an
Additional Protocol to the Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT) allowing for more intrusive inspections by the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and placing
into effect a temporary halt on all uranium-enrichment
activities inside Iran. In exchange for these
concessions, London, Paris and Berlin offered Tehran
nuclear-research information and greater access to
modern technology.
Tehran agreed to the
Additional Protocol not because it planned on giving up
its uranium-enrichment program, but because it
considered signing the protocol to be the best available
route toward that program. By complying with the IAEA's
demands, and forging a compromise with London, Paris and
Berlin, Tehran hoped to secure greater assistance from
trade partners in the form of modern technology. This
assistance would help Iran better understand the methods
involved in all aspects of nuclear technology, including
the methods of creating nuclear weapons. Outside support
would also help Tehran build the necessary
infrastructure to increase the country's economic and
military stability - a path that it must follow because
of the regional threats it faces.
Iran's true
intentions of restarting its uranium-enrichment program
can already be seen in the recent statements by Iranian
officials. Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi argued during
a cabinet meeting that "it's our legitimate right to
enrich uranium". Echoing statements made in October
after the signing of the Additional Protocol to the NPT,
Kharrazi continued, "We suspended uranium enrichment
voluntarily and temporarily. Later, when our relations
with the IAEA return to normal, we will definitely
resume enrichment."
Hassan Rohani, the secretary
of the Supreme Council for National Security, also made
a statement explaining how Tehran complied with the
Additional Protocol only because it considered it the
best route toward the country's goal of controlling
every aspect of the nuclear fuel cycle. Rohani explained
that Tehran agreed to a compromise with the three
European states because "the pressures applied on Iran
were so great that most of the world's leading
industrial nations conditioned trading with us to the
signing of the protocol, as seen in the Azadegan
oilfields that the Japanese refused to develop".
Also, by not compromising with the main European
Union states, there would be little chance that the
Europeans would be able to restrain the United States'
aggressive foreign policy. Rohani admitted as much,
warning that had Tehran failed to comply with the IAEA,
"it would face the same fate as Iraq". Indeed, the
threat that the US poses to Iran is very real, and could
be one of the driving factors behind Iran's possible
quest for nuclear weapons.
Washington's
demonstration of power in Iraq perhaps proved to the
leadership in Tehran that the threat from the US could
not be taken lightly, and that to prevent the US from
using force to push through political decisions
affecting Iran, it would have to develop a solid
deterrent force made up of nuclear weapons. Furthermore,
Tehran is also aware that its future progression as a
regional power will be stunted by the State of Israel
unless Tehran acquires the capability of deterring that
country. Israel, because of its support from the United
States, has always remained a force for the status quo
in the Middle East, working with the US to prevent any
Middle Eastern or regional contender becoming strong
enough to alter the balance of power. This strategic
relationship was best seen during Israel's attack on
Iraq's Osirak nuclear reactor in 1981.
With
these two threats in mind, Tehran is aware that if it is
to have an independent foreign policy, free from the
restraints of outside powers, it will need to develop
nuclear weapons to deter conventional attacks. While
becoming nuclear-armed would not ensure its protection
from attacks from the United States, Israel, or other
neighbors, it would lessen the risks. In fact, the only
reason Iran would not seek nuclear weapons would be if
it were afforded a nuclear umbrella, similar to the way
the US shielded Western Europe under its own nuclear
umbrella during the Cold War.
Iran at present
has no such protection. The primary country willing to
offer Tehran military support is the Russian Federation,
but Moscow is in no position to assist Tehran in any
military conflict with Washington. Therefore, the
leadership in Tehran must rely on itself for its
security and, in a region full of threats, it may need
to develop nuclear weapons to do so adequately.
Rohani admitted as much, stating, "We want to be
recognized as a member of the nuclear club, that means
Iran be recognized as a country having the nuclear fuel
cycle, and enriching uranium. This is very difficult for
the world to accept." Rohani continued, outlining Iran's
agenda, "We have two goals ahead of us that we must
achieve. One is closing Iran's nuclear dossier with the
IAEA and bringing the board of governors to take it out
of their agenda, and the other is to have Iran
recognized globally as a nuclear country."
With
such outspoken policy goals, Tehran's aim of joining the
nuclear club is sure to spark incessant controversy.
With the US and Israel desperately trying to preserve
the balance of power in the Middle East, they will
tactfully respond to each step Iran takes toward
acquiring control over the nuclear fuel cycle. The only
way such persistent conflict may end is if Iran does
indeed prove that it is a nuclear-armed country. The
response by the US and Israel might then be rather
muted, similar to the way the world responded when China
acquired nuclear weapons in 1964; rather than launch a
military attack to restore the balance of power in the
region, the administration of US president Richard Nixon
instead responded to Beijing with none other than a full
presidential visit, giving China instant credibility in
the eyes of the world.
Published with
permission of thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed tocontent@pinr.com.
