US Army's ranks spread thin
By Erich Marquardt

Washington's recent decision to withdraw an army brigade of about 3,600 soldiers from South Korea to redeploy it in Iraq emphasizes the strain on the US military caused by the Bush administration's March 2003 decision to invade and occupy Iraq. The decision to redeploy the brigade, part of the US Army's 2nd Infantry Division, will make little tactical difference to Washington's ability to defend South Korea from a North Korean attack; nevertheless, the decision has symbolic importance since it demonstrates Washington's continued difficulty in stabilizing Iraq, in addition to highlighting the strain that the occupation is causing to US soldiers.

While it was expected that contingents of US troops would remain in Iraq for years after the US invasion was completed, it was not expected that more than 100,000 troops would be necessary for this mission. The US military, which is composed of an all-volunteer force, is not suited to handle large-scale missions for long periods of time. As US Representative John Spratt of South Carolina warned late last year: "We are pushing the envelope. We are using our troops pretty much to their maximum utility."

Indeed, US troops are spread so thin that the Pentagon announced on Wednesday that the army would expand its "stop-loss" program, meaning thousands of soldiers who planned on retiring from the military will now be forced to extend their terms of service and join their units in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan. This controversial decision raises broad implications, since it challenges present conventions of an all-volunteer military force. The army provides the vast majority of the 138,000 US troops in Iraq and the 12,000 in Afghanistan.

Criticism of the "stop-loss" program was most publicly aired in a recent edition of the New York Times, when a former army captain who recently served in Afghanistan stated: "Many, if not most, of the soldiers in this latest Iraq-bound wave are already veterans of several tours in Iraq and Afghanistan. They have honorably completed their active duty obligations. But like draftees, they have been conscripted to meet the additional needs in Iraq."

Furthermore, since US troops are being used to their "maximum utility", the Pentagon has been forced to rely on reserve and National Guard soldiers for combat missions, rather than for their traditional combat support roles. The duration and danger now involved in reserve and National Guard deployments has angered many segments of the military, since these soldiers usually have full-time civilian jobs and only perform military training one weekend a month and for two weeks in the summer. While their employers are obliged by law to take them back once they return from duty, they often find that their work opportunities suffer as a result of their extended time away. In a conflict as bloody as Iraq, the psychological damage on these soldiers can also be quite severe.

But it is the symbolism involved in Washington having to pull troops out of South Korea that has the most significance. This decision will spark many to argue that the administration of President George W Bush has made ill-fated policy choices that are causing damage to the US military establishment and also to US interests. Present conditions in Iraq mean that there will be no reduction in US troop levels there for some time; if anything, there will need to be an increase in troops. On May 19, General John Abizaid, the chief of US Central Command, warned that the United States "might need more forces" in Iraq. Such an increase would add even further strain to present US military deployments throughout the world.

The explanation for why there is such a strain on US forces lies in the Bush administration's miscalculation of how easy it would be to administer the occupation of Iraq. From the start of the invasion there were a number of similar miscalculations, such as the failure to anticipate the extensive looting that took place after the fall of Saddam Hussein, the level of support US soldiers would receive from the Iraqi population, and the ferocity and diversity of the insurgency.

What the Bush administration now faces in Iraq is far different from what it had planned for. It has been more than a year now, and the insurgency has grown in size, and its strength has not been diminished. And now, even though Iraq may achieve some level of sovereignty on June 30, US military commanders are predicting that the insurgency will likely become more deadly after that point. Abizaid recently announced: "I would predict ... that the situation will become more violent even after sovereignty because it will remain unclear what's going to happen between the interim government and elections. So moving through the election period will be violent and it could very well be more violent than we're seeing today."

Abizaid's prediction is right on the mark. The fact remains that the most difficult stages in Iraq's postwar development have yet to occur. Since the end of the US-led invasion in May 2003, Iraq's three main ethnic/religious groups - Sunni Arabs, Shi'ite Arabs and Sunni Kurds - have largely waited to see what the future political structure of the country would be. Up until recently, the three primary parties largely refrained from violence and waited to see whether their interests would be realized through the US-led coalition's policy decisions. Of course, violence did occur - most likely from former members of the military establishment and discharged Ba'athists - but, by and large, no general uprising took place until later in the occupation when some of the country's Shi'ites, led by Muqtada al-Sadr, revolted against US rule.

Therefore, because the most difficult decisions have yet to be made - involving the exact nature of Iraq's new government structure - it is uncertain how intense the level of violence will become. Once the moment of final judgment arrives, then the parties involved who disagree with the outcome will begin to resist that conclusion, most likely through violence. That may start on June 30.

If June 30 marks a new date of increased violence and chaos within Iraq, US forces are going to be hugely taxed. Not only will they face violence from at least two of Iraq's main ethnic/religious groups, but US troops could also face a nationalist uprising if Iraq's various insurgents unite together in a marriage of convenience to attack occupation forces. There has already been evidence of this in the Muqtada uprising. While such cooperation is currently limited, it could easily expand if hatred of the US continues to spread.

Published with permission of the Power and Interest News Report, an analysis-based publication that seeks to provide insight into various conflicts, regions and points of interest around the globe. All comments should be directed to content@pinr.com.