Iran: Invisible hands guide military
ambitions By Safa Haeri
PARIS
- This month the Iranian army occupied the new Imam
Khomeini International Airport (IKIA) hours after it had
been officially inaugurated with pomp and due ceremony,
closing runways with tanks and other military vehicles
while a Russian-made MiG-29 and an aging US-made Phantom
F-4 escorted an Iran Air flight to Esfahan airport in
central Iran, a move that signals the winds of change
may again be blowing in the Islamic Republic.
In
a sibylline communique, the armed forces justified the
unprecedented operation under unspecified "security
problems". But as outcry and outrage mounted,
particularly in the reformist camp of the leadership,
claiming that the operation was tantamount to a coup in
a banana republic, the army explained that having some
services of the newly built - but not completed -
airport handled by foreigners was against the security
of the nation, referring to the contract awarded by the
Iranian authorities to a Turkish-Austrian consortium for
the handling of baggage, catering of the planes and
restaurants, cafes, shops and other services in all of
the airport's terminals. (According to some press
reports, Turkey angrily protested to the Islamic
Republic over the expulsion of some 80 Turkish employees
of the IKIA.)
Unable to explain the operation
fully, the military informed the public that it had
acted upon a decision made earlier by the Supreme
Council on National Security (SCNS) urging the
responsible authorities to review the security issues
and handling of the services at the IKIA.
Before
going further, it should be brought to light that Iran
is perhaps the only country in the world that has two
separate armies, both with their own land, air and naval
forces. The regular army is made up of conscripts who
are dedicated and limited to the defense of the nation.
The Army Guardian of the Islamic Revolution, or the
Revolutionary Guard, is better paid and equipped with
more modern armaments than the regular army, and is in
charge of the interior security, fighting insurgencies,
counter-revolutionaries and doing other "dirty jobs".
Though each of the above-mentioned forces has
its own chain of command and joint chiefs of staff, all
of the armed forces, including the police and the
gendarmerie, are under the supreme command of Ayatollah
Ali Khamenei, the supreme leader of the Islamic
Republic, and his deputy, the secretive Major-General
Hasan Firoozabadi, as well as a Supreme Joint Chiefs of
Staff made up of officers of both the regular army and
the Revolutionary Guard.
It is interesting to
note that in this peculiar case, while the Supreme Joint
Chiefs of Staff issued the statements about the airport
operation, the Revolutionary Guard carried it out,
raising several questions, some of them carrying
strategic consequences for the future of the Iranian
theocracy and, above all, the possibility of seeing the
militaries playing a more important role in the
governance of the country, thereby militarizing the
regime.
If there is one thing that all Iranian
observers agree upon, it is that the event that has
"dishonored" the Iranians was not a simple affair of
confrontation between the ruling conservatives and the
defeated reformists. According to the reformists, the
unthinkable operation was instigated by the
conservatives to discredit further the embattled
reformist President Mohammad Khatami, viewed as a
sellout for his inability to take a stand during this
year's election debacle in which the hardline ruling
Guardian Council disqualified thousands of largely
reformist candidates from running in the February
parliamentary elections. The outgoing reformist majority
parliament ends its term next month.
They also
claim that the hardliners sent in the Revolutionary
Guard to shut down the new international airport to
prevent the government from taking all the advantages of
inaugurating the only major project accomplished by the
regime, even if the construction of IKIA, 50 kilometers
south of the capital Tehran, was started under the
previous regime, with construction lasting more than 30
years and still expected to take another four years to
reach full capacity.
To many Iranian political
analysts, these arguments explaining the shutting of the
airport that bears the name of the leader of the Islamic
Revolution and the founding father of the Islamic
Republic by the military does not hold ground, for the
simple reason that although badly lamed, Khatami has
another year to go before the end of his second and last
mandate. Besides, he and the reformists are so badly
discredited there is no need for the conservatives to
make them even more unpopular with the population.
If the army is correct in pretending that it
acted upon the decision of the SCNS, the immediate
question is how Khatami, who is the nominal chairman of
the regime's highest authority on security issues, did
not know it would take place, given that he had ordered
the official opening of IKIA.
The other question
is, if the army was really carrying out the operation in
the name of security, national pride and the handling of
services in the new airport by non-Iranians, why did it
not inform its high command, particularly Khamenei,
calling on him to order the government to revise the
contract, instead of sending in troops and jet fighters
to shut the airport?
Some observers say the
event points to an "economic factor" related to the
regime's financial oligarchy, controlled by the powerful
and influential League of Islamic Associations (LIA),
the shadowy organization that, from behind the scenes,
pulls the strings of the Iranian powerhouse.
In
fact, the LIA provides the ruling Guardian Council with
its main popular basis: it feeds the poor, gives them
housing, helps marriages and controls hundreds of loans
and, in response, fills the Friday prayers and other
conservative meetings and demonstrations with people.
The LIA then benefits from the state's largess, which
reciprocates by giving it lucrative contracts to
companies or individuals close to the LIA.
"Some
observers suspect an economic motive is behind the
Revolutionary Guard's action in the airport row. When
Turkish consortium TAV won the tender to operate the
airport, the losing bidder was reportedly a company with
close ties to the Revolutionary Guard," Kamal Nazer
Yasin (the pseudonym of a journalist specializing in
Iranian affairs) said in an article published by the
EurasiaNet website on the Revolutionary Guard's growing
role in Iranian politics.
Prior to taking on a
higher political profile, the Revolutionary Guard
established itself as an economic force in the country,
launching a vast array of financial and economic
enterprises. In large part, the businesses were seen as
needed to finance Revolutionary Guard security programs.
At the same time, the ventures were intended to build
the Guard's independence. In this, Guard commanders
sought to mimic their military counterparts in Pakistan
and Turkey. In both those countries, the army acts as
far more than an instrument to protect national
interests: they both play high-profile political roles
and often define what the respective nations' security
interests are, Yasin added.
"Khamenei has no
power outside the IAP and the bazaar, for they control
both the regime's economy and its popular base. They are
for the regime what the SS were to Nazi Germany. They
paid for the Islamic Revolution. Even [the late
ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini himself would not dare to
oppose them," Dr Mehdi Mozzaffari, a professor of
international politics at Copenhagen University, told
Asia Times Online.
But who initiated the
intervention of the armed forces into the affairs of the
reformist-controlled government, the first in the
25-year history of the Islamic Republic? Was it
Khamenei, as it should be, or his immediate deputy,
Firoozabadi, or the commander of the Revolutionary
Guard, General Yahya Rahim-Safavi, bypassing the higher
authorities?
It is a fact that the unprecedented
operation happened at a time when more and more military
members, particularly officers of the Revolutionary
Guard, are present in the regime's vital organs, with
many of them elected to the coming seventh majlis
(parliament), sitting at the sensitive Radio and
Television Organization or controlling the Tehran
municipality.
"Thus, when the new parliament
convenes later in May, about one dozen legislators will
be under the effective control of the Revolutionary
Guard. Political observers note that this is the first
time in the Islamic Republic's 25-year history that the
guards have had such a parliamentary presence," said
Yasin.
In a statement issued three days after
the surprise closure of the IKIA, the Transport and
Roads Ministry said the government would seek the
prosecution of all those responsible for the operation.
But pundits immediately said they doubt the judiciary,
which is controlled by the supreme leader, would order
the trial of Khamenei, who, as the leader of the regime,
is considered the representative of God on Earth and
placed above all laws or General Rahim-Safavi, "unless
this one had acted alone, in order to test the reaction
of the ruling authorities", commented Mas'oud Behnoud, a
veteran Iranian journalist based in London.
"Unless one thinks of a third player, someone
like the mysterious Admiral Ali Shamkhani, the defense
minister," said Mozzaffari.
In fact, among all
the regime's officials, Shamkhani is in a unique
position in that he has good relations with all the
parties in the country's establishment. As a former
commander of the Revolutionary Guard Navy before
becoming defense minister, Shamkhani also is favored by
the commanders of both the regular army and the
Revolutionary Guard. At the same time, conservatives and
reformists alike trust him.
"Shamkhani is
powerful enough to have signed recently single-handed a
defense pact with [Syrian President] Beshar Assad,
guaranteeing the security of Syria's integrity while, by
always taking side with other Arabs over the issue of
the three Iranian islands in the Persian Gulf [claimed
by the United Arab Emirates], Damascus is acting against
Iranian territorial integrity and sovereignty,"
Mozzaffari observed.
People around Shamkhani not
only confirm this view, but also add that by running in
the last presidential elections, the defense minister
gave himself a stature above ordinary ministers or army
commanders. "He sees himself as an Iranian Gaddafi," one
journalist who has worked closely with Shamkhani told
Asia Times Online on condition of anonymity, referring
to Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi.
To investigate
the responsibilities, the majlis has already
created a special team comprising members of the
National Security and Foreign Relations Committee, but
observers doubt this will lead to any convincing result,
explaining the real reasons behind the surprise
operation.
"Though I can't believe that
Firoozabadi, the deputy commander of all armed forces,
or Rahim-Safavi, the commander of the Revolutionary
Guard, would take such a brazen decision as confronting
the government of Khatami without authorization from
Khamenei, however, Shamkhani is the only one who could
have taken such a risk, banking on the growing impotency
of the present government and the collapse of the
reformists on the one hand and the privileged position
he enjoys on the other," the journalist added. So far,
there has been no word from Khamenei and no convincing
explanations from the armed forces.
Whatever the
reasons for the military to have interfered in the
government's affairs, it points to sectors in the
Revolutionary Guard, backed by hardline ayatollahs
looking to pave the way for possible militarization of
the regime at a time that the international community,
led by the United States, is seriously concerned about
Iran's nuclear programs.
An important indicator
of the Revolutionary Guard's future in politics should
come next year, when the unelected Guardian Council will
vet a candidate for the presidential election. If the
candidate favored by the guards - current Tehran Mayor
Mahmoud Ahmadi Nezhad - is allowed to run in the
election, many observers will take it as a sign of
conservative acceptance of a Revolutionary Guard role in
politics.
It is interesting to note that Nezhad
is a close friend of Ezzatollah Zarqami, one of the
Islamist students who stormed the US Embassy on November
4, 1979, taking 55 US diplomats and staff as hostages
for 444 days, who joined the Revolutionary Guard and was
appointed a few days ago as the new head of the Iranian
Radio and Television Organization, which is controlled
directly by Ayatollah Khamenei and is a strategic
stronghold for the ruling conservatives.
Both
men, as well as Qolamali Haddad Adel, a close relative
of Khamenei tipped to become the Speaker of the seventh
majlis that starts this week - and the first
non-turbaned man taking this important position - are
the prototypes of the new generation of Iranian
neo-conservatives, though less ideologically motivated
and weaker, but more in line with the fundamentalists of
the Islamic Revolution and above all dedicated to the
concept of velayate motlaqeh faqih, or the
absolute rule of the leader, the cornerstone of the
Iranian ruling theocracy.
"Given the opaque
nature of Iran's political system, it is difficult to
determine the attitude of the country's conservative
religious hierarchy towards the Guard's rising political
profile," said EurasiaNet. "Some observers suggest the
Guard's efforts to become more politically active are
simply a reflection of changing geopolitical conditions
that have rewritten the rules governing domestic Iranian
politics. Others believe the Revolutionary Guard
commanders may be overplaying their hand, and thus could
soon be subject to action designed to curb their
political ambitions."
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