The latest violence
in Iraq has once again focused attention on the young
firebrand Shi'ite cleric, Muqtada al-Sadr, whom top US
civil administrator for Iraq, L Paul Bremer, on Monday
called an "outlaw" and said he will not let the radical
Shi'ite cleric push the country into chaos, according to
a Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) report.
"[Muqtada] is effectively attempting to
establish his authority in the place of the legitimate
authority of the Iraqi government and the coalition, and
- as I said yesterday - we will not tolerate it."
In a sermon last week, Muqtada mentioned attacks
by what he called "the occupiers" and told his followers
to "be on the utmost readiness and strike them where you
meet them". He also called for his followers to end
their protests, saying they were futile, but he also
called on them to "terrorize the enemy".
In the
US, President George W Bush vowed to arrest Muqtada. "We
just can't let [the violence] stand," Bush said on
Monday. Bush added that he would not retreat from
Baghdad, but a new opinion poll as he campaigns for
re-election in November showed support among US voters
for his handling of Iraq had fallen to a new low of 40
percent - down 19 points since mid-January.
Muqtada, backed by armed followers, has taken
refuge in Iraq's holiest shrine, the Imam Ali mosque in
Najaf, south of Baghdad, according to some reports.
US authorities said that an Iraqi investigating
judge issued an arrest warrant for Muqtada several
months ago in connection with the killing of another
Shi'ite cleric in April last year, Ayatollah Abdel Majid
al-Khoei.
There is nothing new, though, in
Muqtada's anti-US statements, writes RFE/RL. Over the
past year, he has appealed to Iraq's impoverished and
uneducated Shi'ites with a fierce anti-occupation
message. But violence had, until now, been relatively
infrequent.
The current tensions were triggered
by Bremer's decision to close Muqtada's newspaper,
al-Hawza, on March 28. Bremer ordered the paper shut for
60 days because of what he said were its incitements to
violence. The coalition last week also arrested one of
Muqtada's top aides, Mustafa al-Yaqubi, in connection
with the murder of a moderate Shi'ite cleric last April.
Muqtada - who is believed to be around 30 years
old - comes from a powerful clerical dynasty. He is the
son of Grand Ayatollah Muhammad al-Sadr, who was killed
in 1999 by agents presumed to be working for
then-president Saddam Hussein, thus becoming one of the
major symbols of Shi'ite resistance to the former
regime.
Larbi Sadiki, a lecturer on Middle East
politics at Exeter University in Britain, said Muqtada
is a populist who has managed to successfully exploit
growing discontent among the Shi'ite. However, Sadiki
said Muqtada is too young and inexperienced to be a
serious leader and that the hierarchy of Shi'ites'
spiritual leaders in Iraq still support the country's
leading cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani.
Al-Sistani has reportedly appealed for calm
after the weekend violence.
"[Muqtada's
influence] is not really so wide as the power base and
followers of Sistani," Sadiki said. "Sistani is unique.
Sistani is like the equivalent of [Iran's Ayatollah]
Khomeini, really, in Iraq."
Sadiki said that if
Sistani had called for rebellion, the situation in Iraq
would be much worse than it is now. "One word from
Sistani and I think really the whole thing will go up in
smoke. There is no doubt about that," Sadiki said. "If
it was Sistani - that's the question you should be
asking. If it was Sistani who ordered basically a
complete rebellion or public disobedience, I think it
would be full-on conflict, full-on war."
But
Sadiki added that Muqtada nevertheless should not be
underestimated. "[Muqtada] al-Sadr comes from a family
of learned scholars. [His father] was killed, as you
know. He's a got a tribal, clan base, which is probably
powerful," Sadiki said.
Last autumn, Muqtada
created his militia, the Mahdi Army, to fight immorality
in Iraq and so-called "alien ideology". At the time, he
pledged that the militia would take not take up arms
against occupying US troops, saying its aim was to
maintain peace and security.
Muqtada also had
made no effort to hide his contempt for the 25-member
Iraqi Governing Council, whose members - including a
representative from the Supreme Council for the Islamic
Revolution in Iraq, the best-organized Shi'ite party -
were chosen by the United States.
Muhammad Abdel
Jabar, a spokesman for the newly established Democratic
Islamist Movement, a Shi'ite political party, said
Muqtada's popularity is directly related to the US
failure to maintain law and order in the country
following the invasion. He said Iraqis are tired of
electricity shortages and the lack of security.
According to a Power and Interest News Report
(PINR) drafted by Erich Marquardt, Muqtada's reaction to
the US-led occupation highlights the divisions in the
Shi'ite community's ranks. Muqtada and Sistani are at
odds over how best to achieve the interests of Iraq's
Shi'ites. Sistani believes that the US may be successful
in its quest to foster stability in Iraq, and he wants
to be on good terms with Washington if and when this
development occurs. By doing so, he will ensure that the
Shi'ite community has a significant power wielding role
in the new Iraqi government.
Because Washington
is publicly calling for democracy in Iraq, Sistani is
aiming to make sure the US lives up to its word; after
all, since the Shi'ite population makes up some 60
percent of the country, democracy would mean that they
would have a huge influence in all political decisions,
and they would not have to shed any blood to achieve it
since the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) would do
all of the grunt work.
Plus, Sistani knows that
if the US fails in this objective, he can still rally
his followers to forcefully achieve control in the
country. His present path considers all of these options
and does not burn any bridges in Washington.
Muqtada, on the other hand, according to
Marquardt of PINR, is skipping the first part of
Sistani's strategy and is calling for immediate open
confrontation. Muqtada believes that the Shi'ite
community needs to flex its might and demonstrate its
power to the US. Furthermore, Muqtada holds nowhere near
the level of respect and authority that Sistani does; by
becoming the fiery leader of open resistance to the CPA,
Muqtada is hoping to boost his reputation in the eyes of
many Iraqis.
The future of Iraq is looking to be
quite tumultuous. The guerrilla conflict raging in the
Sunni Arab areas of the country has shown no sign of
abating, and now Muqtada is threatening to pull at least
part of the Shi'ite community into open confrontation
with the CPA. If Muqtada is successful, all eyes will be
on Sistani to see whether he endorses Muqtadar's
strategy. Sistani will have difficulty saying no since
hatred against the US is a popular rallying cry in Iraq.
If Sistani endorses Muqtada, then the past 12 months of
the occupation will look awfully peaceful compared to
what is still to come, Marquardt believes.
