Washington's ultimate success in creating a
stable Iraq completely hinges on its ability to create
viable Iraqi security forces capable of handling all of
the security tasks currently being undertaken by US-led
forces. While the United States is presently taking the
majority role in attempts to bring security to Iraq, it
will be able to fulfill this role at its present
intensity for only so long. Washington does not have the
funds, troop reserves, or domestic support to sustain a
permanent occupation with troops numbering in the tens
of thousands and coming under consistent guerrilla
attack. Washington will have to replace the bulk of its
troops with indigenous Iraqi security forces, or else
risk the chance of having to end the occupation of Iraq
on terms not in synch with US regional interests.
This is not the first time in the history of US
foreign policy that it has faced the difficult task of
creating indigenous security forces in the midst of an
ongoing guerrilla struggle. Back during Washington's
involvement in the Vietnam conflict, spanning from the
1950s to the 1970s, subsequent presidential
administrations realized that their ultimate success in
creating a stable South Vietnam generally in line with
US interests depended on their ability to create
indigenous Vietnamese security forces capable of
quelling the Vietnamese nationalist and communist
insurgency.
Washington never managed to achieve
its aims in Vietnam, and was finally forced out of the
country when Vietnamese guerrillas and North Vietnamese
regulars overran the South and established military and
political control over Saigon two years after the
departure of US troops. There were a multitude of
reasons why Washington failed in its objectives in
Vietnam, but a central one was the fact that the US was
never able to create viable Vietnamese security forces
that were not corrupt or ineffective. Instead, US
policymakers consistently had to deal with a Vietnamese
security apparatus that often stole from Vietnamese
peasants, or performed poorly in combat against
nationalist and communist insurgents in addition to the
North Vietnamese Army.
In Iraq, Washington faces
a similar predicament. Thus far, the indigenous Iraqi
security forces trained by the US have been both corrupt
and ineffective. For instance, much of the equipment
supplied to the new Iraqi security forces has fallen
into the hands of Iraqi insurgents, and it is believed
by Pentagon officials that various individuals in the
Iraqi security forces reveal critical and sensitive
information to the guerrillas.
The US has
trained and fielded more than 200,000 Iraqi security
forces serving in police, border patrol and site
protection. But the process of setting up the armed
forces has been fraught with problems. Most members of
the first Iraqi battalion formed quit within weeks
because of dissatisfaction over pay and conditions.
And the newly trained Iraqi security forces have
also been quite ineffective, which was brutally evident
during the recent Shi'ite uprising throughout central
and southern Iraq. According to Major General Martin
Dempsey, the commander of the US 1st Armored Division,
who recently spoke with Associated Press reporters,
during the Shi'ite uprising and violence in Fallujah, 10
percent of Iraq's security forces "actually worked
against" US troops, implying that some of this 10
percent took up arms against the US-led coalition.
Indeed, during the uprising, many insurgents
were seen still wearing US-issued uniforms, and using
US-issued military equipment to fight against US-led
troops. As one lieutenant of the Iraqi Civil Defense
Corps told the New York Times: "We may work for the
government now. But if anything happens, we all work for
[Muqtada al-]Sadr." Muqtada is the Shi'ite leader who
called on his private militia, the Mahdi Army, to
forcefully resist US governance.
Just as
concerning, Dempsey said that an additional 40 percent
of Iraq's security forces simply quit due to either fear
or out of an unwillingness to fight fellow Iraqis under
the orders of the US government. Dempsey said: "It's
very difficult to convince [Iraqi security forces] that
Iraqis are killing fellow Iraqis and fellow Muslims,
because it's something they shouldn't have to accept.
Over time I think they will probably have to accept it."
If Washington has any hopes of creating a stable
Iraq, then Dempsey's words must not go unheeded and
Iraq's security forces will "have to accept" standing
with the US in fighting against the present insurgency.
One way to accomplish this may be reincorporating former
Ba'athist leaders who have knowledge and experience in
running Iraq's military services, despite their history
of repression over much of the Iraqi populace. While
such a decision may be scorned on by ideological
thinkers inside the current Bush administration,
considering the lack of options on the ground in Iraq,
this option may be one that has to be pursued.
Administration officials have recognized this,
and there are now attempts to bring back former members
of Ba'athist leader Saddam Hussein's military
establishment. In the same interview, Dempsey
articulated this policy shift, stating that "part of me
says our jobs may have been easier had we just found a
way to keep some of the Ba'ath Party in place". Other US
military commanders have made similar statements, such
as Major General John Batiste and Brigadier General
Carter Ham.
US Central Command General John
Abizaid made parallel comments in the early days after
the start of the Shi'ite uprising, announcing: "It's
also very clear that we've got to get more senior Iraqis
involved - former military types involved in the
security forces." He continued: "In the next couple of
days, you'll see a large number of senior officers being
appointed to key positions in the Ministry of Defense
and the Iraqi joint staff and in Iraqi field commands."
And US Army Brigadier General Mark Kimmitt said:
"Sooner or later, there would come a time when we need
senior officers, and there are many senior officers
remaining from this country who can meet all the
criteria established in the 'de-Ba'athification' policy
and still have a significant contribution to offer the
nation of Iraq in the defense structure."
In the
end, however, even if Washington is able to create
effective Iraqi security forces, the stability of Iraq
will largely depend on how well Washington can isolate
the insurgents from the rest of the population. As in
all guerrilla conflicts, in order to destroy an
insurgency, the occupying power must discredit it in the
eyes of its own people. Failure to do this will mean
that the insurgency can only be destroyed by
overwhelming force at such a level that is often
considered politically unacceptable by the occupying
power's domestic population. In the case of Iraq, if
Washington fails to isolate the insurgents, it is highly
unlikely that the American people would support their
government in its attempts to destroy the insurgency
using the level of force that will be required.
In the meantime, a senior US defense official
said this week that the total US force in Iraq was
likely to remain at more than 130,000 for another three
months - well after the scheduled June 30 handover of
sovereignty.
Published with permission of
thePower and Interest News Report,
an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide
insight into various conflicts, regions and points of
interest around the globe. All comments should be
directed to content@pinr.com
