US puts Yemen in a bind over 'terror'
sheikh By Brian O'Neill
In
addition to being widely respected throughout Yemen,
Sheikh Abdul Majid al-Zindani, recently indicted by the
United States Department of Treasury on charges that
include recruiting for and promoting al-Qaeda, has
connections to many top leaders and has played an
important role in recent Yemeni history. His falling out
with the US highlights the enormous challenges facing
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh as he attempts to
help the US fight Islamic militants.
Yemen's
recent history Politics in Yemen is a tough game.
Saleh's two direct predecessors were both assassinated
in gruesome circumstances (one was found in a hotel room
surrounded by drugs and dead prostitutes; the other was
killed in his office by an exploding briefcase). Coming
to power in North Yemen in 1978, Saleh had to deal with
tribes that valued their autonomy, powerful business
interests, Saudi interference, and an enemy in the south
- the Marxist People's Democratic Republic of Yemen.
Saleh, with unexpected flair and diplomatic
skill, survived and oversaw unification in 1990. But
unification was not easy, as he and southern leaders
maneuvered for power in the newly integrated state. The
first parliamentary elections were held in 1993, in
which Saleh's party, the General People's Congress
(GPC), took a solid majority and the Yemeni Socialist
Party finished third. It was here that politics in Yemen
showed their new direction. The second-place finish went
to the Yemen Reform Group, also known as Islah, an
Islamic party.
There are a number of reasons for
the Yemen Reform Group's strong finish. They managed to
rally support in the more traditional and Islamic north
by playing on fears of socialist secularization and
disruption of tribal unity (both were planks of the
Marxist south). Another factor was their leader, Sheik
Abdullah al-Ahmar, the head of the Hashid tribal
federation, the largest and most unified in Yemen.
Indeed, Saleh's tribe is a member of Hashid, which has
led some observers and critics to charge collusion.
There is collusion between the GPC and Islah,
but it has little to do with tribal relations. The role
of tribes is important in Yemen, but it is not of
paramount importance, especially for Saleh, whose tribe
is urban and has few real connections to the rural
Hashid tribes. Politics were more of a factor, as GPC
and Islah both wanted to neutralize the reformed, and
reformist, Marxists.
The upshot of the elections
was the increased role of Islah. Sheikh al-Ahmar, its
leader, became chairman of the council of
representatives, a position he still holds. Islah, as
Yemeni scholar Paul Dresch points out, is not a radical
Islamic party, but an Islamic party with some radical
members. Al-Ahmar is not interested in disturbing the
status quo, but some other members of his group are -
especially Sheik al-Zindani, who in the wake of the
elections was appointed to the five-man presidential
council.
As Yemen moved closer to a civil war,
Zindani played an important role. He worked in various
positions in Yemen's past, including, crucially, the
minister of education. But it wasn't until the war with
the Soviet Union in Afghanistan that he really found his
legs. He was a key recruiter in Yemen, which sent more
soldiers than any other country besides Saudi Arabia. It
was also there that he met Osama bin Laden and,
according to reports, became his mentor. After returning
from Afghanistan, Zindani became the leader of Islah's
radical faction, and continued as a mentor to the
"Afghan Arabs". He is known for his fiery taped sermons,
which, among other topics, blame US President George W
Bush and Jews in general for the September 11 attacks on
New York and Washington, and was accused of using his
fighters to kill southern leaders in the period between
unification and civil war.
The Yemeni civil war
began in 1994 and was widely expected to be a stalemate.
But Zindani rallied his "Afghans" to fight on behalf of
the north. While doing so they preached their
Wahhabi-influenced version of Islam to the northern
army. Saudi Arabia was, paradoxically, the south's
biggest supporter, but could rally few states beside
Sudan, Libya, and the universally unrecognized
Somaliland to its cause. Needless to say, the world
community failed to flock to this coalition. The north
eventually won, and Saleh's position was secure.
But his security was not of the
no-strings-attached variety. The radical faction was
allowed to muscle their ideas into the south,
destroying, among other things, Yemen's only brewery.
Saleh was indebted to both Islah, for supporting him
despite Saudi objections, and to Hashid tribesmen for
their fighting. He left the north mostly untouched by
the central government and allowed fundamental social
reconstruction of the south to go unchecked.
Corruption remained rampant, and the economy
continued to plummet following the disproportionate ruin
wrought by an "Arab solution" stance that was perceived
as pro-Iraqi in 1990-91. Still, Yemen remained the Arab
world's closest approximation to a democracy, with a
lively press and dozens of functioning, if largely
ineffective, opposition parties.
Yemen as a
world player After September 11, the US looked at
Yemen as possibly another Afghanistan that might have to
be invaded to root out militants. Saleh quickly offered
his help, avoiding invasion. The militants in his
country were a danger to him, especially as his economy
continued to dive and the population was getting younger
without chance of employment. Saleh realized that he
could have US military help to fight his battles and
also have a chance to change Yemen's image from a hotbed
of Islamic militancy to an active fighter in the "war on
terrorism". This move was also expected to improve
Yemen's dire economic straits.
Saleh's will is
not supreme. His main challenge remains not being seen
as a US lackey, not an easy task when his primary ally
is an administration eager to show its muscle. When a
Central Intelligence Agency drone killed six suspected
al-Qaeda members, including the organization's man in
Yemen, Qaed Salim Sinan al-Harethi, the agreed-upon
story was supposed to be that the militants were
destroyed by their own bomb. Washington quickly revealed
its role, much to Saleh's embarrassment and to general
uproar in Yemen. This led to his refusal to turn over
al-Harethi's replacement when he was caught.
But
Yemen didn't stop its internal war, and the US didn't
stop turning to Yemen in its external one. US Special
Forces are in the country now training Yemeni
anti-terrorist troops, who have stepped up both the
quantity and quality of their operations. In early March
they staged a large raid that netted several top
militants, including a handful of Egyptian fugitives.
Nevertheless, everything is not stable. Northern
tribesmen are helping Saleh, partly because Sheik
al-Ahmar, who as head of the council of representatives
controls the financial funds, is as afraid of messing
with the status quo as Saleh. But the tribesmen are
listening to appeals for Yemen's sake, as well as some
distaste for Wahhabism, not because they are eager to
help the US. If the US sends in more troops, or their
perception of influence is overwhelming, the tribesmen
could revolt.
This is where the case of Zindani
comes in. It is nearly impossible for Saleh to turn
Zindani over to US courts, or - even worse - the US
military installation at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. Yet to
not do so will be in open defiance of Washington. There
have been hints of cooperation. Abdul al-Ansi, deputy
chairman of al-Islah, was quoted in the Yemen Times as
saying: "Does the United States have proof that supports
the accusations? If it does have proof, it should give
it to the Yemeni government." He indicated that Saleh's
government would be more than happy to get rid of
Zindani if there was any political cover.
But
for the moment there is not. Saleh is not quite powerful
enough to take on a popular figure simply because the
Treasury Department has asked him to. Zindani may in
fact be the most dangerous person in Yemen, but he is
also the one man the government fears to go after.
Saleh, who stepped up raids directly following the
indictment, may be trying to send the US a message that
he is still on its side, despite Zindani. Saleh is
trapped in a dangerous game of appeasing both sides, a
game whose rules are dictated by Yemen's difficult and
confusing history. With Zindani now on America's most
wanted list, the game has become considerably more
treacherous.
Published with permission of
thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
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directed to content@pinr.com
Apr 2, 2004
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